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Abstract
It is widely accepted, amongst epistemologists, that evidence plays an important role
in our epistemic life. Crucially, there is no agreement on what evidence is. Follow-
ing Silins, we can cash out the disagreement around the notion of evidence in terms
of the opposition between Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism (Silins,
2005). Evidential internalists claim that evidence supervenes on one’s non-factive
mental states, such as, beliefs, impressions (BonJour, 1999, Audi, 2001). Eviden-
tial Externalists deny that. In this Thesis, first, I contrastively assess the plausibility of
two prominent contemporary externalist theories: Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemological
Disjunctivism, the thesis on which one’s evidence in perceptual cases is truth-entailing
and reflectively accessible (Pritchard, 2012), and Timothy Williamson’s E=K, the the-
sis on which one’s evidence is all and only the propositions one knows (Williamson,
2000). Second, I develop a novel externalist account of evidence that I call Ecumenical
Evidentialism. I show how Ecumenical Evidentialism is able to bring together some
of the benefits of both Pritchard’s Disjunctivism and Williamson’s E=K. This Thesis
is structured into three sections, each of which addresses the following three questions
respectively:
• Does the Access Problem represent a real threat to Evidential Externalism?
• Is Evidential Externalism committed to a sceptical variety of Infallibilism?
• How does Evidential Externalism understand the relation between evidence and
epistemic justification?
I argue that neither Epistemological Disjunctivism nor E=K are fully satisfying Ex-
ternalist accounts of evidence. On one hand, I argue that Disjunctivism captures the
orthodox intuition on which justification is a matter of being evidence-responsive, but
it does so on pain of facing the so-called Access Problem. On the other hand, by re-
jecting any strong accessibility thesis, Williamson’s E=K is better positioned to resist
both the Access Problem as well as the Infallibility Problem, but it does not vindicate
the orthodox intuition on which justification is a matter of being evidence-responsive.
Finally, I show that, while retaining the main commitments of Williamson’s theory of
evidence, such as, E=K, my Ecumenical Evidentialism is able to capture the orthodox
responsiveness intuition about epistemic justification.
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Introduction
Evidence plays a central role in our epistemic life. Crucially, however, there is no
agreement, amongst epistemologists, on how to understand the notion of evidence.
Following Silins (2005), we can cash out the disagreement around the notion of evi-
dence in terms of Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism. Let Evidential
Internalism be the thesis on which one’s evidence supervenes on one’s non-factive
mental states (roughly put, those mental states that do not necessarily entail anything
about the external environment, e.g., beliefs, impressions, sensations). To say that
evidence supervenes on non-factive mental states amounts to saying that if there is a
change in one’s evidence, then there is a change in one’s non-factive mental states as
well. Let Evidential Externalism be the denial of Evidential Internalism.
Traditionally, epistemologists have been Evidential Internalists. For instance, great
empiricists of the twentieth century like Ayer and Russell used to embrace an account
of evidence that we can call, following Williamson’s terminology, the “phenomeno-
logical conception of evidence” (Williamson, 2000: 173).1 On this view, evidence is
reducible to sense data that the subject can be immediately conscious of (cf. Ayer,
1936). But the view is also popular amongst contemporary epistemologists.2 Audi, for
instance, seems to embrace an account of evidence on which evidence is reducible to
non-factive mental states, such as impressions, and seeming:
“[E]vidence is [. . . ] ultimately internal. It centrally involves my sensory
states, memory impressions, inferences, and the like.” (Audi, 2001: 47)
Similarly, Bonjour seems to have in mind something like Evidential Internalism
when defending his Foundationalist picture of justification (assuming justification is a
function of one’s evidence):
1For a great overview of the historical reasons and motivations behind the popularity of this phe-
nomenal conception of evidence see Kelly, 2008.
2One might be tempted to classify Conee and Feldman’s ‘mentalism’ as an instance of Evidential
Internalism. However, although they notoriously define their view as a version of epistemic internalism,
they actually do not restrict the supervenience thesis between evidence and the mental to non-factive
mental states (cf. Conee & Feldman, 2004: 57).
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“[T]he obvious and [. . . ] correct thing to say is that basic or foundational
beliefs are justified by appeal to experience.” (BonJour, 1999: 230)
Recently, however, there has been a new trend in the literature, and Evidential
Externalism has been gaining more and more consensus amongst epistemologists3.
While Evidential Internalists have claimed that whatever evidence one has is fixed
by the non-factive mental states one is in, Evidential Externalists deny that. Instead,
they maintain that features of the external environment are going to be relevant in
determining what evidence one has.
To see how Evidential Internalism differs from Evidential Externalism in some
important respect, Silins invites us to consider Gary and Barry. Gary and Barry are
“internal twins”, namely, they share all non-factive mental states. For example, they
both have an experience as of two bananas in a bowl, and they both believe that there
are two bananas in a bowl. However, Gary and Barry differ in some very important
way:
“Although Gary is now and then mistaken about some matter of fact, Barry
is a radically deceived brain in a vat, as deceived as can be given that he
has the same non-factive mental states as Gary. Gary is in the good case;
Barry is in the bad case.” (Silins, 2005: 375)
We can ask: do Gary and Barry have the same evidence? Evidential Internalists will
answer this question affirmatively. Evidential Externalists will answer this question
negatively.
While epistemologists have dedicated plenty of attention to the traditional Internalism-
Externalism debate over epistemic justification, the Evidential Internalism-Evidential
Externalism debate is still widely overlooked. And yet, there are good reasons why, as
epistemologists, we should care about this debate.
The first reason is meta-epistemological, and it concerns the fact that, as defined,
Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism are relatively neutral theses. Let me
explain. Defining a theory of evidence has never been an easy task, for there are at least
three questions that a theory of evidence has to answer: i) what is evidence?, ii) what
does it mean for one to possess evidence?, and iii) what does it mean for one’s evidence
to support one’s beliefs or hypotheses? Although Evidential Externalism and, most
of all, Evidential Internalism put a restriction on how we can answer these questions
(particularly i) and ii)), they do not restrict the answer in any specific way. That is, they
3Examples of Evidential Externalists are McDowell, 1995, Williamson, 2000, Pritchard, 2012, Lit-
tlejohn, 2012, Littlejohn, 2018b, but also Alston, 1988 and Mitova, 2015.
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do not force us to choose a specific account of evidence over the other. In this sense,
Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism, so defined, are relatively silent on
the above three important issues. Framing the debate around evidence in terms of
Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism thus provides us with a framework
that allows us to classify different theories of evidence into two broad categories: those
that embrace the supervenience thesis between evidence and non-factive mental states,
and those that reject it. This will allow for varieties of Evidential Externalist theses.
Second, it is worth emphasising that Evidential Internalism and Evidential Exter-
nalism as defined above do not entail anything about epistemic justification. As I will
show in a moment, the traditional Internalism-Externalism discussion around epis-
temic justification, and the more recent one on Evidential Internalism and Evidential
Externalism, are thus two different debates. However, as I will stress in Part III, I
think it is plausible to take Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism as two
ways in which one can embrace Evidentialism, the thesis on which justification su-
pervenes on evidence (Conee & Feldman, 2004). Once we do so, then focusing on
the Evidential Internalism-Evidential Externalism debate rather than on the more tra-
ditional Internalism-Externalism debate over epistemic justification might have some
advantages. As Silins points out (Silins, 2005: 378), “an advantage of [Evidential
Externalism] is that it does not entail reliabilist views” namely, the externalist view
on which, one is justified in believing that p only if, roughly put, one’s belief that p
is the result of some reliable belief-forming process4. The reason why Silins takes
this to be an advantage of Evidential Externalism is that it avoids many of the prob-
lems notoriously associated with Process Reliabilism, such as, the so-called Generality
Problem5. The Generality Problem is the problem of defining which type of process
is the relevant type of reliable process that matters for assessing the justificatory sta-
tus of a belief. By avoiding to talk about reliability of cognitive processes, Evidential
Externalism does not face the same problem. At the same time, however, it looks like
an Evidential Externalist can still account for the overall post-Gettier intuition that has
motivated traditional externalist views of justification, namely, the idea that there has
to be a connection between the truth of one’s belief and one’s justification for such a
belief. As noted in Fratantonio and McGlynn (Fratantonio & McGlynn, 2018: 85), we
can similarly expect Evidential Internalism to have some advantages over more tra-
4The locus classicus for Process Reliabilism is A. I. Goldman, 1979, and A. I. Goldman, 1986
5For a discussion on the Generality problem see A. I. Goldman, 1979, Feldman, 1985, and Conee &
Feldman, 1998.
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ditional versions of internalism, such as, Accessibilism. According to Accessibilism,
if S is justified in believing that p, then S has access to whatever makes S’s belief
that p justified (call it the justifier)6. What does it mean for S to have access to the
justifier of S’s belief that p? On one interpretation, it means to have knowledge by re-
flection alone of the relevant justifier (J). But if knowledge requires justification, then
this further knowledge of whatever makes S’s belief that p justified will also have to
be the result of S having access to whatever makes S’s belief that [J is the justifier of
S’s belief that p] justified, thereby leading to an infinite regress. Call this the Regress
Problem. Evidential Internalism does not entail Accessibilism, for it does not pose any
accessibility requirement. Therefore, Evidential Internalism seems to avoid some of
the problems that are notoriously associated with Accessibilism, such as, the Regress
Problem I have just described.7,8
Third, and finally, Evidential Internalism seems to play an important role in some
sceptical argument (Williamson, 2000: ch.8, Silins, 2005: 375-76). In a nutshell, the
worry seems to be that if, as Evidential Internalism entails, Gary has just the same
evidence as Barry’s, who’s radically deceived and therefore does not have knowledge,
then how can Gary have knowledge on the basis of such evidence? One might thus
want to explore whether there’s some plausible Evidential Externalist view available,
for that would mean having an account of evidence that is not vulnerable to the scepti-
cal challenge.9
Epistemological Disjunctivism and E=K as varieties of Evidential
Externalism
As the title of this Thesis suggests, my focus will be on Evidential Externalism. In
particular, I will consider two prominent contemporary varieties of Evidential Exter-
nalism, namely, Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (Pritchard, 2012)
and Timothy Williamson’s E=K (Williamson, 2000), with a particular focus given to
the latter. Before providing an overview of the chapters of this Thesis, however, let me
briefly introduce Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism and Williamson’s E=K,
6For a traditional defence of Accessibilism see Ginet, 1975 and Chisholm, 1988.
7For a recent discussion on the Regress Problem for Accessibilism see Bergmann, 2006
8For an excellent survey of the Internalism-Externalism debate about epistemic justification see Lit-
tlejohn, 2012, Ch. 1.
9In his ‘Deception and Evidence’ Silins argues that, contrary to first appearances, Evidential Ex-
ternalism does not have any strong advantage when it comes to the sceptical challenge (Silins, 2005:
395-96). I will not address this problem in this Thesis. However, see Fratantonio and McGlynn for a
response to Silins’ argument (Fratantonio & McGlynn, 2018: 97).
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and let me clarify why we can classify these theories as instances of Evidential Ex-
ternalism. By doing this, I will also be able to shed more light on what Evidential
Externalism is, what it entails, and what, instead, it is silent on.
Let us start with Duncan Pritchard’s view. In his book Epistemological Disjunc-
tivism he writes:
“In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, an agent, S, has percep-
tual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support,
R [i.e., S’s seeing that], for her belief that p which is both factive10 (i.e.,
R’s obtaining entails p) and reflectively accessible.”
(Pritchard, 2012: 13).
Epistemological Disjunctivism focuses on cases of perceptual knowledge and it
predicts that in epistemically favourable cases, one has entailing evidence for propo-
sitions concerning the external environment11. It is thus easy to see why Epistemo-
logical Disjunctivism will classify as an instance of Evidential Externalism: it will say
that Gary and Barry, despite sharing the same non-factive mental states, have differ-
ent evidence. For only Gary, who’s in the paradigmatic good case, has truth-entailing
evidence that there are two bananas in the bowl (i.e., his seeing that there are two ba-
nanas entails that there are two bananas). On Epistemological Disjunctivism, factors
concerning the external environment matter for determining what evidence one has.
In order to be an Evidential Externalist, however, one does not need to commit to
the thesis that evidence is entailing, namely, that evidence entails the proposition it is
evidence for (cf. Fratantonio & McGlynn, 2018: 85). Considering Williamson’s E=K
will help us seeing why this is so. On Williamson’s E=K, one’s evidence is constituted
by all and only the propositions one knows12. However, E=K does not entail that if
one has evidence for a proposition p, then necessarily one’s evidence entails p. All
E=K predicts is that if one knows that e, then e is part of one’s evidence and vice versa.
That is, if a proposition e is part of one’s evidence, then one knows that e and thus e
10Note that talking about ‘factive’ evidence can be confusing. For, in the literature, it often refers to
the idea that evidence is constituted of true propositions. However, when Pritchard talks about ‘factive’
rational support he refers to the idea that rational support/evidence is truth-entailing. In this Thesis I
will avoid talking about ‘factive’ evidence unless I specify what I mean by it.
11As it appears from the reported quotation, it is worth noticing that Pritchard does not formulate his
view in terms of evidence. However, I think we can have a version of Epistemological Disjunctivism in
terms of evidence.
12Notoriously, John Hyman also defends E=K, although his view differs from Williamson’s one in
various respects. In particular, his defence of E=K is grounded on a notion of knowledge as “the ability
to be guided” by evidence. I will not consider Hyman’s version of E=K in this thesis. See Hyman, 1999
and Hyman, 2006.
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is true. Of course, as I will stress in Chapter 3, one consequence of E=K is that any
proposition one knows is trivially entailed by one’s total evidence. However, it is not a
consequence of E=K that, for every proposition p, if e is evidence for p then e entails
p. It is compatible with E=K that one’s evidence e is evidence for a proposition p (e.g.,
by making p sufficiently likely) without entailing p. Nevertheless, Williamson’s E=K
is a paradigmatic instance of Evidential Externalism: it will say that Gary and Barry,
despite sharing the same non-factive mental states, have different evidence. For only
Gary, who’s in the paradigmatic good case, knows that there are two bananas in the
bowl. On E=K, how things are in the external environment matters for determining
what evidence one has.
However, Evidential Externalism is not even equivalent to the thesis on which evi-
dence is constituted by only true propositions. One can have a view on which evidence
is constituted by only true propositions and still be an Evidential Internalist. For in-
stance, one can maintain that one’s evidence is all and only true propositions about
how things appear to one. This view will not classify as an instance of Evidential
Externalism: it will say that Gary and Barry, who share the same non-factive mental
states, have the same evidence. For things will appear exactly the same to both Gary
and Barry and so the proposition that there seem to be two bananas in the bowl (and
all propositions about how things look like) will constitute both Gary’s and Barry’s
evidence. On this view, how things actually are in one’s external environment will
not matter for determining what evidence one has. But requiring one’s evidence to
be constituted by true propositions only is not even necessary for someone to be an
Evidential Externalist. Think of someone who’s sympathetic with Goldman’s reliabil-
ism (A. I. Goldman, 2009). As Fratantonio and McGlynn point out, one can defend a
theory on which one’s evidence is constituted by all and only the propositions one is
justified in believing, while saying that justification depends on the reliability of one’s
belief-forming process (2018: 85). On this view, Gary might still have some false be-
liefs amongst his evidence for believing that there are two bananas in the bowl, but he
would still end up having different evidence than Barry. For only Gary’s belief would
be the result of a reliable belief-forming process. Only Gary, given he’s in a paradig-
matic good case, would be justified in believing that there are two bananas in the bowl,
and hence, Gary’s “box of evidence” will at least include one instance of evidence that
Barry lacks: the proposition that there are two bananas in the bowl.
Finally, note that Evidential Externalism does not entail any specific account of
what evidence is made of. Once again, appealing to both Pritchard’s Epistemological
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Disjunctivism and Williamson’s E=K will help see why. On one hand, on Williamson’s
E=K, one’s evidence is constituted by all and only the propositions one knows. On the
other hand, a natural evidentialist interpretation of Pritchard’s Epistemological Dis-
junctivism takes evidence to be constituted by one’s perceptual experience.
The moral of the story is the following. By merely denying that one’s evidence su-
pervenes on one’s non-factive mental states, Evidential Externalism seems to be rela-
tively neutral on important questions concerning the nature of evidence, the evidential-
support relation, and the question of evidence possession, thereby allowing for vari-
eties of Evidential Externalist theories. As we will see in this Thesis, Epistemological
Disjunctivism and E=K provide us with very different answers to these questions, and,
nevertheless, they can both be thought of as two instances of Evidential Externalism.
Outline of the Thesis
Now that we have clarified why and to what extent Pritchard’s Disjunctivism and
Williamson’s E=K are instances of Evidential Externalism, let me briefly provide an
overview of this Thesis. This Thesis is divided into three big parts, each of which
addresses the following three questions respectively:
1. Does the so-called Access Problem represent a challenge for Evidential Exter-
nalism?
2. Is Evidential Externalism committed to some sceptical variety of Infallibilism?
3. How does Evidential Externalism understand the relation between evidence and
epistemic justification?
Part I. Evidential Externalism and The Access Problem
In Part I I consider the so-called Access Problem for Evidential Externalism. In partic-
ular, I consider the Access Problem as it arises for Williamson’s E=K and Pritchard’s
Epistemological Disjunctivism in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 respectively. I argue that,
while the Access Problem represents a real challenge for Pritchard’s Epistemological
Disjunctivism, it does not constitute a serious threat to Williamson’s E=K.
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Part II. Evidential Externalism and The Infallibility Problem
In Part II I evaluate whether Evidential Externalism entails some sceptical form of
Infallibilism. I refer to this as The Infallibility Problem. More precisely, I evalu-
ate whether Evidential Externalism is committed to some form of infallibilism that is
nevertheless compatible with the plausible thesis that almost all our beliefs are under-
determined by our evidence. My focus in Part II will be mainly on Williamson’s E=K.
This is because, as I explain in the Introduction of Part II, even if Pritchard’s Epistemo-
logical Disjunctivism is committed to some version of infallibilism, this will not have
any important sceptical implications insofar as his view is restricted to paradigmatic
cases of perceptual knowledge. Williamson’s E=K, instead, is not restricted to cases
of perceptual knowledge, so here we should take the Infallibility Problem seriously.
Fortunately for the defender of E=K, I believe there is nothing to worry about. By de-
veloping varieties of Infallibilism and Underdetermination Theses, I argue, in Chapter
3, that The Infallibility Problem does not represent a threat for E=K.
Part III Evidential Externalism and Epistemic Justification
In Part III I evaluate how Evidential Externalism understands the relation between evi-
dence and justification. As I mentioned above, Evidential Externalism is silent on what
we should say about epistemic justification. However, it is plausible to take Evidential
Externalism as one way of embracing Evidentialism, roughly put, the thesis that takes
one’s justification to be a function of one’s evidence. If Epistemological Disjunctivism
and E=K represent two different ways of being an Evidential Externalist, then, as-
suming Evidentialism, we should expect these views to provide us with two different
ways in which one can be an Evidentialist in an externalist way. Pritchard’s Epistemo-
logical Disjunctivism exemplifies what I call Evidence-first Evidentialism, while E=K
underpins what I call Knowledge-first Evidentialism. In Chapter 4, first I shed light on
what Evidence-first and Knowledge-first Evidentialism amount to, and I clarify to what
extent these views are different. Second, I define a novel externalist variety of Eviden-
tialism, what I call Ecumenical Evidentialism. I show that, while being an instance of
Evidential Externalism, my Ecumenical Evidentialism brings together (what I take to
be) the best features of both Evidence-first and Knowledge-first Evidentialism.
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Conclusion
The main conclusion of the Thesis is the following: neither Williamson’s account
of evidence and justification, nor Epistemological Disjunctivism are fully satisfying.
However, Ecumenical Evidentialism seems to provide us with a novel promising way
of being an Evidential Externalist.
A Methodological Remark
Before diving into Chapter 1, I want to make a methodological remark concerning the
target object of this Thesis. As I mentioned above, most of my attention will be de-
voted to Williamson’s E=K. However, it is important to note that Williamson’s E=K is
to be conceived as part of his broader “Knowledge-first” project. While traditionally
epistemologists have been concerned with an analytic program of defining knowledge
in terms of more basic components, e.g., justification, belief, and truth, Williamson’s
Knowledge-first Epistemology notoriously rejects this project, while taking knowl-
edge to be a more fundamental and unanalysable notion. Part of the motivation behind
this Knowledge-first shift in the debate derives from the impasse that the epistemo-
logical discussion seems to have reached after Gettier’s famous paper (Gettier, 1963),
(allegedly) showing that justification, truth, and belief are notion jointly sufficient con-
ditions for knowledge. In particular, Gettier’s examples aim to show that one can have
justified true belief by luck, and yet, luck seems to be incompatible with the attainment
of knowledge. Since 1963, much of the post-Gettier literature has thus been concerned
with fixing the traditional tripartite account of knowledge as justified true belief in a
way that resists the problem raised by Gettier. Some epistemologists have added a
fourth condition, others have opted for a different notion of justification than the one
underlying the traditional tripartite account, others have just dropped the justification
condition. Unfortunately, sooner or later, any new account that has been suggested
had to face objections and counterexamples. In a sense, Knowledge-first Epistemol-
ogy, despite being extremely controversial, seems to offer a way out of the impasse,
by rejecting the analytic project altogether and its assumption that knowledge is to be
factorised into more basic components. Instead, it reverses the order of explanation
and it uses the notion of knowledge to define and understand other epistemic notions,
e.g., belief, justification, assertion, action, as well as evidence.13 The Knowledge-first
project thus has a wide application. Therefore, the following disclaimers are in order.
13For a great critical analysis of the Knowledge-first Project see McGlynn (2014).
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• In Part I and Part II of this Thesis, my focus will be almost exclusively on
Williamson’s Knowledge-first account of evidence. I will make some brief re-
marks about the general Knowledge-first picture in Part III, when discussing how
it is possible to be Knowledge-first and embrace Evidentialism about epistemic
justification.
• The chapters that follow do not require any previous familiarity with Williamson’s
Knowledge-first Epistemology.
• This thesis does not aim to provide an overarching assessment of all the objec-
tions that have been raised against Evidential Externalism. Instead, it is meant
to provide an assessment of two of the most prominent contemporary Eviden-
tial Externalist theories with respect to how they relate to a cluster of problems
and topics that have traditionally been relevant in the epistemological discussion:
the nature of reflective knowledge, the problem of infallible knowledge, and the
nature of epistemic justification.
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Part I
Evidential Externalism and The
Access Problem
15

Introduction
As I have pointed out in the Introduction of this Thesis, there are different varieties
of Evidential Externalism. However, there is one thing every version of Evidential
Externalism agrees on. That is, by denying that evidence supervenes on non-factive
mental states, every Evidential Externalist theory will claim that what evidence one
has depends on features of the external environment. Here’s one worry one might
have. Assume that if Evidential Externalism is true, we can know by reflection that
Evidential Externalism is true. Given that it is plausible to also assume that we can
have reflective knowledge of the evidence we have, and given that if Evidential Exter-
nalism is true, then our evidence is sensitive to the external environment, then it seems
we can come to know by reflection and deductive reasoning alone features about the
external environment. Crucially, these kinds of “worldly” propositions do not seem to
be something we can know by reflection alone! Call this the Access Problem. In Part I,
I consider the Access Problem for Evidential Externalism.
Part I is constituted of two Chapters, and an overall Conclusion. I first consider the
Access Problem for E=K in Chapter 1. I then address a very similar Access Problem
that arises for Epistemological Disjunctivism in Chapter 2. Given that, as mentioned
above, Epistemological Disjunctivism and E=K are very different varieties of Eviden-
tial Externalism, the Access Problems that seem to threaten these views will be slightly
different. Therefore, in each Chapter, I will clarify the specific kind of Access Problem
that each view seems to face. The Conclusion of Part I shows the overall lesson that
we can draw in the light of what I argue in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2: while the Access
Problem represents a challenge for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism, it does
not constitute a serious threat to Williamson’s E=K.
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Chapter 1
The Access Problem for E=K
1.1 Introduction
In his Deception and Evidence, Silins claims that there is an argument showing that
“Evidential Externalism is false because it has unacceptable consequences about what
one knows from the armchair” (Silins, 2005: 380). More precisely, Silins’ target is a
specific variety of Evidential Externalism, namely, Timothy Williamson’s E=K, which
equates one’s evidence to one’s knowledge (Williamson, 2000). Following Silins, I
will here focus on Williamson’s E=K. I will go back to assess the Access Problem for
Epistemological Disjunctivism in the next Chapter.
Silins’ argument aims to show that, given a (allegedly) plausible thesis about what
we can know from the armchair, E=K leads to the unacceptable conclusion that we
can have armchair knowledge of specific empirical propositions. Call this The Access
Problem1. In this Chapter, I argue that Silins’ Access Problem does not represent a
challenge for Williamson’s E=K, for it relies on an account of armchair knowledge
that Williamson should reject. First, I reconstruct Silins’ argument (Section 1.2), and
I shed light on the nature of its main assumption (Section 1.3). Second, I develop two
lines of response, both of which put pressure on Silins’ Armchair Access thesis. While
the first response focuses on the scope of the thesis (Section 1.4), the second response
focuses on its nature (Section 1.5). The second line of response is the most interest-
ing one. This is because it represents the framework within which I develop a novel
account of second-order knowledge through imagination. After resisting a possible
objection to my argument (Section 1.6), I point out that these two lines of response
are mutually supportive and jointly compatible. I thus conclude that the Access Prob-
1Silins actually calls this problem the ‘Armchair Access Problem’.
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lem does not represent a threat for Williamson’s variety of Evidential Externalism, i.e.,
E=K (Section 1.7).
1.2 The Access Problem
The variety of access argument that represents the focus of this Chapter is one which
does not rest on the following Luminosity thesis:
[Luminosity]: For any proposition p, if one is suitably alert and conceptu-
ally sophisticated, then one is in a position to know whether or not one’s
evidence includes p. (Silins, 2005: 380)
The Access Problem I will address here is one that arises even if we accept Williamson’s
thesis that evidence is not a luminous condition (Williamson, 2000: ch. 4). That is,
even if we grant that it is not the case that if E is part of one’s evidence, then one is
always in a position to know that E is part of one’s evidence. Silins is well aware of
Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument 2. In fact, he explicitly takes his Access Prob-
lem to be a “novel access argument which uses a very different thesis, one which is
not touched by Williamson’s argument against [luminosity]” (Silins, 2005: 380). As
Silins points out, while the luminosity thesis represents a very strong claim about what
one can have access to, this novel argument relies, as we will see shortly, on a weaker
and more plausible claim, one which is compatible with the limited nature of one’s
knowledge of one’s evidence. Let us now see how the argument goes.
Let us imagine an agent, Gary, who is in a room staring at a dial. Gary sees that
the dial reads 0.4. Let us assume Gary is in a perceptually good case3. By seeing that
the dial reads 0.4, he thereby comes to know that the dial reads 0.4. Crucially, if E=K
is true, then the proposition that the dial reads 0.4 belongs to Gary’s evidence. Let us
now assume that Gary considers what evidence he has. The Access Problem against
E=K runs – schematically – as follows:
1. Gary has armchair knowledge that his evidence includes the proposition that the
dial reads 0.4.
2The target of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument, as presented in Knowledge and Its Limits, is
all non-trivial conditions, where a condition is trivial when either it always obtains, or it never does.
However, I will here narrow my focus on the non-trivial conditions of knowledge and evidence.
3I take a perceptually good case to be a paradigmatic good case in which the subject S has a veridical
experience, her perceptual capacities are reliable and fully functioning, no luck is involved, etc. That is,
one in which S obtains perceptual knowledge.
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2. Gary has armchair knowledge that, if his evidence includes the proposition that
the dial reads 0.4, then the dial reads 0.4.
3. Therefore, Gary is in a position to have armchair knowledge that the dial reads
0.4
(Silins, 2005: 382).
The foregoing argument is grounded on the following thesis about what we can
know from the armchair:
(Armchair Access): It is sometimes the case that: one’s evidence includes
some proposition E, and one knows from the armchair that one’s evidence
includes E. (Silins, 2005: 381-2)
In a nutshell, Silins’ argument is that, given that it is sometimes possible to know,
merely from the armchair, that a proposition p is part of our evidence, then, given
factivity of evidence and a plausible closure principle for armchair knowledge, we
can competently deduce, and thereby know, what this propositional evidence entails.
Given E=K, if p is part of my evidence, then I know that p. Therefore, assuming
factivity of knowledge, if p is part of my evidence, then p is true. It follows that if
I can know from the armchair that a proposition p is part of my evidence, then I can
competently deduce, thereby coming to know merely from the armchair, that p is true4.
But, Silins says, although “Gary can know what the dial reads, he cannot know such a
proposition through armchair reflection” (Silins, 2005: 382). It is worth noticing that
Silins develops this argument as a parallel to the more notorious McKinsey Paradox,
concerning the incompatibility between Privileged Access and Semantic Externalism
(McKinsey, 1991). More precisely, in his [1991] McKinsey argues that the following
three claims are jointly incompatible, assuming reflective knowledge is closed under
entailment5:
(Content Externalism) The content of our thoughts is determined by fac-
tors external to the agent.
(Privileged Access) It is possible to have reflective knowledge6 of one’s
own mental content.
4Note that not only is the thesis that if p is part of your evidence then p is true can be easily derived
from E=K and factivity of knowledge, but a priori philosophical arguments have also been provided in
favour of this thesis. (see Littlejohn, 2012: ch. 3)
5A similar argument is also offered by Boghossian (Boghossian, 1998).
6Terminology is not very helpful here, for there are various notions used in this debate: a priori,
reflective, and armchair knowledge. It is worth pointing out that McKinsey does not talk about reflective
knowledge: he talks about a priori knowledge of one’s mental content. However, the notion of a priori
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(Knowledge of External World) It is not possible to have reflective knowl-
edge of the external world.
If Content Externalism and Privileged Access Thesis are both true, then, given a
plausible closure principle for reflective knowledge, and assuming that it is possible
to have reflective knowledge of Content Externalism, it follows that one could come
to know, merely by reflection and deductive reasoning alone, that a certain empirical
proposition is true. Crucially, this contradicts Knowledge of External World, which is
taken to be indisputably true7. Let RK stand for the epistemic operator for reflective
knowledge. From Content Externalism, Privileged Access, and a plausible closure
principle for reflective knowledge we can thus get the following notorious McKinsey
argument8:
(PR1) RK [I have the concept ‘water’]
(PR2) RK [If I have the concept ‘water’, then water exists]
(CONC) RK [water exists]
Again, (CONC) looks problematic, for the existence of water seems to be some-
thing we can know only empirically9.
In what follows, I argue that Silins’ argument does not undermine Williamson’s
E=K. In order to do so, first, I evaluate and shed light on Silins’ notion of armchair
knowledge as underlying the Armchair Access thesis. Second, I argue that Gary’s
knowledge of his evidence does not constitute an instance of armchair knowledge as
defined by Silins.
knowledge in McKinsey’s papers (and, more in general, in the post-McKinsey literature) is thought of as
including introspection (contrary to what happens in the a priori/a posteriori debate, where introspective
knowledge is generally considered to be empirical knowledge). See Nuccetelli, 1999, Brown, 2004, and
Farkas, 2008 for relevant discussion. Silins mainly talks about about ‘armchair’ knowledge. Here I will
use ‘armchair knowledge’ and ‘reflective knowledge’ interchangeably. I will specify later how and to
what extent the notions of a priori knowledge and armchair/reflective knowledge are intertwined.
7Although most philosophers have taken this consequence to be plainly unacceptable, Sarah Sawyer
notoriously resists the McKinsey paradox by biting the bullet: Content Externalism and Privileged
Access Thesis jointly lead to the conclusion that we can know by reflection alone specific empirical
propositions. However, she argues, this is not an unacceptable result. See Sawyer, 1998.
8See Putnam, 1975, McKinsey, 1991, and Boghossian, 1998
9For a collection of articles on the McKinsey problem for Content and Semantic Externalism see
Nuccetelli, 2003.
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1.3 What is Armchair Knowledge?
1.3.1 On Silins’ Notion of Armchair Knowledge
To fully understand Silins’ Access Problem, we need to clarify the notion of armchair
knowledge he employs. But to begin with, I would like to point out that Silins’ in-
troduction of the first premise is too abrupt. Silins introduces the argument by stating
that “Gary has armchair knowledge that his evidence includes the proposition that the
dial reads 0.4” (Silins, 2005: 382). Crucially, given E=K, to know what propositions
belong to one’s evidence is, first of all, to know what one’s knowledge is. That is,
given E=K, knowledge of one’s evidence is nothing more than knowledge of one’s
knowledge. If we then ask what is the nature of Gary’s knowledge that the dial reads
0.4, the answer will be straightforward. Gary’s first-order knowledge is an instance of
perceptual knowledge. Gary sees that the dial reads 0.4, thereby coming to know that
the dial reads 0.4. But if we ask what is the nature of Gary’s knowledge that he knows,
the answer seems to be less straightforward. The following worry arises: is Gary’s
knowledge of his evidence, and thus Gary’s knowledge of his knowledge, an instance
of armchair knowledge, as stated in premise 1.? In order to answer this question, it is
worthwhile to shed light on what it means, according to Silins’ formulation, to have
armchair knowledge of a proposition. Silins defines armchair knowledge as follows:
“One has armchair knowledge of a proposition when one knows it, and
one’s justification for believing the proposition does not constitutively de-
pend on one’s having had any particular experience or sense experience”
(Silins, 2005: 380)
The foregoing definition is of little help unless we get a clear idea of what the
notion of constitutive dependency amounts to. According to Silins:
“[. . . ] one can have armchair knowledge of a proposition, even if a back-
ground condition for having that knowledge is that one has had a certain
experience or type of experience. For example, one might have armchair
knowledge that redness is a colour, even if one knows that proposition only
if one has had experiences of redness” (Silins, 2005: 381)
In order to have a better understanding of what notion of armchair knowledge Silins
has in mind, let us consider the distinction, often used in the a priori/a posteriori debate,
between the enabling role of experience and the evidential role of experience. The
enabling role of experience is usually taken to be what enables us to understand the
concepts involved in the target proposition. The latter form of experience is what
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is sometimes required, besides the enabling experience, in order for one to know a
proposition. As Williamson says:
“[e]xperience is held to play an evidential role in our perceptual knowledge
that it is sunny, but a merely enabling role in our knowledge that if it is
sunny then it is sunny: we needed it only to acquire the concept sunny in
the first place” (Williamson, 2013: 293).
Silins’ words in the above-mentioned quotation seem to suggest that, even if there
is a sense in which one requires a certain experience (e.g., having perceived redness,
having interacted with a linguistic community) in order to know a proposition (redness
is a colour), this instance of propositional knowledge should be considered as being
armchair knowledge as long as the required experience is merely enabling one to un-
derstand the concept involved (redness). If what Silins has in mind is that armchair
knowledge is compatible with having had enabling experience, then to say that arm-
chair knowledge does not constitutively depend on experience is to say that it does not
depend on evidential-justificatory experience. That is, Silins seems to take armchair
knowledge to be based on enabling experience only10. If it is possible to have such
armchair knowledge, then, according to Silins, we should expect Gary’s knowledge of
his evidence to be a perfect candidate for armchair knowledge: “we should expect that
Gary knows from the armchair that his evidence includes the proposition that the dial
reads 0.4” (Silins, 2005: 381).
As mentioned above, Silins is well aware of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argu-
ment. However, even if we are not always in a position to know from the armchair
what our evidence (and thus our knowledge) is, it is plausible to claim that we are
sometimes able to know from the armchair what knowledge and what evidence we
have. The Armchair Access thesis seems compatible with the limits of our knowledge
suggested by the anti-luminosity argument. One would thus expect that everyone – in-
cluding Williamson – would be on board with that. In what follows, I argue that Silins’
argument does not represent a challenge to Williamson’s E=K, insofar as it relies on
a very questionable notion of armchair knowledge. More precisely, I will put forward
two lines of response to Silins’ argument. On the first line of response, I argue that,
given Silins’ formulation of Armchair Access, there is a plausible restriction the exter-
nalist would build into Armchair Access thesis, one that prevents the argument from
getting going. On the second line of response, I argue that, even if we grant that there
10Although Silins does not explicitly use this terminology, the text I’ve quoted seems to suggest, as
I’ve just pointed out, that he has this distinction in mind.
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is a sense in which Williamson should acknowledge the possibility of one’s having
knowledge “from the armchair” of one’s evidence, this knowledge is not a problem-
atic instance of armchair knowledge as understood by Silins. In order to do so, I take
Williamson’s cognitive-based account of imagination as a framework for understand-
ing what’s happening in Gary’s scenario, thereby suggesting an imagination-based ac-
count of second-order knowledge. As I will show in the conclusion of this Chapter,
these two lines of response are compatible and mutually supportive.
1.3.2 A Clarification
Before developing my responses, a clarification is in order. One can point out that there
is a straightforward way of resisting the Access Problem. That is, one could argue that
the conclusion 3. does not follow from the premises: Gary does not know from the
armchair that the dial reads 0.411. The reason is simply that Gary already knew that
the dial reads 0.4 by looking at the dial (by assumption). The Access Problem would
thus not be a genuine problem, as Gary has an empirical basis for believing that the dial
reads 0.412. However, I believe this is not an effective response for at least two reasons.
First, note that the validity of the Access Problem as presented by Silins, depends on
the truth of a plausible closure principle for armchair knowledge. Anyone who resists
the argument by claiming that the conclusion 3. fails to follow from the premises 1. and
2., thus also has to reject closure for armchair knowledge, while providing a satisfying
explanation of why Gary’s empirical basis in 1. prevents the entailment from 1. to
3.. Second, I believe this reply fails to capture the real worry underpinning the Access
Problem. Everyone – including Silins – would grant that Gary originally had empirical
knowledge of the target proposition. However, it still seems problematic to claim that
he can reach knowledge of the same empirical proposition from the armchair. As Silins
says:
“[I] know that I am having a certain sense experience only if I am having
the sense experience, but that does not show that I lack armchair knowl-
edge that I am having the experience. The source of my knowledge is
arguably still reflection instead of experience” (Silins, 2005: 381).13
11Thanks to Tommaso Piazza for raising this objection to me in conversation.
12Pritchard, 2012 provides a similar response as a solution to an analogous access problem that seems
to threaten his Epistemological Disjunctivism. However, in the next Chapter, I will show that this kind
of solution is problematic for Pritchard’s view.
13Note that someone could further claim that what Silins is saying here is not even possible. That is,
one could object that, in order for the source of one’s knowledge to be reflection instead of experience,
one’s belief in the target proposition must be completely based on the non-empirical reasoning only,
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Analogously to the original McKinsey challenge, I believe we can appreciate the
(prima facie) problematic nature of the Access Problem once we state it as a para-
dox. We start from a very plausible claim about what we can know from the armchair
(the Armchair Access thesis), and from a plausible distinction between enabling and
evidential experience, and we reach a very counterintuitive conclusion, namely, that
we can gain knowledge of empirical propositions that is grounded on enabling experi-
ence only. Even if one could (rightly) highlight Gary’s original empirical knowledge,
I still believe that we need to say something more in order to account for the above-
mentioned paradox. What follows should thus be conceived in the light of the paradox-
ical structure under which the Access Problem can be presented. More importantly, the
rest of the Chapter should be understood in the light of the following question: what is
the role experience plays in so-called armchair knowledge?
1.4 A First Response: A Restriction of Armchair Ac-
cess
As seen in the previous sections, Silins’ argument relies on the following thesis regard-
ing our access to our evidence:
(Armchair Access): It is sometimes the case that: one’s evidence includes
some proposition E, and one knows from the armchair that one’s evidence
includes E. (Silins, 2005: 381)
I have also already mentioned that Silins takes Armchair Access to be overwhelm-
ingly plausible as well as compatible with Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. We
can ask: is there a restriction that Williamson, and the externalist more in general, could
plausibly build into Armchair Access as defined by Silins? Silins’ answer is negative.
Presumably, the externalist would restrict Armchair Access to non-environmentally
sensitive propositions14 in order to resist Silins’ argument. Crucially, according to
Silins, any restriction of Armchair Access to non-environmentally sensitive proposi-
tions would be an ad hoc move. It is important to stress that Silins’ claim is not
that there is no plausible distinction between propositions that can be known from
rather than on sense experience. However, I will not develop this line of response here.
14I take environmentally sensitive propositions to be propositions whose truth-value depends on how
the environment is. By contrast, I take non-environmentally sensitive propositions to be propositions
whose truth-value does not depend on how the environment is.
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the armchair (as defined by Silins) and propositions that cannot, where the latter cat-
egory includes environmentally sensitive propositions. The relevant question, instead,
is whether there is a plausible distinction between evidence one has and that can be
known from the armchair (as defined by Silins) and evidence one has and that cannot
be known from the armchair, where the latter category includes environmentally sen-
sitive propositions. The question is thus whether it is plausible to say that we can have
armchair knowledge of some instances of our evidence, but not of all of them. As I
said, Silins’s answer is negative, for he takes this to be an ad hoc move, something
the Externalist is forced to do merely in order to resist the challenge. However, it is
unclear why it would be ad hoc. Silins offers no significant reason for thinking that any
relevant restriction would turn out to be implausible. In fact, the contrary seems true.
First, remember that “armchair knowledge” as conceived by Silins is knowledge based
on enabling experience only. But if this is the notion of armchair knowledge Silins
has in mind, then claiming we can have enabling-based knowledge of some evidence
is thus a very plausible move regardless of whether it resists the Access Problem or
not. A move that, in fact, might also be made in the context of the a priori/a posteriori
debate. Second, note that, by drawing a parallel with the McKinsey Paradox, Silins has
formulated Armchair Access as a rather weak existential claim (i.e., Armchair Access
is introduced by: “it is sometimes the case that”), and this is exactly what makes both
McKinsey’s and Silins’ access theses look quite plausible15. Silins’ concern about the
restriction being ad hoc would thus be weighty only if he were committed to a stronger
claim than he actually is. That is, only if he were committed to an access thesis that
has the strength of a universal claim, one on which it is always the case that: one’s ev-
idence includes a proposition E, and one knows from the armchair that one’s evidence
includes E. Finally, note that Silins himself points out that, unlike the more notori-
ous Luminosity Argument, his novel access argument rests on a weaker access thesis,
thereby focusing on how one can know one’s evidence, rather than putting pressure on
when one can know one’s evidence (Silins, 2005: 380). Given as things stand, it is
overall unclear why restricting armchair knowledge to some (but not all) instances of
our evidence is supposed to be an ad hoc move.
But, if we restrict Armchair Access to non-environmentally sensitive propositions,
what are we left with? We need to find a set of propositions that can be known from
the armchair, whilst not being environmentally sensitive. I take it a plausible candi-
15In fact, as mentioned above, McKinsey’s Privileged Access is the thesis that typically one is in the
position to know by reflection the content of one’s mental states. A similar point is made in Fratantonio
& McGlynn, 2018.
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date to be represented by logical and mathematical truths. Traditionally, mathematical
knowledge has been thought of as being a priori. It might be an open question whether
visual thinking, as well as the use of external representations (e.g., symbols, arrows,
diagrams, computer simulations, graphs) should seriously cast doubts on the a priori
nature of mathematical knowledge (Cf. Burge, 1998). Nevertheless, the standard view
has it that knowledge of mathematical truths depends on enabling experience only. For
example, while Williamson claims that knowledge of some mathematical proofs seems
to rely on more than merely enabling experience, at the same time, he is not willing to
embrace an account of mathematical knowledge as a posteriori (Williamson, 2013). On
one hand, Williamson maintains that the way in which we come to know some mathe-
matical axioms in set-theory, for instance, is not very different from the way in which
we come to know other propositions traditionally taken to be a posteriori. On the other
hand, however, he also grants that this does not entail that no mathematical truths can
be known a priori. My purpose here is not to clearly define which mathematical truths
are knowable a priori and which ones are not. It is rather to point out that it is plausi-
ble to maintain that there are some propositions that are part of our evidence, that are
knowable on the basis of enabling experience only, and that are not environmentally
sensitive. More precisely, I claim that it is plausible to say that there is a subset of our
mathematical knowledge that is based on enabling experience only. The point I want to
make is that, although it might be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to exactly define
which non-environmentally sensitive propositional evidence can be known “from the
armchair” and which ones cannot be known “from the armchair”, it is still plausible
to think that there indeed is such a distinction. Mathematical and logical truths (or at
least some of them) seem to represent a very plausible candidate for a restriction of
Armchair Access16,17. Williamson, and the Externalist more generally, could thus re-
strict Armchair Access to non-environmentally sensitive propositions, without leaving
Armchair Access an unmotivated and empty claim.
Once we realise that a plausible restriction of Armchair Access thesis to non-
16Note that it is not entirely appropriate to talk about a “restriction” of Armchair Access. As I men-
tioned above, Armchair Access is formulated as an existential claim. This is what makes it very plausi-
ble. What I am doing here is to pick some propositions as instances of that existential claim. However,
given Silins himself calls this sort of move to be a “restriction” of Armchair Access, I here use his
terminology.
17Although I believe it is very plausible to assume that mathematical and logical knowledge can be
evidence for something, one might instead find this idea questionable. However, note that, by putting
forward the Access Problem, Silins is offering a reductio ad absurdum of E=K. Once we assume E=K,
any mathematical and logical truths become part of one’s evidence merely in virtue of one coming to
know such truths. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this potential worry to me.
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environmentally sensitive propositions is available, the argument does not go through:
given Silins’ notion of armchair knowledge, Williamson would be happy to deny that
Gary has armchair knowledge of the fact that his evidence includes the proposition that
the dial reads 0.4. If Silins wants to show that E=K, when joined with Armchair Ac-
cess, brings about the undesirable conclusion, he has to consider a different example,
one which Williamson would be happy to grant as a case of armchair knowledge as
defined by Silins, namely, as a case of knowledge based on enabling experience only.
1.5 A Second Response: On the Nature of Armchair
Knowledge
In the previous Section, I have argued that Silins is too dismissive in taking any re-
striction of Armchair Access to be ad hoc. The conclusion of my first line of response
was that it is far from clear why Williamson should accept the first premise of Silins’
argument:
1. Gary has armchair knowledge that his evidence includes the proposition that the
dial reads 0.4.
However, someone might not find this first line of response as intellectually sat-
isfying as it should be. For one could still object that it is plausible to say that there
is a sense in which we can sometimes know “from the armchair” what our evidence
is, even when our evidence includes a proposition about the environment. After all,
even Williamson explicitly allows for extended but not unlimited knowledge of our
knowledge, as well as of our evidence. For instance, Williamson himself grants the
possibility of knowledge of our evidence when he writes:
“Our extensive but not unlimited ability to know that we know without
further observation whether we know something is what enables us to use
knowledge as evidence. It constitutes an extensive but not unlimited ability
to know without further acquisition of evidence whether something is part
of our present evidence.” (Williamson, 2000: 15)
Similarly, Williamson acknowledges that, although no non-trivial mental state is
luminous, “none of this is to deny that in favourable cases one can know without ob-
servation whether one is in a given mental state” (Williamson, 2000: 14). It might thus
be tempting to argue that there is a sense in which even Williamson has to grant Gary
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knowledge of what his evidence is. Nonetheless, as I will show in the second half
of this Chapter, I believe that we should be careful in assimilating what Williamson
takes to be “knowledge without further observation” with Silins’ notion of armchair
knowledge.
In what follows, I put forward a second line of response against Silins’ argument.
I argue that, although we do need to account for the fact that it is sometimes possible
to know what our evidence is merely “from the armchair”, Silins’ argument relies on
a notion of armchair knowledge that Williamson should reject. That is, I argue that
Gary’s knowledge of his evidence (and, given E=K, Gary’s knowledge of his knowl-
edge) is not an instance of armchair knowledge as understood by Silins, namely, it is
not an instance of knowledge depending on enabling experience only. This will enable
us to resist the Access Problem. For reasons of simplicity, instead of directly address-
ing Gary’s knowledge of his evidence, I will consider Gary’s second-order knowledge.
This is because E=K allows me to apply the conclusions I draw on the nature of one’s
second-order knowledge to cases of one’s knowledge of one’s evidence.
The main challenge taken up in this Chapter is to provide a plausible explana-
tion of why, in cases of higher-order knowledge where one’s first order knowledge is
empirical, I consider second-order knowledge to not be armchair knowledge in any
problematic sense18. I will not defend any specific theory of second-order knowledge,
for an evaluation of which account is the correct one is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, for the purpose of this Chapter, I will consider cases in which a subject has
second-order knowledge in virtue of: i) having first-order knowledge (assuming fac-
tivity of knowledge), and ii) having conducted a further inquiry on her epistemic status
(more precisely, on her first-order knowledge). This further inquiry must not be em-
pirical, and it must, of course be properly conducted in order to constitute knowledge.
It is important to stress that I do not want to suggest that second-order knowledge can
only be achieved by means of a further inquiry on one’s epistemic status. In fact, it is
plausible to think that, in some cases, one might be able to easily achieve second-order
knowledge merely by “being exposed” to first order knowledge19. In Section 1.6, I will
address more explicitly these cases of “easy second-order knowledge”, and I will argue
that they do not constitute a threat to my overall strategy. However, my focus here will
18Note that, in this Chapter, I am only concerned with cases of second-order knowledge (or higher-
order knowledge). That is, I am interested in a person’s knowledge of her knowledge, and not in her
(psychological) self-knowledge, understood more broadly as the person’s knowledge of her own mental
states.
19Thanks to Timothy Williamson and to an anonymous referee for raising this point to me.
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be mainly on cases of second-order knowledge that involve reflection on one’s epis-
temic status, for this represents Silins’ target as well. In particular, his being concerned
with these “reflective” cases of second-order knowledge is clear when he describes the
Gary scenario. He says:
“[W]e can focus on a thoughtful subject in the good case. Suppose Gary
sees that the dial reads 0.4, and considers what evidence he has and what
his having certain evidence entails.” (Silins, 2005: 381. Italics are mine).
In the Gary scenario, Gary knows that p by having a paradigmatic visual experience
that p. Given what I have said above, if Gary knows that he knows that p, then Gary
knows that p and Gary has conducted a further inquiry on his epistemic status, namely,
on whether he indeed had a paradigmatic knowledge-yielding visual experience that
p. What follows can thus be understood as indicating a way of cashing out what this
“further inquiry” involves. In particular, I shall address two questions. First, what is
the object of this inquiry? Second, what is the nature of this inquiry? Before providing
an answer to these questions, I will consider Williamson’s imagination-based episte-
mology of counterfactuals and how, on Williamson’s view, the employment of these
imaginative capacities involves experience playing a role which is “more than merely
enabling and less than strictly evidential” (Williamson, 2016). I will then go back to
address the questions regarding the object and the nature of Gary’s further inquiry on
his first-order knowledge. By developing a new application of Williamson’s cognitive-
based account of imagination, namely, an imagination-based account of second-order
knowledge, I will argue that we should understand Gary’s further inquiry on his epis-
temic status as involving those imaginative capacities that Williamson takes to be in
place when we evaluate counterfactuals, or when we come to know some propositions,
allegedly taken to be known a priori. I will conclude that, if my imagination-based
account of second-order knowledge is correct, then there are good reasons to believe
Williamson would resist the major assumption of Silins’ argument: Gary’s knowledge
of his evidence is not “armchair” in any problematic sense, namely, it is not based
on enabling experience only. A general point can be made: once we consider seri-
ously Williamson’s stand on the a priori/a posteriori distinction, Silins’ objection can
be undermined. Even if there is a sense in which our second-order knowledge is “arm-
chair”, namely, it is not merely grounded on evidential experience, it is not however
an instance of armchair knowledge as underlying Silins’ interpretation of the Arm-
chair Access thesis. That is, our second-order knowledge is not grounded on enabling
experience only.
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1.5.1 Experience, Counterfactuals, and Imagination
Recently Williamson has offered an imagination-based account of epistemology of
counterfactuals20. That is, he argues that in evaluating a counterfactual conditional,
namely, in considering both its antecedent and its consequent, we employ our imagi-
native cognitive capacities21. In order to understand what Williamson has in mind, let
us consider his own example as introduced in The Philosophy of Philosophy:
“You are in the mountains. As the sun melts the ice, rocks embedded in
it are loosened and crash down the slope. You notice one rock slide into
a bush. You wonder where it would have ended if the bush had not been
there. A natural way to answer this question is by visualising the rock
sliding without the bush there, and then bouncing down the slope into the
lake at the bottom. Under suitable background conditions, you thereby
come to know this counterfactual: [. . . ] if the bush had not been there,
the rock would have ended in the lake.” (Williamson, 2007b: 142; Italics
added)
What underpins Williamson’s evaluation of the foregoing scenario is the idea that
imaginative exercises are knowledge-yielding cognitive processes that involve “a gen-
eral human capacity to transpose ‘online’ cognitive skills originally developed in per-
ception into corresponding ‘offline’ cognitive skills subsequently applied in imagina-
tion” (Williamson, 2013: 296)22, 23. Without performing any kind of empirical exper-
iment, one can come to know a counterfactual by ‘visually’ imagining its antecedent
in one’s mind and by spontaneously developing its consequent. These two moments
in the evaluation of a counterfactual mirror, on Williamson’s view, the two moments
involved in our imaginative exercise: a first one in which imagination is exercised vol-
untarily, and a second one in which it is employed involuntarily. The former modus
20See Williamson, 2007b. It is worth pointing out that Williamson’s imagination-based epistemology
of counterfactuals should be understood within Williamson’s aim of showing epistemology of metaphys-
ical modalities as being a subset of the epistemology of counterfactuals. An evaluation of Williamson’s
epistemology of metaphysical modality is beyond the scope of this Chapter. For criticisms, see Jenkins,
2008.
21It is worth stressing that the notion of imagination here is not restricted to the Aristotelian notion
of imagination as phantasia that might feature in dreaming and daydreaming (see Hicks & Aristotle,
1907, iii). Rather the notion of imagination at stake here is that of a broad capacity that shows itself in
heterogeneity of knowledge-yielding cognitive processes, e.g., entertaining possibilities and alternative
scenarios, evaluating counterfactuals, and making mental comparisons (cf. Williamson, 2016).
22Similar ideas can also be found in Williamson, 2007b, Williamson, 2016.
23Unfortunately, Williamson leaves the notion of “offline” rather unexplained in his texts. However,
it is plausible to understand Williamson’s use of the notion of “offline” to be similar to the notion used
by defenders of simulation theory (e.g., A. I. Goldman, 1989). That is, the imagination is the result
of “offline” cognitive skills insofar as, roughly put, these cognitive skills work with surrogated and
idealised situations and they can be employed in the absence of the actual object/scenario imagined.
This also involves the idea that one can update one’s belief even in the absence of the new evidence.
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operandi of imagination is exercised when we make ourselves imagine a possible sce-
nario. That is, we voluntarily consider a specific possibility and we try to imagine
what would happen if we were in that possible scenario. However, the imagination
works involuntarily when it comes to fill the target possible scenario with details24. In
Williamson’s words:
“[H]aving forced the initial conditions, [one] lets the rest of imaginative
exercise unfold without further interference” (Williamson, 2016: 116)
But what enables one to “involuntarily” develop the consequent of a counterfac-
tual in such a way that it produces knowledge? That is, what makes imagination a
knowledge-yielding cognitive process? On Williamson’s view, our imagination is al-
ways constrained by our background knowledge, where this includes our past experi-
ences. More precisely, our past experiences determine the operation of imagination in
at least two ways25. First, when addressing the imagined scenario, our ‘offline’ cogni-
tive skills minimise the changes with respect to our background knowledge of similar
cases. That is, the imagined scenario remains tuned with how reality is. Second,
our background knowledge has a causal role in our evaluation of the counterfactual.
That is, when spontaneously developing the possible scenario in the light of our back-
ground knowledge, the way in which our imagination operates is reality-oriented. This
is what makes imagination a reliable and predictive cognitive process. In fact, it is in
virtue of its being constrained by previous experiences that the imagination is selective
and truth-oriented, thereby “spontaneously” developing the possible scenarios in ques-
tion26, 27. In the epistemology of counterfactuals, and in our imaginative exercises in
general, sense experience thus plays an important role. As Williamson writes:
“[I]n our imagination-based knowledge of counterfactuals, sense experi-
ence can play a role that is neither strictly evidential nor merely enabling.
24See Williamson, 2007b, Williamson, 2016.
25Thanks to Aidan McGlynn for stressing this point.
26It is important to point out that although imagination is reality-oriented, it is far from being an
infallible way of gaining knowledge. Nonetheless, the reliability of this cognitive capacity is enough,
on Williamson’s view, to become of necessary use in our daily life, for example, as applied in our
decision-making, or in the activity of mindreading, as well as in the way we gain knowledge about the
future.
27I believe that Goldman’s simulation theory can offer a framework for a better understanding of
Williamson’s account of imagination. For instance, Goldman explicitly links imagination to simulation
by defining the so-called enactment-imagination: “Enactment-Imagination is a matter of creating or
trying to create in one’s own mind a selected mental state, or at least a rough facsimile of such a state,
through the faculty of imagination” (A. L. Goldman, 2008). However, I take our imaginative capacities
to be something broader than what Goldman takes our simulative capacity to be. See also Gordon, 1986
and Heal, 1986 who were the first ones to propose simulation as an account of human psychology.
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For, even without serving as part of our total evidence, it can mold our
habits of imagination and judgment in ways that go far beyond a merely
enabling role.” (Williamson, 2007b: 165)
To sum up: given Williamson’s cognitive-based account of imagination, sense ex-
perience plays an interesting epistemic role in imagination. Although not being strictly
evidential, experience seems to play a role that is more than merely enabling one in
understanding the concepts involved in the counterfactual. Given the less than strictly
evidential yet more than merely enabling role that experience plays in the employment
of our imaginative capacities, and given the imagination-based epistemology of coun-
terfactuals that Williamson defends, it follows that, on Williamson’s view, knowledge
of counterfactuals should not be classified as being a priori, nor a posteriori. The point
can thus be generalised to any instance of knowledge involving our imaginative capac-
ities28. As a consequence, given that much of the knowledge traditionally thought of
as a priori involves the employment of our imaginative capacities, it actually fails to fit
within that category, for experience plays a role that is more than merely enabling29.
An example is provided in ‘How Deep is The Distinction Between A Priori and A
Posteriori Knowledge?’, where Williamson considers the following two truths:
(a) All crimson things are red
(b) All recent volumes of Who’s Who are red.
As Williamson points out, the standard view classifies one’s knowledge of (a) as
a priori knowledge, and one’s knowledge of (b) as a posteriori knowledge. However,
he argues that the cognitive process underlying one’s knowledge that (a) and the cog-
nitive process underlying one’s knowledge that (b) are almost the same (Williamson,
2013). More precisely, he argues that what underlies one’s knowledge in both cases
is an imaginative process. As a consequence of his cognitive-based epistemology of
imagination just described, Williamson argues that the experience plays a similar role
both in one’s knowledge of (a) as well as in one’s knowledge of (b). On the standard
view, one’s knowledge of (a) relies on enabling experience only, thereby constitut-
ing a priori knowledge, while one’s knowledge of (b) relies on evidential experience,
thereby constituting an instance of a posteriori knowledge. Contra the standard view,
28For relevant discussion on the evidential-justificatory role of imagination see, for example, Jackson,
2016, Jackson, 2018.
29Williamson further claims that this shows that the a priori/a posteriori distinction lacks any relevant
explanatory power. I do not want to commit myself to such a claim here.
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Williamson argues that the role that experience plays, both in one’s knowledge of (a)
and in one’s knowledge of (b), is “more than pure enabling and less than strictly evi-
dential”. On one hand, in one’s knowledge of (a), the experience of redness not only
enables one to understand the proposition (a), it also provides one with the “skills in
applying the terms ‘crimson’ and ‘red’ to the point where he could carry out the imag-
inative exercise successfully”. On the other hand, in one’s knowledge of (b), the only
role the experience plays is that it grounds “his skill in recognising and imagining such
volumes” (Williamson, 2013: 297).
1.5.2 Second-order Knowledge Through Imagination
In the previous Section, I have reconstructed Williamson’s account of imagination and
how it is widely involved in different ways in our daily epistemic practises, e.g., in our
evaluation of counterfactuals. I have pointed out how, on Williamson’s view, imagina-
tion, broadly understood as one of our cognitive capacities, is sensitive to our past ex-
periences: in our imaginative exercises, sense-experience plays a role which, although
less than strictly evidential, is more than merely enabling.
Where does this leave us? In this Section, I argue that Gary’s knowledge of his
knowledge (and hence, given E=K, his knowledge of his evidence) involves the eval-
uation of counterfactual conditionals, and hence the employment of imaginative ex-
ercises. That is, first, I argue that we should understand second-order knowledge as
partly entertaining and mentally visualising error-possibilities; second, I argue that,
given the more-than-enabling role experience plays in the imagination, and given my
imagination-based account of second-order knowledge, Gary’s knowledge of his knowl-
edge does not represent an instance of armchair knowledge in any problematic sense.
Given E=K, the same conclusion can be applied to Gary’s knowledge of his evidence.
Crucially, if this is so, the Access Problem does not represent a threat for E=K. Even
if it is true that there is a sense in which Gary has “knowledge from the armchair” of
what his evidence is, Gary’s knowledge is not an instance of armchair knowledge as
understood by Silins, and as underlying the Armchair Access thesis.
Remember that we are concerned here with a case of second-order knowledge in
which Gary is a thoughtful subject. That is, Gary has second order knowledge that the
dial reads 0.4 in virtue of the following two things: i) he has first-order knowledge that
the dial reads 0.4; ii) he has conducted a further inquiry on his first-order knowledge30.
30I am here assuming failure of the KK-principle as originally defended by Hintikka, 1962. Daniel
Greco has recently offered a novel defence of the KK-principle (D. Greco, 2014). However, the vast
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In the previous section, I have addressed the following two questions: first, what is the
object of this further inquiry? Second, what is the nature of this inquiry? Providing
an answer to the first question will enable us to answer the second question, thereby
shedding light on why Gary’s first-order knowledge is empirical, yet his second-order
knowledge is not an instance of armchair knowledge as intended by Silins.
In the scenario originally described, Gary knows that the dial reads 0.4 simply by
looking at it. For Gary to conduct a further inquiry on his epistemic status means to
check, without further empirical inquiry, whether he indeed had a knowledge-yielding
visual experience. That is, Gary will consider whether the conditions for a paradig-
matic good case of perceptual knowledge obtained. For example, he will consider
whether his sight was good or not at the moment of the perceptual experience, whether
the lights in the room were good, and so on. In a nutshell, for Gary to conduct a fur-
ther inquiry on his epistemic status (in order to determine whether he had knowledge
of a specific empirical proposition p), is to conduct a further inquiry on whether his
visual experience that p was a reliable one, thereby constituting a knowledge-yielding
process.
It is important to stress that, as I mentioned above, this further inquiry must not
involve any empirical check in the environment, yet it must be put forward merely “by
reflection” alone. If this is so, then what, in practice, does it mean for Gary to conduct
this further inquiry on the reliability of his visual experience? It means that Gary would
probably consider the possibility of having had a non-reliable and non-paradigmatic
visual experience. In practice, by addressing error-possibilities, Gary would consider
what would be the case, if he had not had a paradigmatic visual experience. In address-
ing this possibility, he would appeal to his background knowledge and he would try to
remember previous cases in which he had a visual experience of a dial, perhaps in the
same room, or in a different room. He would then make a comparison between past
experiences and the visual experience he has just undergone. That is, he would “make
up his mind” on his epistemic situation without conducing any further empirical check.
Gary’s further inquiry would thus consist of addressing and evaluating counterfactual
conditionals such as the following:
If I had not had a paradigmatic visual-experience of a dial reading 0.4,
then it would not look like there was a dial reading 0.431
majority of epistemologists would reject such a principle nowadays. In particular see Williamson, 2000,
ch. 5.
31I am here ignoring any skeptical hypothesis.
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But, as I have said above, evaluating such a counterfactual involves considering
error-possibilities, mentally visualising past experiences and making comparisons with
recent ones.
We can now go back to the second question I have addressed: what is the nature of
this further inquiry? Given the above description of what Gary’s second-order knowl-
edge involves, I suggest we should understand Gary’s inquiry on his epistemic status
(required in order for him to have second-order knowledge) as involving the employ-
ment of those imaginative capacities that Williamson takes to be involved in our eval-
uating counterfactuals. In fact, as described in the above scenario, Gary seems to con-
duct this required inquiry by using much of the imaginative exercises that Williamson
has taken to represent specific instances of the more general and heterogeneous cogni-
tive capacity of transposing skills “offline”. Crucially, I have pointed out that, accord-
ing to Williamson, the employment of imaginative exercises is constrained by past
experiences in such a way that makes imagination relying on more-than-enabling ex-
perience. It follows that Gary’s second-order knowledge involves cognitive capacities
relying on experience that does not merely have an enabling role. Although Gary’s past
experience fails to have a strictly evidential role, it still constrains Gary’s imaginative
process in a significant way. But, if Gary’s second-order knowledge is not relying on
merely enabling experience, then it is not an instance of armchair knowledge as under-
stood by Silins. That is, it is not an instance of armchair knowledge in any problematic
sense. Given E=K, the same can be said about Gary’s knowledge that his evidence
includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4.
1.5.3 Why Knowing the Environment from the Armchair is not Ab-
surd
In the previous Section, I have put forward a second line of response against Silins’
Access Problem. I have questioned the main assumption underlying Silins’ argument,
namely, the Armchair Access thesis. I have argued that, although Gary’s knowledge
of his evidence is not empirical, it is not “armchair” in any problematic sense: Gary’s
inquiry on his epistemic situation is somehow constrained by experience, where this
plays a quasi-evidential role. More precisely, along this second line of response, I have
questioned the nature of Silins’ notion of armchair knowledge as underlying the Arm-
chair Access thesis. The Access Problem mistakenly relies on a picture according to
which the enabling and the evidential roles experience can play are mutually exclusive.
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There is, instead, a third role experience can play, one that is neither strictly eviden-
tial, nor merely enabling. I have argued that, once we take seriously Williamson’s
cognitive-based epistemology of imagination, and once we see how pervasive the em-
ployment of this cognitive capacity is, then we can think of a plausible imagination-
based account of second-order knowledge (and, thus, of knowledge of one’s evidence).
What follows is that, even if there is a sense in which Gary has “armchair knowledge”
of what his evidence is, Gary’s knowledge of his evidence is based on this third quasi-
evidential role of experience, thereby failing to bring about any disastrous conclusion.
As Williamson says:
“[I]t should be no surprise if we turn out to have armchair knowledge of
truths about the external environment.” (Williamson, 2007b: 269)
Before considering whether cases of “easy” second-order knowledge (i.e., cases
that do not involve any inquiry) might affect my overall argument, let me make a fi-
nal remark on a potentially interesting application of my imagination-based account of
second-order knowledge. As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, the Access Problem is
developed by Silins as a parallel to the McKinsey Paradox which establishes a tension
between Content Externalism and Privilege Access. Now that we have a way of re-
sisting the Access Problem, one might thus wonder whether a similar response is also
available to the Content Externalist in order to escape the McKinsey Paradox. That is,
perhaps the Content Externalist could accept that one can know by reflection contin-
gent facts about the external environment, whilst arguing that this is not a problematic
result, insofar as this ‘reflective knowledge’ is based on quasi-evidential experience32.
This potential line of response is one that deserves careful examination and that I have
no time to address here. Nevertheless, I believe it is an option worth exploring in the
future.
1.6 Easy Second-order Knowledge
It could be objected that my account of second-order knowledge is not very plausible
after all. One could argue, for instance, that no epistemic work is required for one to
have second-order knowledge. According to this line of thought, my explanation of
Gary’s scenario would thus fail to show that Gary’s knowledge of his evidence (and
32For an interesting response to the McKinsey Paradox that accepts the conclusion of the paradox
while arguing that it is not absurd see Sawyer, 1998. For an excellent survey of the various responses to
the McKinsey Paradox see Kallestrup, 2011a, Kallestrup, 2011b, ch. 5.
38
thus of his knowledge) is based on more than merely enabling experience. For, if Gary
is able to gain second-order knowledge without engaging in counterfactual thinking,
and without dismissing error-possibilities, then it seems Gary is not employing his
imaginative capacities after all. But remember that my conclusion that Gary’s second-
order knowledge is grounded on quasi-evidential experience is a consequence of the
fact that, as the story goes, it is plausible to take Gary as employing his imaginative
capacities. The worry would thus be that, if second-order knowledge does not require
a further epistemic inquiry, yet it comes “for free” together with first-order knowledge,
then Silins seems right after all: Gary’s knowledge is supposedly based on enabling
experience only. Previously in this Chapter, I have already noted that my account is
compatible with the fact that there might be cases in which one can gain second-order
knowledge easily by merely being exposed to one’s first-order knowledge. Further-
more, I have pointed out that the cases Silins himself is interested in are cases in which
the target subject is thoughtful, and in which he actively considers what evidence he
has and what his evidence entails (Silins, 2005: 381). In this Section, I argue that, even
if one insisted that we should read Gary’s second-order knowledge as not involving
any inquiry, this interpretation of Gary’s case would still fail to constitute a real threat
to my response.
First of all, if, as one might argue, one’s second-order knowledge comes almost
“for free” together with one’s first-order knowledge, then the following question arises:
what is this second-order knowledge grounded on? One plausible answer could be
that our second order-knowledge is rooted in the same epistemic basis our first-order
knowledge is grounded on. However, if this turned out to be the most plausible ac-
count of second-order knowledge available, I would happily bite the bullet here, for it
would basically concur with my conclusion that, contrary to what Silins claims, Gary’s
second-order knowledge is based on more than merely enabling experience. In fact, if
this account of second-order knowledge is correct, we would have even a more direct
response to Silins, given that Gary’s second-order knowledge would turn out to be just
as empirically based as his first-order knowledge is33. A different way of answering
my question could be to say that Gary’s second-order knowledge does not require any
further inquiry, and, at the same time, is not epistemically based on the same empirical
33One might also worry that the story I have provided, one that understands second-order knowledge
as involving evaluation of counterfactual conditionals, is incompatible with Williamson’s “knowledge-
first” project. However, note that in The Philosophy of Philosophy Williamson extensively argues for
his epistemology of counterfactuals within a knowledge-first framework. Here I am just applying that
framework to cases of second-order knowledge.
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ground on which Gary’s first-order knowledge is based. Crucially, defenders of this
account owe us an explanation of where this second-order belief is gaining the justifi-
catory support needed for this belief to constitute knowledge. But, even if a plausible
explanation is provided, I believe it would not affect my overall argument. On one
hand, all I wanted to argue for is that there is a plausible explanation of how we some-
times acquire knowledge of what our evidence is (and hence of our knowledge), one
that sheds light on the role experience plays in these cases of second-order knowledge.
It follows that, even if there can be cases in which one gains second-order knowledge
without conducting any active inquiry on one’s epistemic status, what matters is that
this second-order knowledge is not based on merely enabling experience only. On the
other hand, my account does not completely rule out cases of second-order knowledge
that are genuine instances of “armchair knowledge” as intended by Silins. In fact, I
take Section 1.4 of this Chapter to show exactly this.
1.7 Conclusion
In this Chapter, I have considered Silins’ Access Problem. This is supposed to repre-
sent a novel access argument against E=K, one which does not rely on a luminosity
claim. The argument aims to show that E=K is jointly incompatible with Armchair
Access, i.e., the thesis that it is sometimes possible to know from the armchair what
our evidence consists of. Williamson’s E=K, together with Armchair Access, seems
to lead to the disastrous conclusion that it is possible to have armchair knowledge of a
specific empirical proposition. Given that Armchair Access is a very plausible claim,
the argument (allegedly) represents a reductio ad absurdum of E=K.
This Chapter has rejected the Access Problem as a genuine problem for E=K34.
More precisely, I have put forward two lines of response. According to the first line
of response, Silins’ formulation of Armchair Access as an existential claim allows for
a plausible restriction of Armchair Access to non-environmentally sensitive proposi-
tions. Williamson should thus reject the first premise of Silins’ argument, thereby
34Silins’ paper has been very influential within the epistemological debate on Externalism and In-
ternalism about evidence. However, most of the discussion that followed his Deception and Evidence
mainly focused on his so-called ‘Supervenience Argument’ and his novel Sceptical Argument. For rel-
evant discussion on these arguments see Kennedy, 2010, Dunn, 2012, McGlynn, 2014, Fratantonio &
McGlynn, 2018. Less attention has been devoted to the Access Problem. Nevertheless, Littlejohn, 2011
constitutes an exception. Note that my response differs from the one provided by Littlejohn for various
reasons. In particular, while Littlejohn rejects the principle of armchair access by arguing that E=K (and
Externalism more in general) can account for the intuitions allegedly motivating such a principle, this
Chapter aims to reconcile the principle of armchair access with E=K.
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claiming that Gary does not have armchair knowledge that his evidence includes the
proposition that the dial reads 0.4. According to the second line of response, everyone
– including Williamson – should grant that there is a sense in which Gary can know
“from the armchair” that his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4.
However, Gary’s second-order knowledge is not an instance of armchair knowledge as
underpinning Silins’ Access Problem. In fact, the Armchair Access thesis as under-
stood by Silins, relies on the assumption that experience can play either an enabling
or an evidential role, where these roles are mutually exclusive. That is, Silins’ for-
mulation of Armchair Access overlooks the possibility of experience having a third
role: one that is more than merely enabling and less than strictly evidential (what I
have called quasi-evidential). Furthermore, I have offered an explanation of why I
believe Gary’s knowledge of what his evidence is (and thus, given E=K, Gary’s knowl-
edge of his knowledge) represents an instance of knowledge based on quasi-evidential
experience. More precisely, I have argued for a novel imagination-based account of
second-order knowledge, one according to which we gain second-order knowledge
by means of evaluating counterfactual conditionals, thereby employing our imagina-
tive exercises. Crucially, if we take seriously Williamson’s cognitive-based account
of imagination, according to which imagination relies on more than merely enabling
experience, then we are forced to re-think the role experience plays in second-order
knowledge. Second-order knowledge seems to rely on experience that, although less
than strictly evidential, plays more than a mere enabling role.
Finally, let me highlight why these two lines of response are compatible and mu-
tually supportive. If we understand “armchair knowledge” as knowledge based on
enabling experience only (as Silins understands it) then Williamson should be happy
to accept the Armchair Access thesis, while saying that one can only have armchair
knowledge of non-environmentally sensitive propositions. It follows that Gary does
not have armchair knowledge of the fact that his evidence includes the proposition
that the dial reads 0.4. This is what the first line of response has shown. At the same
time, Williamson could grant that there is a sense in which Gary has knowledge “from
the armchair” of what his evidence is, while rejecting the idea that Gary has arm-
chair knowledge (as defined by Silins) of the target proposition. The conclusion 3. that
Gary knows merely “from the armchair” the specific empirical proposition that the dial
reads 0.4 thus follows from the premises 1. and 2.. However, this does not represent
a disastrous consequence, for Gary’s knowledge is based on more than mere enabling
experience. This is what the second line of response has shown.
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The moral of the story is that the Access Problem rests on an ambiguity over the no-
tion of armchair knowledge underpinning its main assumption (i.e., Armchair Access
thesis). Once we get clear on which notion of armchair knowledge we are considering,
we realise that the Access Problem does not represent a challenge for E=K.
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Chapter 2
The Access Problem for
Epistemological Disjunctivism
2.1 Introduction
In the previous Chapter, I have considered the so-called Access Problem for E=K,
and I have argued that, contrary to first appearances, it does not represent a threat for
Williamson’s Externalist view. Are all varieties of Evidential Externalism able to resist
the Access Problem? This Chapter shows that the answer to this question is ‘no’. In
this Chapter, I consider the Access Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism and I
argue that it represents a challenge for this view.
Before getting into the details of the problem, let me first introduce what Episte-
mological Disjunctivism is, and why one might find this view appealing. According to
Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism:
“In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, an agent, S, has percep-
tual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support,
R [i.e., S’s seeing that], for her belief that p which is both factive (i.e., R’s
obtaining entails p) and reflectively accessible.” (Pritchard, 2012: 13).
In a context in which epistemology has been centred on the opposition between in-
ternalism and externalism about epistemic justification, Epistemological Disjunctivism
(henceforth, (ED)) seems to offer (if true) a middle way which would not force us to
choose one side over the other1. By requiring one’s rational support to be both reflec-
1Note that I am not going to consider whether epistemological disjunctivism is also committed to
metaphysical disjunctivism. For a defense of epistemological and metaphysical disjunctivism See Mc-
Dowell, 1995
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tively accessible and factive2, ED combines the insights underpinning both epistemic
internalism and epistemic externalism respectively. On one hand, the accessibility re-
quirement enables Pritchard to account for the (internalist)3 intuition that the notion of
justification should be considered in relation to the notion of epistemic responsibility
(Pritchard, 2012: 2). On the other hand, the factivity requirement accommodates the
(externalist) intuition that there must be a connection between the truth of the proposi-
tion and the reason why one believes such a proposition. It is in virtue of this factivity
requirement that, as we’ve seen in the Introduction of this Thesis, Pritchard’s view can
be classified as an Evidential Externalist theory: on Epistemological Disjunctivism,
two subjects can differ in the evidence they have even if they have the same non-factive
mental states. Remember our Gary and Barry. Remember that Gary and Barry have
the same non-factive mental states but Barry is radically deceived while Gary is in a
paradigmatic good case. Epistemological Disjunctivism will say that Gary and Barry
differ in the evidence they have, for only Gary has factive evidence. This brings me to a
further reason one might find Pritchard’s ED very appealing. That is, given that on ED
it is only in the good case that one has reflective access to one’s factive rational support,
this view combines internalism and externalism in such a way that it (allegedly) offers a
neo-Moorean-style solution to the underdetermination-based sceptical paradox, while
leaving our common pre-theoretical intuitions untouched (Pritchard, 2012, Pritchard,
2016a). If true, ED would thus represent, according to Pritchard, the holy grail of
epistemology. However, in his book, Pritchard anticipates what he takes to be three
prima facie problems for his view, namely, the Access Problem, the Basis Problem,
and The Distinguishability Problem. While lots of the critics have focused on the last
two problems, as well as on whether Pritchard’s disjunctivism is really able to solve a
version of the sceptical paradox, not much attention has been devoted to the so-called
Access Problem4. In this Chapter, I will focus on this more neglected argument, thus
2As I mentioned previously in this Thesis, it is worth noting that Pritchard’s use of ‘factive’ here
differs from what epistemologists often have in mind when talking about ‘factive’ evidence/justification.
While epistemologists traditionally refers to the idea that evidence/justification is constituted by true
propositions, Pritchard refers to the truth-entailing nature of one’s rational support. Whenever I talk
about ‘factivity’ in Chapter I have in mind the way in which Pritchard talks about factivity.
3Conee & Feldman, 2004 notoriously defend a variety of internalism about justification, namely,
mentalism, whilst rejecting the accessibility requirement. However, I will not be concerned with men-
talism here. Rather, following Pritchard, I will consider internalism as traditionally understood, namely,
as accessibilism.
4For a discussion on the Basis Problem see, for example, Pritchard, 2011a, Ranalli, 2014 and Ghi-
jsen, 2015. For a discussion on the Distinguishability Problem see Dennis, 2014 and again Ranalli, 2014.
For a recent discussion on whether Pritchard’s Disjunctivism is able to resist the Sceptical Paradox see
Ashton, 2015, Zalabardo, 2015, and Smith, 2016b
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hoping to foster and expand the debate around this issue. After clarifying the nature
of the problem (Section 2.2), and considering Pritchard’s response to this challenge, I
point out that in order to assess whether Pritchard’s response is a satisfying one, we
first need to have a better idea of what it takes for someone to have ‘Reflective Access’
of one’s rational support R (Section 2.3). In particular, Pritchard has to provide an
account of reflective knowledge that predicts (i) that one can have reflective knowl-
edge of one’s empirical rational support (seeing that), and (ii) that one does not have
reflective knowledge of what one’s rational support entails (p). This turns out to be a
very difficult task. After considering three possible ways of cashing out the notion of
Reflective Access, I show that none of them enables us to satisfyingly resist the Access
Problem (Section 2.4 and Section 2.5). Finally, I consider Tim Kraft’s paper (Kraft,
2015), in which he offers a different diagnosis of why Pritchard’s response to the Ac-
cess Problem is unsatisfying. I argue that the source/content distinction he appeals to is
unmotivated and leads to undesirable results (Section 2.6). This shows why my diag-
nosis should be preferred. I conclude that, as it stands, the Access Problem represents
a real challenge for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism. More interestingly, I
conclude that the arguments I have provided shed light on a general troublesome fea-
ture of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism, namely, the lack of an unambiguous
and unproblematic account of reflective knowledge (Section 2.7).
2.2 Epistemological Disjunctivism and The Access Prob-
lem
In his Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012), Pritchard addresses the so-called Access
Problem as representing a prima facie challenge for his view. Before describing the
Access Problem in detail, it is worth mentioning that, similarly to what Silins does
when formulating the Access Problem for E=K, Pritchard takes this argument to mirror
the more notorious McKinsey’s paradox. Let us thus briefly recall what the McKin-
sey Paradox is about. As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the McKinsey paradox
allegedly shows the incompatibility between Content Externalism and Privileged Ac-
cess. I’ve taken Privileged Access to be, roughly put, the thesis that one can typically
know by reflection the content of one’s mental states. I’ve taken Content Externalism
to be, roughly put, the thesis that the content of one’s mental states is determined by
factors in the external environment. Let us consider again the example involving “wa-
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ter thoughts”. Imagine that one is thinking that the water is wet. Privileged Access
entails that one can know by reflection that one is thinking that water is wet. Content
Externalism entails that if one has a thought about water, then one must have had in-
teracted with H2O. Assuming one can know by reflection that Content Externalism is
true, and assuming a closure principle for reflective knowledge, the McKinsey Para-
dox aims to show that one can know by reflection a contingent fact about the external
environment (e.g., one can know by reflection that one has interacted with H2O), yet
this is (supposedly) absurd.
By requiring the rational support to be both factive and reflectively accessible, and
assuming the plausible thesis that it is possible to know by reflection alone that seeing
that p entails p, Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED) seems to immediately face a
problem analogous to the one faced by Content Externalism. Pritchard’s formulation
of this so-called Access Problem goes as follows:
The Access Problem5
(AP1) S can know by reflection alone that her reason for believing the
specific empirical proposition p is the factive reason R.
(AP2) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p.
So,
(APC) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition
p.
(Pritchard, 2012: 46)
The first premise AP1 is a direct consequence of Pritchard’s ED. In particular,
what matters for the foregoing argument to go through is the thesis, entailed by ED,
that a subject S can know by reflection alone that R, where S’s rational support R
is S’s seeing that. The second premise AP2 is a thesis about S’s knowledge of the
truth-entailing nature of R. This second premise is usually taken to be plausible, for it
merely assumes that S can know by reflection that seeing that p entails p. However, the
conclusion, which is the result of S’s making a competent deduction, looks (allegedly)
unacceptable. Before evaluating Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem, let me
highlight the crucial role that a Closure Principle for Reflective Knowledge plays in
the foregoing argument. I take the Closure Principle for Reflective knowledge to be
the following CRK:
5In evaluating the McKinsey-style challenge for (ED), Pritchard actually considers four different
formulations of the Access Problem. In this Chapter, I will only refer to the main formulation, while
assuming the agent being in a good+ case, where a good+ case is, following Pritchard’s taxonomy of
good-bad cases, a paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge. See Pritchard, 2012, p. 29-30.
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(CRK): If one knows by reflection that p, and one knows by reflection that
p entails q, and one competently deduces q from p while retaining her
knowledge that p, then one comes to know by reflection that q.6, 7
The foregoing formulation of closure is what underpins the argument driving the
Access Problem. That is, the argument’s validity crucially depends on the truth of
CRK. We can thus briefly summarise the Access Problem as follows: given that it is
possible to know by reflection alone that R (AP1), and that it is possible to know by
reflection alone that R entails p (AP2) then, if CRK is true, it follows that it is possible
to know by reflection alone that p. If Pritchard wants to save ED he thus needs to block
the argument from AP1 to APC.
2.3 Pritchard’s Response to The Access Problem
As described above, what distinguishes Epistemological Disjunctivism is the conjunc-
tion of the following two constraints:
(a) The possibility of having reflective access to one’s rational support R.
(b) The truth-entailing nature of one’s rational support R.
These two constraints underpin AP1 and AP2 respectively. It is thus the conjunc-
tion of (a) and (b) that, together with CRK, gives rise to the Access Problem. Fortu-
nately, Pritchard seems to have a solution to this problem. That is, he argues that:
“the access problem does not represent a challenge to [epistemological
disjunctivism], because the conclusion of the above argument [. . . ] fails
to follow from the premises, contrary to first appearances”
(Pritchard, 2012: 47).
Insofar as Pritchard is not willing to reject either (a) or (b), his line of response
can be defined as compatibilist8. That is, he maintains that the accessibility thesis (a)
and factivity of one’s rational support (b) are jointly compatible. Instead, given the
6This formulation of closure principle is built upon the one offered by Williamson, 2000 and
Hawthorne, 2005.
7Insofar as it is plausible to assume that deductive reasoning is a way of coming to know something
by reflection, the consequent of the conditional CRK might look redundant. However, for the sake of
clarity I will use closure principle for reflective knowledge as stated in CRK.
8The terminology is here borrowed from Jessica Brown who, in her discussion of the McKinsey
paradox for Content Externalism, takes a compatibilist response to the McKinsey Paradox to be one
claiming that Content Externalism and Privileged Access are jointly compatible (Brown, 2004).
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argument from AP1 to APC, he rejects the conclusion APC: given the possibility of
reflective knowledge of one’s rational support, and given factivity of one’s rational
support (as entailed by ED), it does not follow that one can have reflective knowledge
of the empirical proposition p, thereby leaving ED untouched.
But what is Pritchard’s motivation for rejecting the entailment from AP1 and AP2
to APC? The reason why the conclusion APC does not follow from the premises is,
according to Pritchard, that one’s rational and factive support for believing that p is that
one sees that p. That is, although one can have reflective knowledge of one’s rational
support R, once we specify that one’s rational support is the empirical reason that one
sees that p, then it becomes clear that
“S’s route to her acquisition of this (putatively) exclusively reflective knowl-
edge of the target proposition essentially depends on the fact that she has
empirical reason to believe this proposition.”
(Pritchard, 2012: 47, italics added).
This, in a nutshell, explains why S’s knowledge in APC fails to constitute a genuine
instance of reflective knowledge. More precisely, what Pritchard is claiming in the
foregoing quotation is that, in order for one’s instance of propositional knowledge to
be in the market for reflective knowledge, it cannot be essentially dependent on one’s
empirical reasons. It is far from clear what it means for one’s knowledge (and for
one’s propositional attitude more in general) to essentially depend on one’s empirical
reasons, and, unfortunately, Pritchard does not explicitly spell out which notion of
dependency is in play here. Crucially, in order to assess whether Pritchard’s response
to the Access Problem is as effective as he hopes it to be, we need to have a better grasp
of what it means to have reflective access. That is, we need an account of what it takes
for an instance of knowledge to be essentially dependent on any empirical reasons one
might have. More precisely, for Pritchard’s response to be successful, we need a notion
of dependency that meets the following two desiderata:
1. it predicts that one has reflective knowledge of one’s empirical rational support
R (i.e., one’s seeing that).
2. it predicts that one does not have reflective knowledge of what the rational sup-
port R entails (i.e., p).
In what follows, I will consider three ways of understanding this ‘essential depen-
dency’ as it underpins the notion of reflective access: a metaphysical understanding, a
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folk understanding (Section 2.4), and an epistemic understanding (Section 2.5). While
I will consider and develop all three possible readings, I will devote most of my atten-
tion to the epistemic understanding because, as I will point out later, I take this to be
the most charitable interpretation of Pritchard’s words. However, I will argue that none
of these interpretations is able to meet both the above-mentioned desiderata.
2.4 On the Metaphysical and Folk Interpretation of Es-
sential Dependency
As mentioned in the previous section, Pritchard’s way of dealing with the Access Prob-
lem Argument is to reject its conclusion. Although we can have reflective knowledge of
our rational support R (i.e., our seeing that p), we do not have reflective knowledge of
what R entails (i.e., p). This is because, Pritchard says, our knowledge of p essentially
depends on our having empirical reason R in the first place, and reflective knowledge
is knowledge that does not essentially depend on empirical reasons. But what does
it mean for a doxastic attitude to essentially depend on empirical reasons? The first
interpretation I consider here is what I call the metaphysical notion of dependency:
(MD): S’s believing that p metaphysically depends on x for a subject S iff,
S wouldn’t believe that p if x had not been the case.
If MD is the correct way of understanding the notion of ‘essential dependency’,
then, reflective knowledge amounts to the following:
(MDRF): S’s knowledge that p is reflective knowledge iff, S’s knowledge
that p does not metaphysically depend on S’s seeing that p. That is, S’s
knowledge that p is reflective knowledge iff, it is not the case that: if S
hadn’t seen that p, S wouldn’t believe that p.
Can we rely on this metaphysical understanding of the notion of dependency in
order to satisfyingly resist the Access Problem? If S comes to know that p by seeing
that p, then it is plausible to say that S’s knowledge that p metaphysically depends
(in the sense expressed by MD) on S’s seeing that p. For remember that Pritchard is
concerned with paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge9. Therefore, if S knows
9The reason why it is important to stress that Pritchard is concerned with paradigmatic cases of
perceptual knowledge is that one might be tempted to say that, if MD is the right interpretation of the
notion of essential dependency in play, then S knows that p by reflection. After all, one might say,
even if S hadn’t seen that p, one might come to know that p in a different way, such as, by testimony.
Appealing to paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge stops this move.
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that p by seeing that p, then S wouldn’t have believed that p if S hadn’t seen that p.
Thus, it looks like MD rightly predicts that one does not have reflective knowledge
of the empirical proposition p. However, note that, if MD is the notion of essential
dependency that we should consider, then, we can’t allow for one to have reflective
knowledge of one’s rational support either. In fact, one’s knowledge of one’s seeing
that p clearly metaphysically depends (in the sense expressed in MD) on S’s seeing
that p. This first metaphysical interpretation of essential dependency is thus not a
promising one, for it fails to meet one of the desiderata that a satisfying interpretation of
essential dependency should have: although it successfully denies reflective knowledge
of the empirical proposition one’s rational support entails, it fails to allow for reflective
knowledge of one’s rational support.
Let us now move onto the second interpretation of essential dependency, namely,
what I call the folk interpretation. Remember, once again, that, on Pritchard’s view,
one’s knowledge can be classified as reflective knowledge iff it does not essentially
depend on one’s empirical reasons. However, a defender of Epistemological Disjunc-
tivism might claim that we should weaken the foregoing notions of ‘essential depen-
dency’ and ‘reflective access’. That is, one might argue that we should understand
‘reflective access’ as referring to a very cheap and undemanding notion, one that is
compatible with the layman’s everyday usage of “knowing something by reflection
alone and without further empirical enquiry”10. The idea here is that, even if one had
to see that p before coming to know that one sees that p, one can acquire this knowl-
edge merely by ‘reflecting’ on one’s situation and without having to carry any further
empirical check. The benefit of appealing to this folk understanding of the notion of
reflective access is that, contrary to the metaphysical interpretation, it allows for re-
flective knowledge of one’s rational support. The drawback of this interpretation is,
however, that it entails that one can have reflective knowledge of the target empirical
proposition entailed by one’s rational support. After all, one can just “reflect” on what
seeing that p entails without having to conduct an empirical check.
Perhaps Pritchard could thus bite the bullet here, thereby granting the possibility
of “reflective knowledge” of a specific empirical proposition p. At the same time,
he could say that, once we are not taking “reflective knowledge” to be any techni-
cal notion, this wouldn’t be a disastrous conclusion after all. Although this might be
a tempting move, this strategy is also doomed to failure, for it is incompatible with
10Littlejohn, 2012 and J. Greco, 2014 seem to have something like this in mind when talking about
reflective knowledge.
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Pritchard’s overall project of offering Epistemological Disjunctivism as being the holy
grail of epistemology, as well as being a non-revisionist theory. First, remember that
Pritchard takes the strength of his Epistemological Disjunctivism to be the fact that it
combines the core internalist intuition together with the core externalist intuition. More
specifically, the reflective access requirement is supposed to account for the internalist
intuition that (doxastic) justification should be considered in relation to the notion of
epistemic responsibility. Crucially, a worry here is that a weakening of the notion of
“reflective access” would fail to capture the internalist notion of access that has been
usually traditionally understood in relation to the technical notion of doxastic respon-
sibility11. Second, and I think more importantly, Pritchard takes another advantage of
his view to be that Epistemological Disjunctivism is not a revisionary theory, thereby
leaving our pre-theoretical intuitions untouched. A biting-the-bullet strategy would
thus fail to account for the general intuition that it is in fact absurd to have “reflective
knowledge” of specific empirical propositions.
2.5 On the Epistemic Interpretation of Essential Depen-
dency
In the previous Section, I have briefly considered two interpretations of the notion of
essential dependency, namely, a metaphysical interpretation and a folk interpretation.
I have shown that neither of them is satisfying. The former is too restrictive and it
predicts that one can have reflective knowledge of neither one’s rational support R
nor what R entails. The latter is too liberal, for it predicts that one can have reflective
knowledge of both one’s rational support R as well as the empirical proposition p one’s
rational support R entails. In the remainder of this Chapter, I will focus on what I call
the ‘epistemic interpretation’ of the notion of essential dependency. I take this to be the
most charitable interpretation of Pritchard’s words. Crucially, I will argue that, despite
being more promising than the metaphysical and folk interpretations, the epistemic
interpretation is nonetheless highly problematic. I will thus conclude that, as things
stand, there is no plausible account of essential dependency (and thus of Reflective
Access) that would enable us to resist the Access Problem, while remaining in line
with the spirit of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism.
I believe that Pritchard’s notion of dependency is to be understood in the light of
11A similar concern is expressed by J. Greco, 2014
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what constitutes his main target of interest, namely, the nature of perceptual knowledge
and, most of all, the nature of a (rational) epistemic basis, together with his interest in
doxastic justification12. Bearing this in mind, I will here understand the notion of
epistemic dependency as the following conditional (EPD):
(EPD) S’s believing that p epistemically depends on x for a subject S iff,
S’s believing that p is based on x.13, 14
If we take EDP to be the notion of dependency Pritchard has in mind, then the
fact that S’s knowledge that p essentially depends on S’s having the empirical reason
that she sees that p is to be understood as the fact that the (rational) reason why S is
believing that p (and, granted that S is in a paradigmatic good case, S knows that p) is
that she sees that p15. In other words, S’s knowledge that p epistemically depends on
S’s seeing that p, insofar as S is basing her belief that p on the fact that she sees that p.
We can recapitulate things as follows: Pritchard has to resist the argument from AP1
to APC in order to save his ED. Given he is committed to both premises AP1 and AP2,
he rejects the conclusion APC. What is Pritchard’s motivation for rejecting APC? The
answer seems to be that, while S’s knowledge that R is reflective, S’s knowledge that p
is not reflective after all, rather it is an instance of empirical knowledge, given that S’s
reason for believing that p is primarily S’s seeing that p. That is S’s knowledge that p
is based on S’s seeing that p.
12His being concerned with what constitutes the epistemic basis for perceptual knowledge becomes
clear in his text, especially in the following two passages:
“[W]hat is key is that one is no longer basing one’s belief on the empirical epistemic support once
the competent proof has been conducted. Indeed, it is only if this is so that the resultant knowledge is
properly classed as exclusively reflective.” (Pritchard, 2012: 48)
“[. . . ] the challenge we are raising for the access problem explicitly concerns a case where the agent
continues to base her belief on the prior empirical epistemic support that she has [i.e., the fact that she
sees that p].” (Pritchard, 2012: 48)
13I take the epistemic basis in (EPD) to be the notion of epistemic basis traditionally involved in the
notion of doxastic justification. This is not an uncontroversial topic. However, an analysis of the notion
of epistemic basis would be beyond the scope of this Chapter. For the purpose of this Chapter, it is
sufficient to cash out the notion of “epistemic basis” in terms of S’s reasons on the basis of which S
believes a target proposition. I will go back to discussing the notion of basing and doxastic justification
in Chapter 4.
14Note that this is not related to what Pritchard has in mind when talking about “epistemic depen-
dence” in Pritchard, 2015.
15I am here assuming that S’s belief that p is based on r iff r is S’s reason for believing that p. Note
that this biconditional is not uncontroversial. In particular one could question the right to left side of the
biconditional. However, this won’t matter for the purpose of the Chapter.
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2.5.1 Why The Epistemic Interpretation is Problematic
In the previous Section, I reconstructed Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem in
the light of an epistemic interpretation of the notion of dependency involved. Prima
facie, it looks like this epistemic interpretation is able to meet the above-mentioned
two desiderata. Crucially, at closer inspection, we can see that, even in the light of this
more promising notion of ‘essential dependency’, Pritchard’s response is problematic.
In particular, I now argue that relying on this epistemic interpretation enables Pritchard
to successfully resist the Access Problem only at the high cost of rejecting a plausible
Closure Principle for Reflective Knowledge. Let’s see why.
As I have mentioned previously in this Chapter, Pritchard’s response to the Access
Problem can be thought of as a compatibilist one, insofar as he argues that factivity of
rational support and privileged access are jointly compatible (as follows from ED). Let
us go back to the Access Problem as originally stated by Pritchard:
The Access Problem
(AP1) S can know by reflection alone that her reason for believing the
specific empirical proposition p is the factive reason R.
(AP2) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p.
So,
(APC) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition
p.
(Pritchard, 2012: 46)
If Pritchard wants to save ED, he needs to block the argument from AP1 and AP2
to APC. He cannot reject AP1 without giving up his view, for, as mentioned above,
AP1 directly follows from ED. He cannot reject AP2 without embracing very counter-
intuitive ideas, for, as mentioned above, AP2 is overwhelmingly plausible. Rejecting
the conclusion APC, thereby questioning the argument’s validity, seems thus to be the
only way to go. As we have seen, the way Pritchard argues for the rejection of APC
is by pointing out that S’s knowledge that p essentially depends on S’s having factive
reason R (i.e., on S’s seeing that p). On Pritchard’s view, even if we grant the possibil-
ity of reflective knowledge of R and reflective knowledge of the truth-entailing nature
of R, the allegedly disastrous conclusion APC does not follow, for S already knows the
specific empirical proposition p on the basis of her factive rational support R. The most
S can come to know by reflection alone is something about her rational support, and
not the specific empirical proposition p (Pritchard, 2012: 51). As Pritchard maintains
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when reformulating the Access Problem, what follows from AP1 and AP2 is, at best,
the following modified conclusion (MAPC):
(MAPC) “[. . . ] S can know by reflection alone that her reason for believ-
ing the specific empirical proposition p is the factive empirical reason R
that entails p” (Pritchard, 2012: 51).
But, is MAPC really the strongest claim you can get from AP1, AP2 and CRK, as
presented in the Access Problem? I here argue that it is not.
In order to see clearly what is in play in Pritchard’s response, and why MAPC is
not the strongest claim we can get from AP1 and AP2, let us reformulate Pritchard’s
modified argument, namely, one which has AP1 and AP2 as its premises, and MAPC
as its conclusion. Let RKs be “S knows by reflection alone that”; let rs be “S has factive
rational support R” and let p be an empirical proposition:
(AP1*) RKs[rs]
(AP2*) RKs[rs ⊃ p]
(MAPC) RKs[rs&(rs ⊃ p)]
The above formulation of the argument shows that the conclusion MAPC results
from the conjunction of one’s reflective knowledge of one’s having rational support R
(AP1) with one’s knowledge of the truth-entailing nature of one’s rational support R
(AP2). What Pritchard needs to assume in order to derive the conclusion MAPC from
the premises is nothing as strong as a closure principle CRK, but rather a mere Principle
of Agglomeration16. Crucially, if this is correct, Pritchard’s reformulated version of the
argument fails to capture the real worry addressed by the original Access Problem17.
The original Access Problem, as Pritchard himself presents it, is one which involves
the possibility of knowing by reflection alone the conceptual implications that follow
from one’s previous reflective knowledge, assuming that reflective knowledge is closed
under known entailment. If Pritchard wants to save his ED from the Access Problem,
16I take a general Principle of Agglomeration for reflective knowledge to be the following conditional:
(KRs[p]&KRs[q])⊃ KRs[p&q].
17In fact, it would also fail to capture McKinsey’s original worry. When describing the paradox, what
McKinsey has in mind is a conceptual notion of dependency, and the problem is one involving a closure
principle for knowledge. He writes:
“[I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and
your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence
of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world
exists” (McKinsey, 1991: 16).
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he should thus consider the original formulation of the Access Problem in the first
place, one which rests on the above-mentioned closure principle CRK (and not one
involving the Principle of Agglomeration). Crucially, once the Closure Principle for
Reflective Knowledge is back on the table, it is easy to see that MAPC is no longer the
strongest claim we can get from the premises AP1 and AP2. In fact, if we reformulate
the argument involving a Closure Principle for Reflective Knowledge (CRK), we can
derive the stronger conclusion APC, i.e., that it is possible to have reflective knowledge
of a specific empirical proposition p:
(AP1*) KRs[rs]
(AP2*) KRs[rs ⊃ p]
(APC*) KRs[p]18
Remember that what Pritchard needs is an account of ‘essential dependency’ (and
thus of ‘reflective knowledge’) that meets the following two desiderata:
1. it predicts that one has reflective knowledge of one’s rational support R (i.e.,
one’s seeing that).
2. it predicts that one does not have reflective knowledge of what the rational sup-
port R entails (i.e., p).
What I have argued for in this section is that, although the epistemic interpretation
of the notion of essential dependency seems more promising than the metaphysical and
the folk interpretation, it is still unsatisfying. Merely appealing to this epistemic notion
of essential dependency doesn’t enable us to satisfyingly meet the above-mentioned
desiderata. Although understanding reflective knowledge in terms of epistemic depen-
dency allows us to account for reflective knowledge of one’s rational support, it is not
able explain why one cannot gain reflective knowledge of what the rational support
entails. If the notion of reflective access underpinning Epistemological Disjunctivism
is to be cashed out in terms of epistemic dependency then, Pritchard cannot resist the
conclusion of the Access Problem, unless he is willing to reject a plausible Closure
Principle for Reflective Knowledge. As I have shown, by questioning the argument’s
validity, Pritchard has to account for the fact that the argument is valid iff the Closure
Principle for Reflective Knowledge is true. To sum up: with an epistemic notion of
essential dependency in place, the only way to resist the Access Problem is thus to
reject the following plausible Closure Principle for Reflective Knowledge:
18It is worth noting that a single premise closure is actually enough to take us from (MAPC) to the
undesirable consequence (APC*).
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(CRK): If one knows by reflection alone that p, and one knows by reflec-
tion alone that p entails q, and one competently deduces q from p while
retaining her knowledge that p, then one comes to know by reflection alone
that q.
2.5.2 Restricting Closure
Defenders of Pritchard’s version of ED could reply by biting the bullet once again:
they could be willing to reject both APC as well as CRK. Crucially, this does not seem
to be what Pritchard has in mind. If Pritchard were really committed to rejection of
closure principle, then it is not clear why he never explicitly blames closure as being
what generates this prima facie McKinsey-style problem19. As things stand, it seems
Pritchard’s disjunctivism is in trouble. Perhaps, however, we can think of a possible
solution. One possible strategy could be to argue for the following restricted version
of closure (CRK’):
(CRK’) If one knows by reflection alone that p, and one competently
deduces q from p while retaining one’s knowledge by reflection that p,
thereby coming to believe that q for the first time (on a reflective basis, or
on any other basis), then one comes to know by reflection alone that q20.
Pritchard could argue that the only closure principle we should consider seriously
is the restricted CRK’. The advantage of arguing for CRK’ is straightforward: by ap-
pealing to CRK’ Pritchard could provide an explanation of why APC fails to follow
from the premises, while anyway retaining a version of closure. By posing an extra
condition (i.e., one deductively comes to know that q for the first time), the weaker
CRK’ is entailed by CRK, thereby allowing Pritchard to reject the latter without re-
jecting the former version of closure. Crucially, while CRK is needed in order for the
Access Problem argument to go through, CRK’ does not give rise to the same problem.
Given that one knows by reflection alone that one has R, and that R entails p, it is easy
for one to bring about a competent deduction, thereby coming to know by reflection
that p. However, this piece of deductive knowledge is merely a second way in which
19In his [2012: 51] Pritchard writes: “[T]he reasoning at issue in the access problem is revealed to be
fallacious, in that for the premises to be true it simply cannot be the case that S’s knowledge of the target
proposition is exclusively reflective”. One might read this passage as showing Pritchard’s commitment
to rejecting closure, yet he never explicitly commits himself to such a rejection. On the contrary, al-
though Pritchard never mentions a Closure Principle for Reflective Knowledge in his discussion of the
access problem, he does explicitly consider a very similar variety of closure principle for knowledge in
other sections of his book. (see Pritchard, 2012: 68).
20Remember that I am still assuming a notion of reflective knowledge as understood in Section 2.5,
namely, as knowledge that does not epistemically depend on empirical reasons.
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one knows that p. That is, one does not know that p on a reflective basis for the first
time, for one first comes to know that p empirically by means of seeing that p. It
follows that from AP1, AP2 and a weaker closure CRK’, the conclusion APC does not
follow. To recapitulate: Pritchard resists the Access Problem argument by rejecting
its conclusion, namely, by questioning its validity. Since, as I have pointed out above,
the validity of the argument driving the Access Problem depends on the acceptance of
CRK, Pritchard is also forced to reject CRK. At the same time, there is another closure
principle for reflective knowledge, namely CRK’, that Pritchard can easily embrace
without being forced to accept the Access Problem as a real challenge for ED.
Crucially, there are some problems with this restricted closure principle. First, it
is far from obvious why we should embrace this restricted version of closure principle
and reject the unrestricted one. In order to see why I take CRK’ to be left unmotivated,
let us imagine a paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge. Let us suppose that S
sees that q, thereby coming to know that q at time t1. Let us now suppose that, at a
later time t2, S also gets testimony knowledge that p, and that p entails q. It seems
intuitive to say that, given a plausible closure principle for testimonial knowledge, S
also knows that q by testimony. Let us now consider the following restricted version
of closure principle for testimonial knowledge:
(CTK’) If one knows by testimony that p, and one knows by testimony
that p entails q, and one competently deduces q from p while retaining
her knowledge that p, thereby coming to believe that q for the first time
(on a testimony basis, or on any other basis), then one comes to know by
testimony that q.
If we were to embrace CTK’ (instead of an unrestricted closure principle for testi-
monial knowledge), nothing will guarantee that the conclusion that [S has testimonial
knowledge that q at time t2] is true, insofar as S does not come to have testimonial
knowledge that q for the first time (in fact, she already knew that q at t1). This, how-
ever, seems counterintuitive, for it is plausible to say that S can know that q both
perceptually and, at a later time, by testimony. We probably wouldn’t be willing to
reject an unrestricted closure principle for testimonial knowledge in favour of the re-
stricted (CTK’): (CTK’) does not look appealing. But then, why should we embrace a
restricted closure for reflective knowledge, while rejecting restricted closure for testi-
monial knowledge? The point I want to make is that, we should expect any defender
of a restricted closure principle, such as CRK’, to have a general strong motivation
for favouring restricted closure principles over unrestricted ones. Crucially, it is not
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clear what reasons could be behind restricted closure principle. Besides avoiding the
foregoing problem, what motivations underpin CRK’ is left unclear, thereby making
this restriction looking like an ad hoc move.
One could rightly object that as stated (CTK’) is questionable21. However, I think
we can raise a more general concern, one that is enough to show the implausibility of
restricted closure principle even to those who might want to reject my first point by
stressing that it is not clear whether testimony knowledge is closed under competent
deduction. In fact, the previous consideration shows that, more generally, a restricted
closure principle seems to strike against the intuition that it is indeed possible to know
a specific proposition in more than one way. Consider the following scenario. John
is a first-year student in math. One day John goes to the lecture and his professor,
Jane, mentions that there are infinitely many prime numbers. John thus comes to know
this proposition by testimony. Suppose that some later time, John is actually able to
prove that there are infinitely many prime numbers. He reasons and he deductively
proves that proposition. Thus, John now knows the same proposition by reflection and
deductive reasoning. Crucially, although John’s knowledge is the result of deductive
reasoning, he does not come to know that proposition for the first time, as required by
CRK’. It follows that, if CRK’ (and not CRK) is the relevant variety of closure prin-
ciple, then nothing will guarantee that John comes to know by reflection that there are
infinitely many prime numbers. But this is highly counterintuitive22. Rejecting CRK,
yet holding CRK’ might thus have the effect of preventing someone from knowing
something in more than one way. Once again, this restricted closure principle does not
look appealing.
One might rightly point out that there is a crucial asymmetry between the scenario
involving John and Jane, and the original scenario involved in the formulation of the
Access Problem. While in the John and Jane scenario we have a combination of tes-
timony and reflective knowledge, in the original scenario we have a combination of
perceptual and reflective knowledge. It can then be argued that the way in which re-
flective knowledge depends on experience in the first scenario is not the same way
in which reflective knowledge depends on testimony knowledge in the John and Jane
scenario. In fact, while in the Access Problem S could have not had reflective knowl-
edge that p without having had experience that p in the first place, the same is not
21In particular, one might say that one’s basis for q isn’t just testimony, but inference from
testimonially-supplied premises. Thanks to Aidan McGlynn for stressing this point.
22Note that we can get the same result when considering any conjunction of a contingent truth with a
logical truth, e.g., the proposition that [the sun is shining &(p
∨
¬p)].
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true in the second scenario: John could have gained reflective knowledge that there are
infinitely many prime numbers even without having had testimony knowledge of that
proposition. But this line of objection seems to appeal to the notion of metaphysical
dependency we have seen in the first half of this Chapter, one that, as I have shown,
we should not use to cash out the notion of ‘reflective access’ underpinning Epistemo-
logical Disjunctivism. Furthermore, and more importantly, what my argument aims to
show is merely that even if CRK’, as it stands, turns out to be true, it is nevertheless
limited in its application and we should thus also embrace CRK.
It is worth noting, however, that Pritchard is well aware of this problem and he
explicitly denies the idea that one can never have reflective knowledge of a proposition
if one already had empirical knowledge of the proposition. He says:
“Note that the worry being raised here is not that one cannot come to
have exclusively reflective knowledge of a proposition in cases where one
already has an empirical basis for believing that proposition, since this is
clearly false.” (Pritchard, 2012: 48)
In fact, he claims that the challenge posed by the Access Problem is more specific
than that. After considering a case similar to the one I presented here, a case in which
a student learns something first empirically, and then by means of a proof, he says:
“Accordingly, it had better not be the case that the difficulty we are raising
for the access problem trades on the idea that one cannot come to have ex-
clusively reflective knowledge of a proposition in cases where one already
has an empirical basis for believing that proposition. Fortunately for us, it
doesn’t. For notice that the challenge we are posing for the access prob-
lem is in fact far more specific. In the case just described where one moves
from having empirical epistemic support to having (overwhelming) reflec-
tive epistemic support, and where one comes to know on this latter basis
alone, what is key is that one is no longer basing one’s belief on the empir-
ical epistemic support once the competent proof has been conducted. In-
deed, it is only if this is so that the resultant knowledge is properly classed
as exclusively reflective.”
(Pritchard, 2012: 48)
Pritchard’s point thus seems to be that when S comes to know that p in the con-
clusion of the Access Problem, S is still basing her belief on her empirical epistemic
support once the deductive reasoning has been conducted. That is why, on his view,
S’s belief that p in the conclusion cannot be classified as reflective knowledge. Cru-
cially, it is really not clear why he would allow for reflective knowledge in the case of
the student, but not in the case described by the Access Problem. What prevents the
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subject of our Access Problem from believing that p on a mere reflective basis, once
he came to know that p empirically? In a nutshell, Pritchard owes an explanation as
to why the subject S in the Access Problem Argument cannot believe that p while no
longer basing her belief that p on her empirical support R, while the student can do
that.
Before moving on to the next section, I want to make a final remark. The consid-
erations I have drawn so far, and the arguments I have provided, show that if Pritchard
wants to save his Epistemological Disjunctivism he has some work to do. But what
I have said so far also enables us to make a step forward towards understanding the
source of dissatisfaction with Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem. That is, the
main reason why Pritchard’s response is not a satisfying one derives from the fact that
the notion of reflective access underpinning ED is unclear. In this Chapter, I have tried
to fill in this gap by providing three ways of interpreting the notion of reflective access.
Crucially, I have shown that none of them comes without serious problems. Before
concluding the Chapter, I will consider an alternative diagnosis of Pritchard’s response
to the Access Problem, one recently put forward by Kraft (Kraft, 2015). I will argue
that my diagnosis of what’s problematic with Pritchard’s response is to be preferred.
2.6 An Alternative Diagnosis: Tim Kraft’s Source/Content
Distinction
As I mentioned in the introduction of this Chapter, not much attention has been devoted
to the Access Problem for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism. In this final sec-
tion, I consider one of the few papers explicitly addressing this problem, namely, Tim
Kraft’s recent paper (Kraft, 2015), which provides an alternative diagnosis of where
Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem goes wrong. I argue that the source/content
distinction underpinning his diagnosis is unmotivated.
Kraft’s starting point in critically evaluating Pritchard’s response is the same as
mine. He quotes the relevant passage where Pritchard explicitly states that, contrary
to first appearances, the conclusion of the argument fails to follow from the premises
(Kraft quoting Pritchard, 2015: 318). Kraft then acknowledges that, by rejecting the
entailment from the premises to the conclusion, Pritchard is rejecting a plausible clo-
sure principle for reflective knowledge. In fact, he takes rejection of closure to be the
only palatable option available to the disjunctivist. He writes:
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“[t]his leaves epistemological disjunctivism with only one option as a se-
rious contender: the culprit must be closure of reflective knowledge. [. . . ]
[T]his is the option chosen by Pritchard.” (Kraft, 2015: 317)
However, Kraft points out that Pritchard does not provide an explanation as to
why closure for reflective knowledge fails in the Access Problem argument. In his
paper, Kraft attempts to fill in this gap. He argues that an explanation can be given by
appealing to a distinction between the source and the content of the empirical support.
Roughly put, the idea is that there are two ways in which our epistemic support can be
empirical:
“According to the source criterion, R is empirical support for believing
that p iff the source of one’s knowledge of, or of one’s access to, R is
empirical. [. . . ] According to the content criterion, R is empirical support
for believing that p iff the content of R has the form I φ that p, with φ,
being a perceptual or experiential verb” (Kraft, 2015: 319).
The advantage of appealing to the source/content distinction is, according to Kraft,
twofold. First, the source/content distinction constitutes the conceptual tool the dis-
junctivist needs in order to account for the possibility of having reflective knowledge
of an empirical support. Second, and more importantly, the source/content distinction
would offer an explanation of why reflective knowledge fails to be closed under com-
petent deduction. In order to see how it can do so, let us recall the original Access
Problem argument:
(AP1) S can know by reflection alone that R.
(AP2) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p.
So,
(APC) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition
p.
With respect to the first point, Kraft claims that, once the source/content distinc-
tion is available, we can classify S’s knowledge that R in the premise AP1 as reflec-
tive knowledge because, despite the fact that R is empirical in the content sense, R is
nonetheless reflective in the source sense. Hence, what Kraft seems to be suggesting
is that the nature of the belief’s source is what determines whether the target instance
of knowledge should be classified as reflective rather than empirical.
But how is the source/content distinction supposed to explain why reflective knowl-
edge is not closed under competent deduction? Here is what Kraft says with respect to
this second point:
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“If one deduces something from something known reflectively, one always
ends up with more knowledge, but not necessarily with more reflective
knowledge. Reflective access is lost if the first belief is reflective in the
source sense but not in the content sense.” (Kraft, 2015: 319, italics is
mine)
As I have just explained, Kraft takes S’s knowledge in AP1 to be reflective because
R in AP1 is reflective in the source sense, despite being empirical in the content sense.
Kraft does not explicitly say anything about S’s knowledge in AP2, but in the light of
what we have just said, we can plausibly assume he would classify it as an instance
of reflective knowledge as well. In fact, the rational support R in AP2 is empirical in
the content sense, but reflective in the source sense. Finally – and here is the crucial
bit - Kraft takes S’s knowledge in APC to be empirical knowledge because, as he says,
“reflective access is lost if the first belief is reflective in the source sense but not in the
content sense”. Why is this so? Here is Kraft’s motivation behind this:
“[w]henever I see that p and believe that p (on that basis), my belief that
p is empirical in the source sense – no matter how I can know that I see
that p” (Kraft, 2015: 319, italics added).
Remember that the source of our knowledge that R is what defines whether this
target knowledge is empirical or reflective. To say that “my believe that p is empirical
in the source sense” is thus to say, in Kraft’s jargon, that my belief (and hence my
knowledge) that p is an instance of empirical knowledge. This is supposed to explain
why APC fails to follow from AP1 and AP2. Nevertheless, in the second half of his
paper, Kraft argues that the Access Problem for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunc-
tivism cannot be solved anyway. This is because – Kraft says – the source/content
distinction can be employed only if a so-called “independent requirement” is met, but,
as it turns out, Pritchard’s disjunctivism does not meet such a requirement. Here I
shall not discuss whether Pritchard’s disjunctivism does or does not meet this “inde-
pendent requirement”. What I will focus on is the plausibility of Kraft’s diagnosis and
his source/content distinction in the first place. In particular, in what follows, I show
that Kraft’s source/content distinction is highly implausible, and that the way this dis-
tinction is exploited fails to capture the real reason why the Access Problem originally
arises for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism.
Before considering the source/content distinction, let me make an important clarifi-
cation on the general dialectic within which Kraft develops his diagnosis of Pritchard’s
response. Remember that Kraft takes the rejection of closure for reflective knowledge
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to be the option chosen by Pritchard. However, this is far from being obviously the
case. In fact, as I have stressed in the first half of this Chapter, Pritchard never men-
tions the closure principle for reflective knowledge when resisting the Access Problem.
Kraft takes rejection of closure as the only plausible option available to the disjunc-
tivist. Whether this is true or not, it is something Pritchard should not happily welcome.
Instead, as I’ve shown in the first half of this Chapter, it is the undesirable consequence
Pritchard has to pay if he wants to resist the Access Problem in a way that is in line
with the overall spirit of his Epistemological Disjunctivism.
Let us now move onto considering Kraft’s source/content distinction. First, Kraft’s
source/content distinction, and the way he exploits it in order to explain why APC fails
to follow from AP1, is unmotivated. On one hand, Kraft seems to take the source
criterion to be what determines the nature of one’s knowledge. In fact, remember that
it is exactly by appealing to S’s knowledge being reflective in the source sense that
Kraft explains out the possibility of having reflective knowledge in AP1. On the other
hand, remember that Kraft takes S’s knowledge that p in APC to be not reflective,
because S’s belief in APC is deduced from her belief that R in AP1, which, despite
being reflective in the source sense, is empirical in the content sense. Again, as Kraft
puts it: “reflective access is lost if the first belief is reflective in the source sense but not
in the content sense”. However, there is no reason why the content of S’s knowledge
in AP1 should have a role in determining the nature of S’s belief in APC, namely, of
the belief S infers from S’s original instance of knowledge in AP1, together with S’s
reflective knowledge in AP2. That is, there is no reason why the content of S’s belief
in AP1 should have a role in determining the source of S’s belief in APC. Furthermore,
it is completely arbitrary to state, as Kraft seems to be doing, that the content of S’s
belief in AP1 is what determines the source of S’s belief in APC, while leaving the
source of the belief in AP1 untouched. I take this to be a very puzzling aspect of the
way Kraft exploits the source/content distinction.
Second, if we follow Kraft’s way of exploiting the source/content distinction, we
have a very controversial scenario in which one starts off with reflective knowledge
(as in (AP1)), and ends up with empirical knowledge (as in (APC)), without doing
anything but bringing about a competent deduction. I believe this upshot is even more
absurd than the one predicted by the original Access Problem.
Third, the source/content distinction, as Kraft uses it, has the undesirable result
of classifying paradigmatic instances of reflective knowledge as cases of empirical
knowledge. We have seen that, according to Kraft, one can have reflective knowledge
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of R, insofar as one’s knowledge is reflective in the source sense. However, if one’s
knowledge of R is empirical in the content sense, then any other knowledge one has af-
ter the first belief will lose its reflective status. Or at least, this is what Kraft maintains.
Let’s assume for a moment that he’s right in saying that S’s knowledge that R in AP1
can be classified as reflective, while S’s knowledge that p in APC should be classified
as empirical. From S’s knowledge that p (in APC), S can easily infer, and thereby
know, that (p
∨
¬p). Crucially, if Kraft’s diagnosis is correct, then we are forced to
classify S’s knowledge that (p
∨
¬p) as empirical. But everyone would agree in taking
S’s knowledge that (p
∨
¬p) to be non empirical. However, here Kraft might have an
explanation accounting for the puzzling phenomenon I have just described, namely the
fact that:
“[w]henever I see that p and believe that p (on that basis), my belief that p
[in APC] is empirical in the source sense – no matter how I can know that
I see that p” (Kraft, 2015: 319, italics added).
If this were so, perhaps we should just accept this way of exploiting the source/content
distinction – pace our pre-theoretical intuitions. Note, however, that the way he sets up
the problem is mistaken in the first place. Kraft is assuming that S’s belief that p in the
conclusion APC is based on S’s seeing that p. Crucially, this is exactly what is under
discussion in the Access Problem. As I mentioned in the previous sections, the original
problem is one in which S comes to know, by deductive reasoning alone, the concep-
tual implications of S’s previous reflective knowledge. For the same reason, to say that
it does not matter how I can know that I see that p (Kraft, 2015: 319), is to simply
dismiss the Access Problem as it originally arises for Pritchard’s view. Once we take
seriously the challenge posed by the Access Problem, we are then back to consider a
case in which S comes to believe and know that p in APC by deductive reasoning.
In the light of the above considerations, I take my diagnosis of where Pritchard’s
argument goes wrong to be preferred over Kraft’s one. Besides avoiding the unaccept-
able results that Kraft’s source/content distinction faces, my diagnosis better captures
what is at the bottom of the Access Problem. That is, the diagnosis I’ve offered better
highlights that what generates the Access Problem can eventually be traced back to a
weakness of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism: a lack of a clear and plausi-
ble account of what he calls “reflective access”. Furthermore, while Kraft’s diagnosis
appeals to a controversial distinction, one that Pritchard does not explicitly embrace,
the diagnosis I have provided relies on (and only on) claims that can be derived from
Pritchard’s own version of Epistemological Disjunctivism.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this Chapter, I have addressed the Access Problem for Pritchard’s Epistemological
Disjunctivism (ED). The Access Problem, which mirrors the more notorious McKinsey-
paradox, aims to show that the conjunction of accessibilism and factivity of rational
support (as entailed by ED) leads to the unacceptable conclusion that one can have
reflective knowledge of a specific empirical proposition. In his book, Pritchard offers
a way of resisting the problem, namely, he argues that the conclusion fails to follow
from the premises: S does not know the specific empirical proposition p by reflection.
Pritchard points out that one’s instance of knowledge can be classified as ‘reflective’
only if it does not essentially depend on any empirical reasons. Crucially, he does not
provide us with a detailed account of what it takes for a doxastic attitude to essentially
depend on empirical reasons. In this Chapter, I have argued that in order to assess the
plausibility of Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem, we first need to clarify what
it takes for someone to have Reflective Access in the first place. In particular, a sat-
isfying account of Reflective Access (and the related notion of essential dependency)
has to meet the following desiderata: 1. it has to allow for reflective access of one’s
rational support; 2. it has to deny reflective access to the proposition one’s rational
support entails. I have thus provided three interpretations of the notion of essential
dependency underlying Reflective Access: a metaphysical, a folk, and an epistemic
interpretation. I have shown that none of the account is a satisfying one. The meta-
physical account fails to meet the first desideratum. The folk interpretation fails to
meet the second desideratum. Most of my attention has however been devoted to the
epistemic interpretation insofar as I take this to be the most charitable interpretation of
Pritchard’s own words. Crucially, I have argued that the only way in which appealing
to the epistemic interpretation enables us to resist the Access Problem, thereby meet-
ing both the desiderata, comes at the high cost of rejecting a plausible closure principle
for Reflective Knowledge. Finally, I have considered an alternative attempt to make
sense of Pritchard’s response to the Access Problem, namely, the one offered by Kraft
(2015). I have argued that the source/content distinction Kraft appeals to is unmoti-
vated and leads to undesirable consequences. As things stand, and without a clear and
unproblematic account of Reflective Access, the Access Problem remains a challenge
for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism.
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Concluding Remark on Part I
In Part I, I have considered the so-called Access Problem for Evidential External-
ism. More precisely, I have focused on the Access Problem as it seems to arise for
Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012) and Williamson’s E=K (2000).
We can now ask: does the Access Problem represent a challenge for Evidential
Externalism? Given what I have argued for in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, I believe we
should answer this question as follows: it depends on the variety of Evidential Ex-
ternalism we are considering. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 show that, while the Access
Problem represents a real threat for Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism, it does
not constitute a serious challenge for Williamson’s E=K. More precisely, what Chapter
1 and Chapter 2 show is that, whether the Access Problem represents a serious threat
for Evidential Externalism or not seems to depend on the specific variety of Evidential
Externalism, and on what notion of ‘reflective knowledge’ the target Evidential Exter-
nalist view is committed to. Crucially, I have argued that no matter how we define this
notion of ‘reflective access’, Pritchard’s Disjunctivist view will be in trouble. That is,
Chapter 2 shows that there does not seem to be a notion of ‘reflective access’ available
that resists the access problem while remaining in the spirit of Pritchard’s Disjunc-
tivism (i.e., while remaining the alleged holy grail of epistemology). Williamson’s
E=K, however, is not committed to any specific thesis about ‘reflective knowledge’.
Chapter 1 shows that the account of reflective knowledge I develop, one on which
‘reflective’ knowledge is based on more than merely enabling experience, is perfectly
compatible with E=K and it is able to successfully resist the Access Problem.
At the end of the day, I believe what Pritchard should do is to just give up on
such a strong accessibility requirement and embrace a biting-the-bullet strategy. That
is, he should just accept that we do have knowledge of contingent propositions about
the external environment, and yet this ‘reflective knowledge’ is not absurd once we
take seriously the idea that even ‘reflective knowledge’ is based on more than merely
enabling experience, as Chapter 1 shows. Of course, as I have already stressed, this
would come at the cost of not capturing the internalist intuition, and, furthermore, it
would mean accepting that Epistemological Disjunctivism is a revisionist theory.
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Part II
Evidential Externalism and The
Infallibility Problem
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Introduction
In Part I of this thesis, I have considered the so-called Access Problem for Evidential
Externalism. In particular, I have focused on two prominent varieties of Evidential
Externalism: Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism and Williamson’s E=K. I have
argued that, while the Access Problem represents a challenge for Pritchard’s view, it
does not constitute a real threat to E=K.
In Part II I will address another argument that has been raised against Eviden-
tial Externalism, the so-called Infallibility Problem. Remember that by ‘Evidential
Externalism’ I mean the mere denial of Evidential Internalism, the thesis on which
one’s evidence supervenes on one’s non-factive mental states. As I have stressed in
the Introduction of this thesis, the core idea underpinning Evidential Externalism is
that features external to one’s environment make a difference on what evidence one
has. One worry one might have is that, if evidence is so strictly connected with how
things are in the external environment, then Evidential Externalism seems to be com-
mitted to the idea that evidence gives you a sort of “infallible knowledge of the world”.
Assume for now that propositionalism is true (roughly put, the idea that evidence is
propositional in its nature) (Cf. Williamson, 2000: Ch. 9). On Evidential Internalism,
evidence is restricted to propositions about one’s non-factive mental states. By deny-
ing Evidential Internalism, and assuming that all one’s evidence is constituted by true
propositions, Evidential Externalism will allow for one’s “box of evidence” to contain
propositions about the world. This seems to be a desirable features of Evidential Exter-
nalism. However, as a consequence some propositions about the world are going to be
certain23 given our evidence, and this might clash with the intuition about the limits of
our knowledge. Consider again Gary and Barry. Remember that Gary and Barry share
the same non-factive mental states, but Barry is radically deceived, while Gary is in a
paradigmatic good case. Both Gary and Barry have a seeming of two bananas in the
bowl, but only Gary’s environment actually includes two bananas in a bowl. Evidential
Externalism entails that Gary and Barry differ in the evidence they have. In fact, the
Evidential Externalist will say that Gary’s evidence is incompatible with Garry being
in a radically deceived situation as Barry is. How things are in the environment deter-
mine the evidence one has. In a sense, if Evidential Externalism is the correct view
of evidence, and evidence is so strictly related to how in fact things are in the external
23Note that it is not very clear how we should understand ‘certain’. I will address this issue in the
coming Chapter.
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environment, then, given Garry is in a paradigmatic good case, he seems to have some
sort of infallible knowledge. Crucially, it is overwhelmingly plausible to think that we
can never get such an infallible knowledge. Plausibly, most of our beliefs are under-
determined by our evidence. In essence, one might worry that Evidential Externalism
is committed to some sceptical variety of infallibilism. I will call this the Infallibility
Problem for Evidential Externalism, and it will represent the topic of Part II.
This Part is constituted by Chapter 3, and it is followed by a general conclusion.
In Chapter 3, I consider the Infallibility Problem for E=K as presented by Dylan Dodd
(2005). I will argue that, although Williamson’s E=K is committed to a form of infal-
libilism, this, by itself, does not give rise to any sceptical worry.
While in Part I I have considered the Access Problem for both E=K and Episte-
mological Disjunctivism respectively, in Part II, I will focus my attention on E=K. Re-
member that Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism is a view that concerns paradig-
matic cases of perceptual knowledge only. However, I take it that, at least in this
debate, epistemologists are willing to grant that in paradigmatic cases of perceptual
knowledge our beliefs are generally not underdetermined by our evidence. Neverthe-
less, one might feel the pull of the underdetermination thesis when it comes to beliefs
about the future and, more generally, beliefs about what we cannot directly perceive.
Given the restricted scope of Epistemological Disjunctivism, then, even if Epistemo-
logical Disjunctivism is committed to a version of infallibilism, it seems that it would
have no straightforward sceptical implication. Contrary to Epistemological Disjunc-
tivism, E=K does not restrict its scope to paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge
and we should thus take the Infallibility Problem for E=K seriously.
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Chapter 3
E=K and the Infallibility Problem
3.1 Introduction
Infallibilism has gained a very bad reputation amongst epistemologists, for it has been
blamed as being a source of scepticism. In essence, the problem seems to be that the
epistemic standards required by the infallibilist are too high to be realistically achieved.
Hence, the sceptical worry arises. For this reason, as soon as a theory of knowledge,
or epistemic justification, seemed to have an infallibilist vibe, philosophers have often
not hesitated to discard the target theory as an implausible view, one that is incom-
patible with the assumption that - to use Lewis’ words – “we know a lot” (Lewis,
1996). A perfect example of the idea that we should be ready to embrace scepti-
cism if we want to be infallibilist can be found in Dodd (2005)1. According to Dodd,
Williamson’s E=K is committed to infallibilism, thereby being the source of sceptical
troubles. More precisely, Dodd argues that E=K leads to scepticism when jointly taken
with the overwhelmingly plausible thesis that virtually all of our beliefs are underde-
termined by our evidence. So, Williamson seems to face a dilemma: either he rejects
the overwhelmingly plausible Underdetermination Thesis, or he accepts the sceptical
conclusion. None of the options look very promising.
The aim of this Chapter is two-fold. First, by focusing on Dodd’s argument against
E=K, I will show that he provides us with a false dilemma: Williamson could both
embrace E=K and a plausible Underdetermination Thesis without facing any sceptical
problem. In order to show that Dodd provides us with a false dilemma, I will formu-
late varieties of infallibilism, and I will show that for each infallibilist thesis we can
1Note that somewhere else Dodd argues in favour of infallibilism, while saying we should in fact be
willing to accept skepticism (Dodd, 2011)
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formulate a corresponding variety of underdetermination thesis. Developing this plu-
ralism about infallibilism and Underdetermination theses will not only enable me to
resist Dodd’s dilemma, but it will also enable me to draw some more general conclu-
sion concerning the status of infallibilism. That is – and here is the second aim of the
Chapter – it will enable me to show that the bad reputation infallibilism has gained
is undeserved. This pluralism about infallibilism and underdetermination theses will
show that infallibilism per se is not the source of any sceptical worry. Rather, each va-
riety of infallibilism leads to scepticism when jointly taken with its corresponding va-
riety of underdetermination thesis. One might think that this is far from a consolation
for the infallibilist, insofar as this verdict concurs with Dodd’s conclusion regarding
the incompatibility between infallibilism and underdetermination theses. Crucially, I
argue that once we have all varieties of infallibilism and underdetermination theses
on the table, we should take seriously the possibility of mismatching infallibilism and
underdetermination across the taxonomy. This will be enough to show that Dodd’s
dilemma is a false dilemma: E=K entails some varieties of infallibilism that, when
combined with some non-corresponding varieties of underdetermination theses, avoid
scepticism. Furthermore, this will show that not only there are various ways of be-
ing an infallibilist, but there are also different ways in which we can account for the
intuition that most of our beliefs are underdetermined by our evidence (Section 3.3
and Section 3.4). After that, I will go back to evaluate Dodd’s argument with re-
spect to the specific propositions he considers when formulating the dilemma, such as,
lottery-style propositions and propositions about the future. After identifying the main
problem with Dodd’s argument, I argue that by appealing to the pluralism I develop in
the first half of the Chapter, we can account for our knowledge of (some) propositions
about the future and the present, as well as for our ignorance of lottery-style proposi-
tions (Section 3.5). I conclude with some general considerations on infallibilism and,
in particular, on the infallibilist nature of E=K (Section 3.6).
3.2 The Argument from E=K to Scepticism
In his “Why Williamson Should be a Skeptic” Dodd argues that Williamson’s E=K is
committed to a variety of infallibilism that is incompatible with anti-scepticism (Dodd,
2007). More precisely, he argues that E=K is committed to the infallibilist thesis that
if one knows that p, then the evidential probability of p is 1 (i.e., Ps(p | E) = 1). This is
a straightforward consequence of explaining the notion evidential probability in terms
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of knowledge in the way Williamson does (see Williamson, 2000, ch. 9 and 10). Nor-
mally, before knowing that p, Ps(p | E) < 1. But once p is known, p becomes part of
one’s evidence, thereby making Ps(p | E) = 1. Crucially, Dodd argues, this infallibilist
thesis is incompatible with the allegedly overwhelmingly plausible underdetermina-
tion thesis on which for virtually all of our beliefs, Ps(p | E) < 1. Infallibilism and
underdetermination theses lead to scepticism when jointly taken:
“For if anti-scepticism and the underdetermination view are both correct,
then S can know that p even when S’s evidence underdetermines S’s belief
that p, i.e., when p is only made probable and not certain by S’s evidence
(in other words, when Ps(p | E) < 1). I shall call the view that this is
possible ‘fallibilism’, and the view that S can only know that p if Ps(p |
E) = 1 ‘infallibilism’.”
(Dodd, 2007: 632)
Dodd puts the argument in a form of a dilemma. Either Williamson rejects the
plausible underdetermination thesis, or he holds onto both his infallibilist E=K and
underdetermination thesis, while embracing the skeptical conclusion that we know
almost nothing at all. As anticipated in the Introduction of this Chapter, I believe
Dodd is providing us with a false dilemma. But before explaining why it is so, let me
first stress one more thing about Dodd’s argument. That is, Dodd acknowledges that
Williamson might have an explanation for why E=K does not lead to skepticism when
it comes to cases of perceptual knowledge (Dodd, 2007: 637). In fact, on Williamson’s
Knowledge-first Epistemology, knowledge is the most general factive mental state to
the extent that any factive mental state, e.g., seeing something, will be just a way
of knowing something (Williamson, 2000: 33-35). Dodd is aware of this feature of
Williamson’s view, and he acknowledges that Williamson would be happy to say that,
in these perceptual cases, it is just plainly false to claim that the target known proposi-
tion has evidential probability less than 1. Nevertheless, Dodd says, Williamson cannot
appeal to the same explanation when it comes to other kinds of knowledge, such as,
knowledge about the future. He says:
“I do not doubt that if Williamson’s theory is true then we do know some
things about the external world. [. . . ] What about a sceptic who does not
deny that I know what I can directly perceive and what I can remember, but
who claims I can know very little about what it is like outside the region
of the world with which I have direct perceptual contact, or about what
will be the case in the future? Has Williamson a response to this sort of
sceptic? I think not.”
(Dodd, 2007: 637)
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This is sufficient, according to Dodd, to make Williamson a sceptic.
As I already mentioned, I believe there is nothing to worry about. Dodd’s dilemma
relies on a mischaracterisation of what a plausible underdetermination thesis looks like.
In what follows, taking inspiration from and further exploring Littlejohn’s response to
Dylan Dodd (Littlejohn, 2008), I develop a taxonomy of infallibilist and underdeter-
mination theses. This will enable me to: i) shed light on what the real source of skepti-
cism is, thereby showing that infallibilism per se does not lead to any skeptical result;
ii) argue that Williamson’s E=K can escape the dilemma by embracing infallibilism, a
plausible underdetermination thesis, as well as anti-scepticism. In Section 3.4, I will
then further expand the taxonomy of infallibilism and underdetermination thesis in
way that will enable me to iii) show that there is a combination of infallibilism and un-
derdetermination thesis that is compatible with E=K and can account for knowledge of
(some propositions about) the future, while capturing the intuition that there is a sense
in which propositions about the future are underdetermined by our evidence. In order
to show this last point, I will have to draw a distinction between propositions about the
future, something that Dodd crucially fails to do (Section 3.5).
3.3 What is Infallibilism?
As mentioned in the Introduction, infallibilism has gained a very bad reputation, mainly
because it has been thought of as leading to scepticism. But what is infallibilism? I
believe there is no univocal way of answering this question. We should thus be wary
of drawing any conclusions regarding the sceptical import of infallibilism, and we
should clearly specify what we have in mind when we are talking about infallibilism.
According to Dutant, “infallibilism is the claim that knowledge requires that one sat-
isfies some infallibility condition” (Dutant, 2007: 59). In order to have an intelligible
characterisation of infallibilism, we thus need to answer the question of what this in-
fallibility condition is. We can start by considering one of the main intuitions that have
traditionally been taken to underly infallibilism. That is, the idea that knowledge re-
quires certainty. It is important to distinguish at least two notions of certainty, i.e., a
psychological one and an epistemic one. To say that a subject S is certain in believing
that p, is not the same as to say that the target proposition p is certain for S. We can
thus sketch two different ways of understanding the infallibilist idea that knowledge
requires certainty:
Psychological Certainty Infallibilism: If S knows that p, then S is certain
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that p.
Epistemic Certainty Infallibilism: If S knows that p, then it is certain that
p for S.
According to Psychological Certainty Infallibilism, knowledge that p requires one
to be certain in believing that p, where certainty is understood as a psychological state,
as oppose to the (psychological) state of doubt. A way of understanding Psychological
Certainty Infallibilism is thus to say that being maximally confident about a proposi-
tion p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. By contrast Epistemic Certainty
Infallibilism is silent on what one’s degree of confidence should be2. All it claims is
that knowledge that p requires the proposition p being certain for S in some relevant
epistemic sense. Even though there might be a plausible normative relation between
the former and the latter, one according to which one should be maximally confident
in believing that p only if p is epistemically certain for S, the two formulations do not
entail each other. Think of someone who is affected by some kind of persecutory delu-
sion and hence believes that everyone intends to harm her. In this scenario, the person
is psychologically certain that everyone intends to harm her, despite the fact that it is
not certain that that is actually the case (at least not in any plausible way of understand-
ing epistemic certainty). Some epistemologists in the past have embraced something in
the neighbourhood of Psychological Certainty Infallibilism (see Moore, 1959, Unger,
1971: 208, Unger, 1975: 95-6). However, this view is not very popular amongst epis-
temologists nowadays, as far as I am aware. And this is – I believe – rightly so. First,
there seems to be cases in which we have knowledge despite being under-confident3.
Second, if knowledge requires psychological certainty, then the question of whether we
can have knowledge entails a question about whether there are propositions one can
believe with maximal confidence. But this is clearly an empirical question, one psy-
chologists should mainly be concerned about. Therefore, if anything, epistemologists
who aim to offer an account of infallibilism in terms of certainty should be concerned
with an epistemic notion of certainty. Crucially, things are not so simple even when we
decide to understand infallibilism as Epistemic Certainty Infallibilism. For there seems
to be different ways in which we can understand the notion of epistemic certainty. That
is, there are different ways to spell out what it takes for a proposition p to be certain
for a subject S in some relevant epistemic sense. A traditional way of doing it is to say
2See also Stanley, 2008.
3See Radford, 1966. Although Radford’s notorious student example is originally supposed to show
that there can be knowledge without belief, what I take it to show is that one can know that p without
being confident that p.
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that knowledge that p requires epistemic certainty in the sense that it “[demands] that
the agent has eliminated all possibility of error associated with [p]” (Pritchard, 2005a:
18). Call this Ruling-Out Infallibilism:
Ruling-Out Infallibilism:
If S knows that p, then S has ruled out all the possibilities of error about
p.
Notoriously, Lewis has made the link between infallibilism and ruling out error-
possibilities explicit :
“[I]t seems as if knowledge must be by definition infallible. If you claim
that S knows that p, and yet you grant that S cannot eliminate a certain
possibility in which not-p, it certainly seems as if you have granted that S
does not after all know that p. To speak of fallible knowledge, of knowl-
edge despite uneliminated possibility of error, just sounds contradictory.”
(Lewis, 1996: 549)
However, a good characterisation of ruling-out infallibilism needs to clearly ex-
plain what it means to “rule out” an error-possibility, and what counts as “error-
possibility”. But this has revealed to be a very difficult task4. For instance, to say
that knowledge requires ruling out all error possibilities has been often understood as
the idea that one has to know that all error possibilities do not obtain. But if this is
so, then knowledge is defined in terms of knowledge. This might not necessarily be
a disastrous result by itself. However, as Dutant points out, if this is how we should
understand what it takes for someone to ‘rule out’ error-possibilities, then Rule-Out
Infallibilism is not an infallibilist position after all, yet it is the mere consequence of a
plausible closure principle for knowledge (Dutant, 2007). Furthermore, it is important
to stress that Lewis develops his infallibilist view within a contextualist framework,
one that allows for ‘S knows that p’ to be true even when some incompatible alterna-
tive possibilities are not ruled out, as long as these are not relevant alternatives. As he
famously puts it:
“I say S knows that p iff p holds in every possibility left uneliminated by
S’s evidence - Psst! - except for those possibilities that we are properly
ignoring.” (Lewis, 1996: 561)
Overall, Lewis’ account of infallibilism does not seem very promising. One might
think ‘contextualist’ infallibilism is unsatisfactory and does not really qualify as a gen-
uine ‘infallibilist’ thesis. More generally, defining what it takes for someone to ‘rule
4See Hawthorne, 2003 and Dutant, 2007 for a relevant discussion.
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out’ an alternative, as well as defining what it takes for an alternative to be relevant
might not be so easy5. Therefore, if we want to provide a satisfying characterisation
of the notion of epistemic certainty, I believe we should avoid defining it in terms of
ruling out error-possibilities. At the same time, it is worth stressing Lewis’ important
role within the infallibilism/fallibilism debate in epistemology, given that, in his paper,
he provides us with an example of how infallibilism is not necessarily an implausible
view. In a sense, this is exactly what I want to do in this Chapter.
For the reasons I have just mentioned, in this Chapter I will not be concerned with
Ruling-Out Infallibilism, but I will nonetheless spell out in different ways the notion of
epistemic certainty as it appears in Epistemic Certainty Infallibilism. More precisely,
given that, as it stands, the notion of epistemic certainty is uninformative, I will treat
it as nothing more than a mere placeholder standing for a general infallibilist posi-
tion. In the next section, I define different varieties of infallibilism that can thus be
understood as various ways of cashing out the infallibilist view on which knowledge
requires (epistemic) certainty. This will hopefully shed light on what infallibilism is.
It will also show that, in arguing that Williamson is a sceptic, Dodd sometimes in-
terchangeably uses radically different notions of infallibilism. Furthermore, as I men-
tioned previously, for each variety of infallibilism, I will define corresponding varieties
of underdetermination theses. This will enable us to detect what the real source of
scepticism is. That is, it will enable us to see that infallibilism per se is not the source
of any sceptical problem. Rather, epistemologists have blamed infallibilism as leading
to scepticism because they have (more or less implicitly) assumed specific varieties
of infallibilism together with corresponding underdetermination theses. In particular,
this is the reason why Dodd takes E=K to be the source of sceptical worries. Finally,
I will argue that, once varieties of infallibilism and underdetermination theses are on
the table, we should take seriously the possibility of mismatching infallibilism and
underdetermination across the taxonomy, thereby resisting scepticism.
3.3.1 Varieties of Infallibilism (and Underdetermination)
a. Probability 1 Infallibilism
The first variety of infallibilism I consider is what I call Propositional Probability 1
Infallibilism (cf. Brown, 2013):
5See also Dretske, 1981 and Nozick, 1981 for different ways of cashing out the notion of ruling-out
error possibilities
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Propositional Probability 1 Infallibilism (P1I):
If S knows that p, then S’s evidential probability that p is 1 (i.e., Ps(p | E)
= 1).6
How to best interpret the notion of probability is beyond the scope of this Chap-
ter. However, for the sake of this Chapter the following clarification will be enough.
That is, it is important to stress that evidential probability is different from probability
understood as frequency (i.e., roughly put, the idea that probabilities are collections of
events), and from probability understood as subjective probability as it usually under-
pins Bayesian theories (i.e., probability as representing the degree of confidence one
has in a proposition).7 Furthermore, note that I am here assuming a reading of P1I in
terms of the requirement of total evidence. According to P1I, knowledge requires that
the evidential probability of the target proposition, namely, its probability given our
total evidence, is 1. However, we can define another variety of infallibilism in terms of
evidential probability, namely, what I call Doxastic Probability 1 Infallibilism:
Doxastic Probability 1 Infallibilism (D1I):
If S knows that p and believes that p on the basis of e, then Ps(p | e) = 18.
The first thing to point out is that, as defined, neither Doxastic nor Propositional
Probability 1 Infallibilism put a constraint on whether one’s evidence has to be true or
false. Of course, someone who’s attracted to a more externalist account of evidence
would probably not allow for evidence to be false. But my point is that P1I, as well
as D1I, do not by themselves entail anything specific about what one’s evidence can
or cannot include. As stated, they are both silent on whether false propositions can be
part of one’s evidence. However, note that although both D1I and P1I are expressed
in terms of evidential probability, the two definitions of infallibilism differ in some
important respects. First, note that while D1I is a thesis about the specific instance of
evidence e one bases one’s belief on, P1I is a thesis about one’s total evidence. Sec-
ond, and related, note that D1I is cashed out in terms of the basing relation between
one’s belief and the evidence9 one is basing one’s belief on (hence, Doxastic Probabil-
6As I mentioned in a previous footnote, Dodd himself defends this variety of infallibilism (Dodd,
2011). For interesting discussion on this view see Brueckner & Buford, 2012 and Brown, 2013.
7For an overview on philosophical interpretations of the notion of probability see Gillies, 2000,
Hájek, 2008, and Hajek, 2008. See also Williamson, 1998 and Williamson, 2000, ch.9 and 10, for a
discussion on the notion of evidential probability.
8From now on, I will use ‘E’ to designate one’s total evidence, and I will use ‘e’ to refer to an
instance of evidence.
9In this Chapter, I will assume ‘evidence’ and ‘reasons’ to be the same, although I am aware this is
not completely uncontroversial.
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ity 1 infallibilism)10. By contrast, P1I does not put any constraint on what a subject
should base her belief on. We can appreciate how different the two formulations are
by considering the following scenario:
Unreliable Guru Testimony
S believes everything her unreliable guru says. One day it is sunny and
S sees that it is sunny outside. However, she comes to believe that it is
sunny outside for reasons that have nothing to do with how things look
like. Instead, she believes that it is sunny outside on the basis of what the
very unreliable guru told her.
What D1I predicts is that S does not know that it is sunny outside: given she
believes everything her guru says (and because her guru said so), the probability of
the proposition that it is sunny outside given the evidence she bases her belief on,
namely, the guru’s testimony, is less than 1.11 By contrast, P1I is silent on what kind
of reason you should base your belief on, in order to have knowledge. All P1I says is
that S’s knowledge that p requires the probability of p given S’s total evidence E to be
1. For all P1I says, one’s knowledge that p might also be compatible with basing one’s
belief that p on a specific instance of evidence e, where P(p | e)< 1.
We can now formulate the two corresponding Probability 1 Underdetermination
Theses as follows:
Probability 1 Underdetermination (P1U):
For virtually12 any proposition p, Ps(p | E)< 1.
Doxastic Probability 1 Underdetermination (D1U):
For virtually13 any proposition p and subject S, if S believes that p on the
basis of e, then P(p | e)< 1.
As I mentioned previously in this Chapter, and as I will further stress later, Dodd
has in mind P1I and P1U when talking about infallibilism and the underdetermination
thesis respectively.
10I am here using the notion of basing relationship as it is usually understood in the notion of doxastic
justification. This is not an uncontroversial topic. More on doxastic justification in Chapter 4 of this
Thesis.
11Note that this is regardless of whether we are internalist or externalist about evidence, namely,
regardless of whether we think evidence supervenes on our non-factive mental states or not.
12There are some exceptions. P1U is false when we let p be a logical truth, or when p belongs to E.
13There are some exceptions. For instance, when p is a logical truth or when p = e.
79
b. Entailing Infallibilism
A second variety of infallibilism I consider is what I call Entailing Infallibilism, roughly
put the idea that knowledge requires truth-entailing evidence. Once again, we can dis-
tinguish a Doxastic and a Propositional variety of entailing infallibilism.
Propositional Entailing Infallibilism (PEI):
If S knows that p, then S’s evidence E entails p (i.e., E |= p).
Doxastic Entailing Infallibilism (DEI):
If S knows that p and believes that p on the basis of e, then e entails p (i.e.,
e |= p)14, 15.
Propositional Entailing and Doxastic Entailing Infallibilism differ in the same way
in which D1I differs from P1I. DEI and PEI are both silent on whether one’s evidence
can or cannot include false propositions16. However, DEI and PEI differ in important
ways. One one hand DEI (as D1I) concerns the specific instance of evidence one is
basing one’s belief on, while PEI (as P1I) concerns one’s total evidence. Considering
once again the Unreliable Guru Testimony case can shed light on the differences be-
tween PEI and DEI. DEI predicts that S does not know that it is sunny outside given
that the evidence she bases her belief on (i.e., the guru testimony) does not entail that
it is sunny outside. PEI, instead, does not put any constraint on what kind of evidence
S has to base her belief on in order to gain knowledge. All it says is that knowledge
requires one’s total evidence to entail the target proposition.
We can now build the corresponding underdetermination theses as follows:
Propositional Entailing Underdetermination (PEU):
For virtually17 any proposition p and subject S, then S’s evidence does not
entail p.
Doxastic Entailing Underdetermination (DEU)
For virtually18 any proposition p and subject S, if S believes that p on the
basis of e, then e does not entail p.
14Similar formulations can be found in Feldman, 1981, Cohen, 1988, Reed, 2002, Brueckner, 2005a,
Stanley, 2005, Dutant, 2007.
15It might be already clear to the reader that, interestingly, and as I will stress in the Conclusion of
Part II, Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism seems to be committed to a version of DEI.
16Note that wile DEI and PEI are silent on whether evidence is propositional, the same is not the case
for P1I and D1I. Arguably, the only way in which the probabilistic relations expressed by P(p | e) < 1
and P(p | e) = 1 are intelligible is only if we assume evidence to be propositional. Cf. Williamson,
2000: ch. 9.
17There are some exceptions. DEU is false for p being a logical truth, and for p being e.
18There are some exceptions. As stated, PEU is false for p being a logical truth, and for p being e.
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3.3.2 Comments on Varieties of Infallibilism
The taxonomy I have developed in the previous Section shows that, if we want to
talk about infallibilism, we should clarify which infallibilist thesis we have in mind,
and we should be very wary when drawing conclusions regarding the skeptical import
of infallibilism. But let me now further analyse the relation between the varieties of
infallibilism I have formulated above.
I think we can classify infallibilist theses into those defined in terms of the basing
relationship between one’s belief and the evidence one is basing one’s belief on, and
those that are not. Call Doxastic Infallibilism the former, and Propositional Infallibil-
ism the latter. Doxastic Probability 1 Infallibilism and Doxastic Entailing Infallibilism
are, not surprisingly, instances of Doxastic Infallibilism. By contrast, Propositional
Probability 1 Infallibilism and Propositional Entailing Infallibilism can all be classi-
fied as varieties of Propositional Infallibilism.
We can now ask: how do these varieties of infallibilism relate to each other? By
adding an extra (basing) requirement for knowledge, we should expect Doxastic va-
rieties of Infallibilism to entail Propositional varieties of Infallibilism. Consider first
the relation between Doxastic and Propositional Entailing Infallibilism. I have already
pointed out that, according to Doxastic Entailing Infallibilism, knowledge requires one
to base one’s belief on one’s evidence e, where e entails p, thereby putting a constraint
on the kind of evidence one has to base one’s belief on in order to have knowledge.
By contrast, all Propositional Entailing Infallibilism claims is that knowledge that p
requires one’s overall evidence E to entail p. Propositional Entailing Infallibilism thus
follows from Doxastic Entailing Infallibilism, but not vice versa. The same relation
holds between Propositional Probability 1 Infallibilism and Doxastic Probability 1 In-
fallibilism: Doxastic Probability 1 Infallibilism entails Propositional Probability 1 but
not vice versa. It should now be clear to the reader that while Doxastic varieties of
Infallibilism are about the logical (or probabilistic) relation between the target propo-
sition p and one’s evidence e on which one bases one’s belief that p (that is, they are
about a doxastic relation), Propositional varieties of infallibilism are simply about the
logical (or probabilistic) relation between one’s total evidence E and the target proposi-
tion p. Let us now look at the relation between (Propositional and Doxastic) Entailing
Infallibilism, and (Propositional and Doxastic) Probability 1 Infallibilism. Recall that
P1I is an instance of Propositional Infallibilism insofar as it does not say anything
about what I have called the “doxastic relation”. According to P1I, if S knows that p,
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then the evidential probability of p given one’s total evidence is 1 (i.e., P(p | E) = 1).
But if P(p | E) = 1, then typically19 one’s total evidence E entails p. Hence, Proposi-
tional Probability 1 Infallibilism entails Propositional Entailing Infallibilism and vice
versa. For the very same reasons Doxastic Probability 1 Infallibilism entails Doxas-
tic Entailing Infallibilism and vice versa. What about the relation between Doxastic
Entailing Infallibilism and P1I? As Doxastic Probability 1 Infallibilism entails (but is
not entailed by) Propositional Probability 1 Infallibilism, it is easy to see that, while
Doxastic Entailing Infallibilism entails P1I, P1I does not necessarily entail Doxastic
Entailing Infallibilism, for there can easily be cases in which one believes that p on
the basis of evidence e, where e does not entail p, while the evidential probability of p
given one’s total evidence E is 1.
To sum up: the taxonomy of varieties of infallibilism I have developed in the pre-
vious section teaches us three important lessons. First, it teaches us that if we want to
talk about infallibilism, we should clarify which infallibilist thesis we have in mind,
for these varieties of infallibilism are not necessarily equivalent. In fact, Doxastic va-
rieties of Infallibilism are the strongest infallibilist claims: they entail all instances
of Propositional infallibilism, yet they are not entailed by any of them. Instead, the
Propositional varieties of infallibilism, namely, PEI and P1I, are equivalent20.
Second, it teaches us that not only we should be wary when talking about infallibil-
ism, but we should also be careful when discussing the problem of underdetermination.
We should acknowledge that there might be more than one way in which we can cash
out the idea that our evidence underdetermines our beliefs.
Third, and finally, having formulated infallibilist theses together with their cor-
responding underdetermination theses helps us individuate what the actual source of
scepticism is. That is, it is easy to see that each variety of infallibilism leads to skep-
ticism only when taken together with its corresponding variety of underdetermination
thesis. On one hand, each infallibilist thesis defines a specific standard for knowledge.
On the other hand, their corresponding underdetermination theses claim that we are
almost never in the position to meet that standard. Hence, the skeptical worry immedi-
19Note that there are some exceptions, such that despite one’s evidential probability that p is 1, one’s
evidence does not entail that p. Thus P1I would fail to entail PEI. An example is given by lottery cases
with an infinite number of lottery tickets. In these cases, a lottery proposition p has probability 0 (or, on
some views, p has infinitesimal probability), yet p is compatible with the evidence one has. However,
for the purpose of this Chapter, I will ignore these cases as they concern very particular and exceptional
scenarios. Thanks to Martin Smith for pressing me on this point here. See Williamson, 2007a, Smith,
2010a and Williamson, 2014.
20See previous footnotes for exceptions.
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ately arises.
Let’s now recall why Dodd thinks that E=K is in trouble. According to Dodd,
given E=K is an infallibilist thesis, Williamson faces a dilemma. More precisely, Dodd
says, E=K is committed to the infallibilist thesis that if S knows that p, then Ps(p |
E) = 1. Crucially, this leads to skepticism when taken together with an (allegedly)
overwhelmingly plausible underdetermination thesis, namely, the thesis that for almost
everything we believe, Ps(p | E) < 1. So, according to Dodd, Williamson has two
options: either he embraces both infallibilism and underdetermination, at the cost of
being forced into scepticism, or he rejects the underdetermination thesis, at the cost
of becoming too dogmatic. However, this should be hardly surprising at this point.
For the infallibilist thesis and the underdetermination thesis Dodd is considering are
cashed out in terms of the same epistemic standards (i.e., he is considering P1I and
its corresponding P1U). But, as I have just pointed out, this is not a particular feature
of P1I, rather it is exactly what we should expect anytime we combine any variety of
infallibilism with its corresponding underdetermination thesis.
At this point one could point out that this is of little help for the infallibilist and,
more specifically, for the defender of E=K. In fact, this seems to concur with what
Dodd was arguing for, namely, that infallibilism is incompatible with the underdeter-
mination thesis. Fortunately, I believe there is no reason to be seriously concerned.
For once all these varieties of infallibilism and underdetermination theses are avail-
able, there is no principled reason why one should not embrace a specific formulation
of infallibilism, while rejecting its corresponding underdetermination thesis. Instead,
we should take seriously the possibility of mismatching infallibilism and underdeter-
mination theses across the taxonomy. In the next Section, I will show how we can do
so, thereby proving that Dodd’s claim that “no infallibilist account of knowledge can
be plausibly combined with anti-scepticism” is just plainly false.
3.3.3 E=K: what Infallibilism? What Underdetermination?
In the previous section, I have shed light on varieties of infallibilism and underdeter-
mination theses. I will now appeal to the taxonomy of infallibilism and underdetermi-
nation to show that Dodd provides us with a false dilemma. If we focus our attention
on E=K, we can now ask the following two questions:
1. What variety of Infallibilism is E=K committed to?
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2. Is there a variety of Underdetermination thesis that, when combined with E=K,
avoids skepticism?
Let’s address 1. first. First of all, note that E=K entails (Propositional) Probability
1 Infallibilism. According to E=K, one’s evidence is all and only one’s knowledge.
This means that, whenever one comes to know that p, p becomes part of one’s total
evidence. Given that once I come to know p, then p belongs to one’s total evidence, it
follows that Ps(p | E) = Ps(p | p) = 1. But as I have pointed out in the previous section,
all Propositional Infallibilist theses are logically equivalent. Therefore given E=K is
committed to P1I, then it is also committed to Propositional Entailing Infallibilism
(i.e., if S knows that p, then E |= p). This comes as no surprise: if S knows that p,
then given E=K, p is part of S’s total evidence E, and, therefore, E entails p. We can
thus say that E=K entails Propositional varieties of Infallibilism, and this is just what
we expect to have once we use the concept of knowledge to define what the notion of
evidential probability and evidence in the way Williamson does.
What about Doxastic varieties of Infallibilism? I have already stressed that, while
Propositional varieties of Infallibilism are entailed by Doxastic varieties of Infallibil-
ism, these in turn do not follow from Propositional Infallibilism. For, as I have just
said, Propositional Infallibilism remains silent on what kind of evidence knowledge
requires us to base our beliefs on. So, if E=K turns out to entail Doxastic Infallibilism,
it is not going to be in virtue of its being committed to Propositional Infallibilism. In
any case, it is easy to see why E=K does not by itself entail Doxastic Infallibilism. For
as it stands E=K is merely a thesis about the nature of evidence, and it does not by
itself answer the question of what kind of evidence one should base one’s beliefs on
in order to have knowledge, or whether you need to base one’s beliefs on evidence at
all (which is, instead, what Doxastic Infallibilism does). It is important to stress that
I am not the first one to notice this. For instance, in his response to Dodd, Littlejohn
similarly points out that, while E=K entails what I here call ‘Propositional Probability
1 Infallibilism’, Williamson is not committed to what I here call ‘Doxastic Entailing
Infallibilism’ (Littlejohn, 2008: 682). Crucially, he says, insofar as Williamson’s E=K
is committed to Propositional Probability 1 Infallibilism but rejects Doxastic Entailing
Infallibilism, then “there is no reason to think he is committed to skepticism (2008:
683).”. And again, he writes: “it seems that while Williamson is an infallibilist in
the sense that he [embraces Propositional Probability 1 Infallibilism], infallibilism so
understood does not clearly entail skepticism” (2008: 682). Note, however, that the
taxonomy I have developed in the previous section shows something even stronger
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than that. It shows that no variety of infallibilism per se entails scepticism21. As there
is nothing intrinsically sceptic about Propositional Probability 1 Infallibilism, there’s
also nothing intrinsically anti-sceptic about it. Once again, skepticism is what we get
only when we combine infallibilism with corresponding underdetermination theses.
One might still object that, even if E=K as stated does not entail any variety of Dox-
astic Infallibilism, there are good principled reasons why Williamson should embrace
it anyway. I believe this is a mistake. If anything, I believe there are good reasons why
the defender of E=K should not embrace Doxastic Infallibilism. Consider for instance
Doxastic Entailing Infallibilism. Remember that, on this version of infallibilism, in
order for an agent S to know that p, then S has to believe that p on the basis of S’s
(specific instance of) evidence e, such that e entails p. Note that if E=K is true, then e
must be something S knows. But if S knows e, and Doxastic Infallibilism is true, then
it means S is believing that e on the basis of a further instance of evidence e2, such that
e2 entails e. It is easy to see how this leads to a regressus ad infinitum.
Let us recapitulate what I have done so far. An analysis of the relationship between
Propositional and Doxastic Varieties of Infallibilism helped us to shed light on which
infallibilist theses E=K is committed to. I have shown that E=K is committed to both
varieties of – what I have called – Propositional Infallibilism (i.e., Propositional En-
tailing Infallibilism, and Propositional Probability 1 Infallibilism). This comes with no
surprise, insofar as all versions of Propositional Infallibilism are trivial consequences
of E=K. By contrast, E=K is not committed to Doxastic varieties of Infallibilism (i.e.,
Doxastic Entailing Infallibilism, and Doxastic Probability 1 Infallibilism). Instead,
I have shown that there are positive reasons why the defender of E=K should reject
Doxastic Infallibilism.22
21It is worth stressing that given Doxastic Infallibilism is the strongest version of Infallibilism of the
ones I have formulated so far, Doxastic Infallibilism leads to scepticism when taken together with any
of the varieties of underdetermination theses I have formulated in the first half of this Chapter. However,
my point is that even Doxastic Infallibilism does not by itself embody any kind of scepticism.
22It is important to mention that Dodd believes there is no plausible view on which P1I is true while
Doxastic varieties of infallibilism are false. The reason why he thinks this is the case is that, if Proposi-
tional varieties are true and Doxastic varieties are false, then you have a scenario in which the evidential
probability of a proposition goes from less than 1 to 1 without having acquired any new evidence. I
think this objection fails to understand what the real nature of E=K is. In Chapter 4, I show further that
E=K by itself says nothing about what evidence one should take into account when coming to believe
something. I believe there is a conflation between two claims: a claim about what it is appropriate to
cite as reason for p; a claim about what kind of relation is required between one’s total evidence and p in
order to have knowledge that p. I do not have time to address this issue here, for my aim in this Chapter
is merely to show that Dodd’s claim that no variety of infallibilism is compatible with anti-scepticism
is just false. However, see Littlejohn, 2008 for a response to Dodd’s worry. See also Brown, 2013 for a
similar criticism to E=K.
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We can now address the second question:
2. Is there an Underdetermination thesis that, when combined with E=K,
avoids skepticism?
I have already pointed out above that each variety of infallibilism leads to skepti-
cism when jointly taken with its corresponding underdetermination thesis. Crucially,
given I have shown E=K to be committed to Propositional Infallibilism, if Proposi-
tional Infallibilism and Propositional Underdetermination theses are both true, then
we should be seriously worried about the skeptical threat. Fortunately, it is easy to
see that, if E=K is true, then all versions of Propositional Underdetermination theses
are simply false. Consider first infallibilism and underdetermination as understood by
Dodd, namely, Propositional Probability 1 Infallibilism, and Probability 1 Underde-
termination. According to (Propositional) Probability 1 Infallibilism, if S knows that
p, then the evidential probability of p on one’s total evidence is 1, i.e., Ps(p | E) = 1.
According to P1U, however, for almost anything we believe the evidential probability
of the believed proposition on our total evidence is less than one, i.e., Ps(p | E) < 1.
But why should we accept underdetermination as stated here? If we assume E=K and
the non-sceptical thesis, as Dodd himself is doing, then if P1I is true, then Underde-
termination as understood by Dodd is just plainly false23. So, if E=K is true, then
what Dodd thought of as being an overwhelmingly plausible thesis actually turns out
to be false. As things stand, there are no reasons why Williamson should be persuaded
by Dodd into accepting P1U as true. The point can be generalised to any version of
Propositional Underdetermination. If Propositional Entailing Infallibilism is true, and
we assume the anti-sceptical thesis that we do have quite a lot of knowledge, then its
corresponding underdetermination thesis turns out to be just plainly false.
Does this mean that Dodd was right after all, and that, if we want to save both E=K
and anti-scepticism, then we need to give up on Underdetermination thesis? I don’t
think so. Williamson is not forced to embrace the first horn of Dodd’s dilemma. In
fact, he is not force to embrace any horn of the dilemma. The defender of E=K does
not have to choose between rejecting underdetermination and embracing skepticism.
For once we have varieties of Underdetermination theses on the table, Williamson, and
the defender of E=K more generally, can reject Propositional varieties of Underdeter-
mination Theses, while embracing Doxastic varieties of Underdetermination Thesis.
Interestingly, insofar as this is a mismatch across the taxonomy I have developed, the
23Of course, as mentioned previously, P1U is also false for reasons that are independent of E=K,
namely, for p being a logical truth and for p being E.
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combination of Propositional Infallibilism and Doxastic Underdetermination does not
lead to any skeptical consequences. As Littlejohn puts it: “Williamson would presum-
ably accept [Doxastic Underdetermination] [...], but would insist that the Underdeter-
mination thesis on this reading is compatible with [Propositional Infallibilism]” (2008:
684)
3.4 What is Underdetermination?
In the previous section, I formulated varieties of infallibilism and, for each of these,
I formulated a corresponding underdetermination thesis. I have shown that, far from
being an undesirable consequence peculiar to E=K, each variety of infallibilism has
skeptical implications only when it is embraced together with its corresponding under-
determination thesis. At the same time, I have shown that while E=K is committed
to some varieties of infallibilism, namely, Propositional Infallibilism, it does not en-
tail Doxastic Infallibilism. I have then argued that we should mismatch infallibilism
and underdetermination theses across the taxonomy. Williamson, and the defender of
E=K more in general, could thus embrace Propositional Infallibilism, while accept-
ing that our beliefs are underdetermined by our evidence in the sense expressed by
Doxastic Underdetermination. That is, there seems to be a combination of (Proposi-
tional) Infallibilism and non-corresponding (Doxastic) Underdetermination available
that Williamson could embrace, and that is not subjected to the skeptical threat. Fur-
thermore, I have argued that, regardless of what the appearances might be, in formu-
lating the dilemma, Dodd is not asking us to choose between infallibilism and a very
plausible underdetermination thesis that everyone – including Williamson – should
embrace at any cost.
However, one might worry that, even if I have identified formulations of Underde-
termination thesis that are compatible with Williamson’s E=K (and with its being com-
mitted to Propositional Infallibilism), these underdetermination theses, namely, Doxas-
tic Entailing and Doxastic Probability 1 Underdetermination, fail to capture the general
intuition behind the notion of underdetermination. It might be that, even though the
Underdetermination Thesis presented by Dodd should be rejected (i.e., Probability 1
Underdetermination), the doxastic ones I proposed are not much better. That is, even
if Doxastic varieties of Underdetermination are compatible with anti-scepticism and
E=K, they might nevertheless fail to be fully satisfactory insofar as they might not seem
to capture the way in which we usually talk about the problem of underdetermination.
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Hence, we should look for a more promising formulation of the underdetermination
thesis, one which is compatible with E=K and which does justice to the main intu-
itions behind the underdetermination thesis. The infallibilist thus still has some work
to do.
We can thus ask: what is the main intuition behind the so-called underdetermi-
nation of theory by evidence? Once again, there is no agreement on how to clearly
spell out the idea that most of our beliefs are underdetermined by our evidence. Within
the context of epistemology, the problem of underdetermination is usually discussed
in relation to the problem of radical skepticism. Two prominent formulations of the
so-called underdetermination-based skeptical argument are provided by Bruckner and
Pritchard, who claim that two beliefs are underdetermined by our evidence when
our evidence does not favour one belief over the other. Although Bruckner’s and
Pritchard’s formulations slightly differ in their presentation, what they both have in
mind is that given two logically incompatible beliefs b1 and b2, to say that our ev-
idence underdetermines b1 and b2 is to say that our evidence does not enable us to
regard b1 as true rather than b2 (Brueckner, 1994, Pritchard, 2005b, Pritchard, 2016a;
see also Cohen, 1998, Byrne, 2004).
In the context of philosophy of science, the radical skeptical problem is not usually
taken seriously. Nevertheless, I believe philosophers of science have in mind some-
thing similar when talking about underdetermination. Amongst philosophers of sci-
ence, it is more common to define the notion of underdetermination in connection
with the notion of empirical equivalence, so two theories are underdetermined when
they are empirically equivalent. In their influential paper, Laudan and Lapin maintain
that two hypotheses are empirically equivalent iff, were they true, they would have
the same empirical consequences (Laudan & Leplin, 1991). Others, however, prefer
to cash out the notion of empirical equivalence in terms of empirical indistinguisha-
bility or empirical congruence (see Earman, 1993, Kukla, 1998, Psillos, 1999, and
Tulodziecki, 2012). However, both epistemologists and philosophers of science seem
to refer, to some extent, to the idea that an hypothesis hp1 is underdetermined insofar
as the available evidence can be accommodated by hp1 as well as by a different hy-
pothesis hp224. I thus take the following Core Underdetermination thesis to capture
the core idea shared by the different conceptions of underdetermination (both amongst
philosophers of science and epistemologists):
24It is worth noting that the problem of underdetermination of theory by data within philosophy of
science is usually addressed in relation to the realism vs anti-realism debate concerning unobservable
entities. I will not consider this issue here.
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Core Underdetermination:
An hypothesis hp is underdetermined for S, if the hypotheses hp and not-
hp are both compatible (in some relevant sense) with the available evi-
dence. 25
Depending on what it takes for two hypotheses (or beliefs) to be compatible in some
relevant sense with the available evidence, and depending on what we take evidence
to be, we will have various ways of understanding the notion of underdetermination.
(More on this later).
If we want an underdetermination thesis that does justice to the Core Underde-
termination Thesis, then we need an underdetermination thesis that accounts for the
idea that our belief that p is underdetermined when p and a logically incompatible
proposition q are on par, in some relevant epistemic sense, with the available evidence.
However, on Doxastic versions of Underdetermination the sense in which two beliefs
can be underdetermined does not seem to be strictly related to the fact that they are
both compatible with one’s available evidence. Rather, Doxastic kinds of Underdeter-
mination mainly focus on the logical (or probabilistic) relation between the specific
evidence why one believes that p and the target believed proposition p. Therefore,
although I believe both Doxastic Entailing and Doxastic Probability 1 Underdetermi-
nation provide us with an interesting way of cashing out the idea that our beliefs are
often underdetermined, one might wonder whether there is a different characterisation
of the underdetermination thesis, one that is more in line with how philosophers of
science and epistemologists often talk about the problem of underdetermination.
Bearing this in mind, in what follows, I further develop my taxonomy of infalli-
bilism and underdetermination thesis. While in the first part of the taxonomy I have
started by considering plausible varieties of infallibilism, and I have then built corre-
sponding underdetermination theses, I here work backwards. That is, first, I formu-
late underdetermination theses. Second, I formulate corresponding infallibilist theses.
After developing these novel varieties of infallibilism and underdetermination, I will
show that while the underdetermination theses I present here are plausible and are in
line with the Core Underdetermination Thesis, their corresponding infallibilist theses
are either extremely implausible or straightforwardly false. More importantly, none of
25Note that what Laudan and Lapin seem to have in mind is something slightly stronger that this
claim. That is, two hypothesis are empirically equivalent when they both entail the available evidence.
However, what matters is that Core Underdetermination is broad enough to be something most episte-
mologists and philosophers of science will embrace as the core idea underlying the problem of under-
determination.
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the corresponding infallibilist theses is something E=K is committed to. Again, once
we take seriously the possibility of mismatching infallibilism and non-corresponding
underdetermination across the taxonomy, it is easy to see that there is a plausible com-
bination of infallibilism and underdetermination thesis available, one which resists
skepticism, thereby showing Dodd’s dilemma to be false.
3.4.1 Varieties of Underdetermination (and Infallibilism)
a. Objective Chance Underdetermination
The first formulation of the underdetermination thesis I propose is the following Objective-
Chance Underdetermination Thesis:
Objective Chance Underdetermination (OCU):
For many26 proposition p, time t and world w, the objective chance of p
at time t in w is less then one and more than 0 (i.e., 0 <Chtw(p)< 1).
Its corresponding infallibilist thesis goes as follows:
Objective-Chance Infallibilism (OCI):
If S knows that p at t in w, then the objective chance of p at t in w is 1 (i.e.,
Chtw(p) = 1)
Some qualifications are in order here. The notion of objective chance I have in
mind is the one considered by Lewis (Lewis, 1980). Although it obeys the laws of
probability, Objective Chance is different from probability understood as frequency,
and it is different from a subjective interpretation of probability, one that takes proba-
bility of a proposition p to express the credence or degree of belief that a subject has
towards p. It is also different from evidential probability: objective chance is not the
probability of a proposition conditional on a subject’s evidence. Objective Chance is a
three-argument function. That is, it is the function that, to a given proposition p, time
t, and world w, assigns a real number x, with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. If Chtw(p) = 1, then, on this
interpretation, the event expressed by p is considered to be not a chancy event. Fur-
thermore, the objective chance of p, where p is a proposition about a particular fact,
is time-relative and it typically27 depends on contingent features of the target world w.
Propositions concerning events about the past always have objective chance 1, and are
26As I will explain in a moment, arguably, (true) propositions about the past, (true) propositions about
the present, and propositions about the future that are entailed by the laws of nature all have objective
chance 1.
27An example is constituted by contingent a priori truths. More on this later.
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thus not chancy. By contrast, propositions about future events typically have objective
chance less than 1. It is in this sense that, as Lewis says, there is a temporal asymmetry
of chance. In more speculative terms, we can say that while the past is fixed, the future
is wide open. In more technical terms, we can say that for any proposition p about the
future, given a time t and a world w, there is a branching possibility in world w at time
t where p is false. As Lewis says:
“The asymmetry of fixity and chance may be pictured by a tree. The single
trunk is the one possible past that has any present chance of being actual.
The many branches are the many possible futures that have some present
chance of being actual.” (Lewis, 1980: 273)
Simply put, branching possibilities are possible ways in which the future could
develop starting from a certain time t. That is, branching possibilities correspond to
possible worlds that share their entire history with the actual world w up to a time
t28. My proposal here is that there is one possible way of formulating the underde-
termination thesis that is cashed out in terms of objective-chance so understood. A
straightforward consequence of explaining the notion of underdetermination (and its
corresponding infallibilist thesis) in terms of the notion of objective chance is that it
makes the notion of underdetermination (and the notion of knowledge in the corre-
sponding infallibilist claim) time and world relative. In this sense, a proposition p is
underdetermined in a world w at time t if 0 < Chtw(p) < 129. That is, a proposition
p might be underdetermined in a world w at time t in the sense that there might be a
possibility branching from w at time t in which the proposition p is false. Conversely,
the corresponding Objective-Chance Infallibilism states that if a subject S knows a
proposition p at time t in a world w, there is no branching possibility at time t in world
w in which p is false. That is, according to Objective Chance Infallibilism knowledge
of a proposition p in w at time t requires Chtw(p) = 1.
b. Appearance-Entailing Underdetermination
The next underdetermination thesis is what I call the Appearance-Entailing Underde-
termination thesis:
28See also Hawthorne & Lasonen-Aarnio, 2009
29Note that while it is true that if 0 < Chtw(p) < 1 then p is underdetermined, the other side of the
conditional does not hold. As it will appear clear later, there might be another sense in which p is
underdetermined by our evidence despite its objective chance being 1. For instance, it is consistent with
my taxonomy that p is underdetermined in the sense expressed by what I’ll call Appearance-Entailing
Underdetermination, while having Objective chance 1. More on this later.
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Appearance-Entailing Underdetermination (AEU):
For virtually30 any proposition p, S’s non-factive psychological states (i.e.,
S’s impressions, appearances etc.) do not entail p.
Its corresponding Infallibilist thesis goes as follows:
Appearance-Entailing Infallibilism (AEI):
If S knows that p, then S’s non-factive mental states (i.e., S’s impressions,
appearances etc.) entail p.
3.4.2 Comments on Varieties of Underdetermination
In Section 3.3 of this Chapter, I have defined varieties of infallibilism and correspond-
ing underdetermination theses. By analysing the relationship between varieties of in-
fallibilism and corresponding underdetermination thesis, I have drawn two important
conclusions. First, infallibilism by itself does not have any skeptical consequences.
Rather, it is only when taken together with its corresponding underdetermination thesis
that infallibilism leads to scepticism. Second, and relatedly, mismatches of infallibil-
ism and non-corresponding underdetermination thesis are perfectly compatible with
anti-scepticism. In the previous Section, I have expanded my taxonomy by formulat-
ing two further varieties of underdetermination theses and corresponding infallibilist
theses. Let me now make two brief remarks on these varieties of underdetermina-
tion theses and their corresponding infallibilist theses. The first remark concerns how
and to what extent these two varieties of underdetermination are in line with the Core
Underdetermination Thesis. The second remark concerns the plausibility of these Un-
derdetermination theses as opposed to the highly implausibility of their corresponding
infallibilist theses, thereby showing the legitimacy of embracing these novel varieties
of Underdetermination thesis while rejecting their corresponding infallibilist theses.
To start with, remember that a motivation for further developing my taxonomy was
that, despite Propositional Infallibilism being compatible with Doxastic Underdeter-
mination, one might think that this version of underdetermination is not in line with
the following Core Underdetermination thesis that seems to be widely shared by both
philosophers of science and epistemologists:
30Some of the few exceptions are when p is a logical truth, when p is the proposition that one has a
seeming that p (i.e., the proposition that one has non-factive psychological states), when p is any other
proposition that is entailed by the fact that it seems to one that p, and when p is any disjunction with a
logical truth as one of its disjuncts.
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Core Underdetermination:
An hypothesis hp is underdetermined by evidence for S, if the hypothe-
ses hp and not hp are both compatible (in some relevant sense) with the
available evidence.
So, we want a variety of underdetermination that is both compatible with Proposi-
tional Infallibilism as well as being able to account for the Core Underdetermination
thesis. At the same time, I have already mentioned that, depending on how we fill
in the details in Core Underdetermination, we can have various interpretations of the
notion of Underdetermination. Both Objective Chance and Appearance Entailing Un-
derdetermination do justice to the Core Underdetermination thesis, whilst representing
two radically different ways of understanding the notion of underdetermination. These
two different interpretations of the notion of underdetermination rest on two different
assumptions about what we take to be included in the subject’s available evidence. Let
us see why.
Let’s start with Appearance-Entailing Underdetermination. What Appearance-
Entailing Underdetermination says is that if neither a proposition p, nor the logically
incompatible proposition ¬p are entailed by S’s non-factive psychological states (e.g.,
it is seeming to S that p), then (trivially) both p and ¬p are compatible with S’s
non-factive psychological states. Appearance-Entailing Underdetermination captures
the Core Underdetermination thesis when taken together with the assumption that the
available evidence is constituted by facts about one’s non-factive mental states31.
How and whether Objective-Chance Underdetermination captures the idea expressed
in Core Underdetermination is less straightforward. As I said before, the notion of
Objective Chance I have in mind in Objective-Chance Underdetermination is the one
defended by David Lewis (1980). Crucially, while Lewis (and epistemologists more
in general) have focused on the relation between objective-chance and credence, no
connection has ever been drawn, as far as I am aware, between the notion of objective
chance and the notion of underdetermination32. My proposal, as I mentioned above,
is that we should use the notion of Objective-Chance to shed light on the notion of
underdetermination in an interesting way. Remember that Objective Chance is time
31Note that this way of talking about a proposition p being underdetermined captures well the way in
which philosophers of science and various of epistemologists talk about a proposition p being underde-
termined for one in the sense that one is unable to subjectively distinguish a case in which p from a case
in which not p.
32For a relevant discussion on the relation between objective chance and credences see Lewis and his
formulation of the “Principal Principle” in his ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’. See Lewis,
1980.
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and world relative, and it obeys the laws of probability calculus. We can combine this
notion of objective chance with the assumption on which the admissible evidence is
constituted by all and only the facts about the present and the past. That is, on this
view, the admissible evidence is constituted by all and only facts about p up to time
t. To sum up: according to Objective-Chance Underdetermination, S’s belief that p
is underdetermined for S at time t in world w, if the objective chance of p given all
the admissible evidence about p is less than 1 and higher than 0, where the admissible
evidence is all the facts about the present and the past33.
Let me now move to the second remark I want to make. It must be clear by now
that the Underdetermination theses have skeptical consequences only when taken to-
gether with their corresponding infallibilist theses. Once again, the suggestion is that
we should embrace these varieties of Underdetermination theses while rejecting the
corresponding infallibilist theses. In fact, both Underdetermination theses are plausi-
ble and they both capture different aspects of the idea that our beliefs are often un-
derdetermined. At the same time, there are good reasons why we should reject their
corresponding infallibilist theses. On one hand, Appearance-Entailing Infallibilism, as
stated, is false, for it is seeming to one that p (i.e., one’s non-factive psychological
states), by definition, (typically) does not entail that p34. On the other hand, by stating
that knowledge requires Objective-chance 1, Objective-Chance Infallibilism is highly
questionable, and the connection between objective chance and knowledge arguably
rejected. In fact, anyone who grants that we can have knowledge of (at least some
propositions about) the future and, more generally, inferential knowledge, will reject
Objective-change Infallibilism. Given any proposition about the future has objective
chance less than 1, Objective-chance Infallibilism entails that we are ignorant about
most of the things we (plausibly) take ourself to know.35 Overall, the varieties of in-
33Requiring objective chance of the target proposition to be more than 0 allows me to avoid the very
counterintuitive consequence that a false proposition about the past, one that has objective chance 0, is
underdetermined by our evidence.
34See footnote 30 for some exceptions.
35Interestingly, Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio show that knowledge does not require Objective
Chance 1 by considering contingent a priori true propositions. As they point out, contingent a priori
true propositions are propositions that have objective chance less than 1 at time t in a world w, and yet
one can know these truths a priori at t in w. However, an important issue here is how objective chance
relates the safety requirement for knowledge, namely, roughly put, the idea that knowledge of a propo-
sition requires that proposition being true in all worlds close to the actual world in which the subject
believes that proposition (more on Williamson’s commitment to the safety requirement later). More pre-
cisely, the relevant question is whether every branching possibility is a close possibility. It seems that if
one wants to hold onto both the safety requirement and the idea that it is possible to have knowledge of
proposition with objective chance less than 1, one has to deny that every branching possibility is a close
possibility. Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio (2009) argue that rejecting this entailment is not enough
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fallibilism I have formulated in this second half of the Chapter are not very promising.
3.4.3 E=K: What Underdetermination? What Infallibilism?
We can now put into practice my proposal of mismatching infallibilism and under-
determination across the taxonomy. Williamson and, more generally, the defender of
E=K, can embrace the underdetermination theses provided in this second part of the
taxonomy, while rejecting their corresponding infallibilist theses. Furthermore, these
underdetermination theses are compatible with the varieties of infallibilism E=K is
committed to, namely, what I have called Propositional Infallibilism. Propositional
Probability 1 Infallibilism, Propositional Entailing Infallibilism, Doxastic Entailing
Underdetermination, Doxastic Probability 1 Infallibilism, Objective-Chance Underde-
termination, and Appearance-Entailing Underdetermination do not lead to skepticism
when taken jointly. Once again, Dodd’s dilemma is defeated.
3.5 Back to Dodd and Why He is Mistaken
In the previous sections, I have shed light on varieties of infallibilism and underde-
termination theses. I have pointed out that no variety of infallibilism per se leads to
scepticism: it is only when they are taken together with corresponding varieties of un-
derdetermination theses that we have a sceptical result. I have clarified which varieties
of infallibilism Williamson’s E=K is committed to, and I have pointed out that there
are at least four varieties of underdetermination theses that, when combined with E=K,
avoid scepticism. With this in mind, I want to now go back to Dodd’s argument and
show why Dodd is wrong in taking Williamson to be a sceptic.
Remember that, as I mentioned above, Dodd acknowledges that Williamson can ac-
count for perceptual knowledge36. However, he argues that if E=K is true, Williamson
is forced to conclude that we know almost nothing “about what it is like outside the
region of the world with which [we] have direct perceptual contact” (Dodd, 2007:
644). More specifically, Dodd considers the following three propositions: i) my lottery
ticket will lose; ii) I will be alive tomorrow; iii) there are books on my shelves. For
for resisting skepticism. A discussion on this topic would lead too far afield. For the purpose of this
Chapter it is enough to point out that there are good reasons why Williamson should reject Objective
Chance Infallibilism.
36It is worth noticing here that this is not a consequence of E=K, but rather it is a more general
consequence of Williamson’s commitment to the idea that knowledge is the most general factive mental
state, thereby making seeing that p a way of knowing that p.
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each proposition, Dodd argues that, if E=K is true, we cannot have knowledge of the
target proposition. Let p be either i), or ii), or iii). In each case, Dodd’s reasoning runs
- schematically - as follows:
1. There is a small non-zero chance that p is false
2. If E = K is true, then knowledge that p is incompatible with there being
a non-zero chance that p is false.
C. Therefore, if E = K is true we cannot know that p.
The main thought driving the argument from 1. to C. is that, in virtue of being
committed to infallibilism, E=K entails that knowledge of a target proposition is in-
compatible with a chance of that proposition being false. In fact, the argument from
1. to C. captures Dodd’s general worry concerning the (allegedly) incompatibility be-
tween E=K’s commitment to infallibilism and the underdetermination thesis (suppos-
edly captured by 1.). In this section, I will argue that Dodd is mistaken. I will evaluate
the arguments for each of the three propositions, and, for each argument, I will show
where Dodd’s reasoning goes wrong. As I will point out, the foregoing argument relies
on an ambiguity of the notion of chance in 1., and, hence, on a mischaracterisation of
the underdetermination thesis. I will argue that whether we can or cannot know that p
does not depend on the evidential probability of the target proposition. It follows that
E=K (and its commitment to P1I) typically does not by itself entail whether we can or
cannot know a specific proposition. By contrast, whether a proposition is something
we can know typically depends on factors related to the modal nature of knowledge37.
Lottery Propositions
Let us start with the first proposition Dodd considers, namely, that my lottery ticket
will lose. With respect to this proposition, Dodd says:
“According to Williamson one cannot know that one’s lottery ticket will
lose. This is an obvious consequence of his or any plausible version of
infallibilism” (Dodd, 2007, footnote 11. Italic is mine)
Remember that the kind of infallibilism Dodd (rightly) attributes to Williamson’s
E=K is what I have called P1I, namely, the thesis that if S knows that p, then the
evidential probability of p is 1. P1I entails that, if I know that my lottery ticket will
lose, the evidential probability of the proposition that my lottery ticket will lose is 1.
37An exception concerns necessary false propositions.
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However, Dodd says, the evidential probability of the proposition that my ticket will
lose is less than 1. Hence, if E=K is true, I cannot know that my lottery ticket will lose.
Dodd is right in saying that Williamson takes lottery-style propositions to be a kind of
propositions we just cannot know. Crucially, this is not a consequence of Williamson’s
commitment to infallibilism. As I have pointed out in the previous sections, P1I is just
what trivially follows once we define the notion of evidence in the light of the notion
of knowledge. In arguing that our ignorance of lottery-style propositions is a direct
consequence of E=K, Dodd is committing a crucial mistake: he is taking the notion
of evidential probability as what determines whether we can or cannot know a given
proposition. By contrast, the evidential probability of a proposition is a mere indicator
of whether, as things stand, we already know the target proposition or not38. So, even
if Williamson denies that we can have knowledge of the fact that my lottery ticket
will lose, the explanation of why this is so is not to be found in E=K’s commitment
to (Propositional) Probability 1 Infallibilism. Putting the matter in another way, my
claim is that Dodd is reversing the order of explanation. Let “lottery” stand for the
proposition that my lottery ticket will lose. The starting point in Dodd’s reasoning is
that P(lottery | E)< 1. On his view, this is sufficient to lead to the sceptical conclusion
that one cannot know “lottery” when taken together with E=K. Crucially, this gets the
order of explanation wrong. Williamson agrees that we cannot know “lottery”, but
this is for reasons that, as I will explain shortly, are independent of E=K. We can agree
with Dodd in saying that the evidential probability of “lottery” is less than 1 at t, but the
evidential probability by itself does not explain, on Williamson’s view, why I cannot
know “lottery”. If anything the fact that we cannot know “lottery” explains why the
evidential probability of “lottery” remains less than 1. The fact that the evidential
probability of a lottery-style proposition for a subject S remains less than 1 is thus a
mere consequence of the fact that we cannot know lottery-style propositions in the first
place, together with E=K39, 40.
How can we explain our ignorance of lottery-style propositions if not by appealing
to the evidential probability of “lottery”? The way we should explain it, or, at least,
38Cf. also Littlejohn, 2008: 681 for a similar point.
39It is important to point out that while, on Propositional Probability 1 Infallibilism, knowledge that
p entails P(p | E) = 1, the other side of the entailment does not hold. We can thus have cases in which
the evidential probability of p for S is 1 and yet one fails to know that p. It is for this reasons that I say
that ignorance of a proposition p entails that the evidential probability of p remains less than 1. This
won’t matter for the purpose of my argument here.
40Note that the idea that we cannot know that my lottery ticket will lose is widely embraced amongst
contemporary epistemologists.
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the way in which Williamson would explain it, is by appealing to the modal nature of
knowledge, and to Williamson’s commitment to the safety requirement for knowledge
(Williamson, 2000, Williamson, 2009a). In a nutshell, this means that if S knows that
p, then S’s belief that p is safe from error. It is easy to see how the notion of safety is
related to the notion of risk. For if S’s belief is safe from error, then S is not at risk of
falsely believing p (or a very similar proposition) in similar cases. Williamson thinks
of the notions of safety and risk as modal notions. He says:
“[O]ne is safe in a possible world w at a time t from an eventuality if and
only if that eventuality obtains in no world ‘close’ to w at t. Call this the
‘no-close risk’ conception of safety”. (Williamson, 2009a: 13)
Different formulations of the notion of ‘safety’ and ‘risk’ have been offered in the
literature, but providing a detailed characterisation of the safety requirement would
lead us too far afield41. Note, however, that my argument does not rely on any specific
account of safety. The generality of Dodd’s mistake in his arguing against E=K is such
that any account of safety will do the job. For the purpose of this Chapter, it is thus
enough to stress that, what all epistemic accounts of safety and risk have in common is
that high probability of p being true is not enough for considering one’s belief that p as
safe42. That is, what ties together knowledge and risk of error is neither the objective
chance of the target proposition, nor its evidential probability. Rather, it is the modal
construal of the notion of safety43.
The point is an important one, for it highlights the general problem with Dodd’s ar-
gument. Remember that Dodd’s argument concerns whether knowledge is compatible
with the fact that virtually all of our beliefs are at risk of being in error (Underdeter-
mination thesis). The way he cashes out the idea that virtually all of our beliefs are
at risk of being in error is by assuming that evidential probability of virtually all our
beliefs is less than 1. By doing so, he is wrongly assuming a notion of risk in terms of
evidential probability, and he is illegitimately assuming that the evidential probability
of a proposition is what determines whether at time t the target proposition is a good
41For formulations of safety see Sosa, 1999, Williamson, 2000: 123-130, Pritchard, 2005a. Re-
cently Pritchard has also moved from talking about epistemic luck to talking about epistemic risk. See
Pritchard, 2016b.
42In fact, this is exactly what lottery propositions are supposed to show.
43Williamson claims that “when epistemological risk is at issue, the explanation will be in episte-
mological terms” rather than in probabilistic terms (Williamson, 2009a, p.9). In fact, he argues that
understanding risk in epistemological terms rather than probabilistic terms will allow us to avoid the
notorious Reference Class problem that most theories of probability face (frequentists in particular).
One worry I have is whether these modal accounts of risk face a similar reference class problem. This
is an interesting question, but one that I am not going to address here.
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candidate for being an instance of knowledge. As I have stressed above, however,
the evidential probability of a proposition is merely an indicator of whether, as things
stand, the agent knows the target proposition at time t. By contrast, it is by appealing to
his modal construal of the notion of safety that Williamson can explain S’s ignorance
of the fact that S’s ticket will lose: roughly put, S’s belief in a world w at time t that
her ticket is the losing one is, despite being highly likely, not safe, i.e., it is not true in
all close possible worlds with respect to world w at time t.
Propositions About the Future
Let us now consider the proposition that I will be alive tomorrow. Dodd’s argument
here is analogous to the previous one. As with lottery-style propositions, the starting
point in Dodd’s reasoning is that there is a small chance that the proposition that I
shall be alive tomorrow is false. From this, he infers that, if E=K is true, then I cannot
know that I will be alive tomorrow. Once again, Dodd is reversing the order of expla-
nation. Now, let us assume that Williamson denies that we know that we will be alive
tomorrow. Even if Williamson might grant that we cannot know that we will be alive
tomorrow, he would make sense of our ignorance in this case by pointing out that the
target belief does not meet the safety requirement for knowledge. It is only once we
have established that we cannot have knowledge of the target proposition that, given
E=K, we can conclude that the evidential probability of the target proposition remains
less than 1.44
Two points are worth stressing here. First, note that Dodd’s reliance on the am-
biguity of the notion of chance becomes particularly apparent when he explains why
there is indeed a possibility that I will not be alive tomorrow. With this respect, Dodd
points out the following two facts:
“Statistical facts about murder rates and automobile fatalities show that
there is a small chance that I shall be killed in the near future.” (Dodd,
2007: 645)
“It is just a fact that my beliefs about what is going on to be the case in
the future are based on information I have right now. And this information
does not entail that I shall be alive next year, or that I shall not be able to
afford an African safari.” (Dodd, 2007: 645. Italics are mine)
I have already pointed out that Dodd explicitly defines the underdetermination the-
44As I will point out in a bit, the details of the case under consideration will matter in determining
whether a target proposition is safe or not.
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sis in terms of evidential probability45. Crucially, in the first quotation, Dodd is appeal-
ing to statistical facts in order to explain why there is a chance that I shall not be alive
tomorrow. By relying on an ambiguity in the notion of ‘chance’, he seems to be shifting
to a notion of underdetermination that is different from the one he explicitly addresses
in his paper. In fact, he seems to be appealing to a notion of underdetermination that
is much closer to what I have here called Objective-Chance underdetermination. But,
as I have shown above, Objective-Chance Underdetermination is perfectly compatible
with the varieties of infallibilism E=K is committed to. In the second passage I have
quoted, instead, we can see that Dodd is cashing out the idea that my belief that I shall
be alive tomorrow is underdetermined by appealing to the fact that the statistical data
about murders are part of my information, and this is what constitutes the rational ba-
sis on which I form my belief. This rational basis, however, does not entail that I will
be alive tomorrow. Again, it is easy to see that Dodd is now moving far from his initial
understanding of the underdetermination thesis, namely, one that is cashed out in terms
of evidential probability. Instead, the formulation of the underdetermination thesis he
is appealing to in the second quotation represents an instance of what I have defined
as the ‘Doxastic Entailing Underdetermination Thesis’. Crucially, as I have shown in
the first half of this Chapter, E=K, and the varieties of infallibilism E=K entails, are
compatible with the Doxastic Underdetermination Thesis.
Second, from our ignorance of the proposition that my lottery ticket will lose, as
well as the proposition that I will be alive tomorrow, Dodd generalises to all proposi-
tions about the future, thereby concluding that, at the end of the day, Williamson is a
sceptic about almost all propositions about the future. However, making such a gener-
alisation amounts to treating any proposition about the future as epistemically equal.
It should be clear at this point why this is a crucial mistake. If we want to evaluate the
overall epistemic status of a target proposition – whether it can be known – we need to
ask whether the belief in the target proposition is safe from being mistaken. Crucially,
given the modal construal of the notion of safety (one that does not cash out safety in
terms of evidential probability), we will answer this question differently depending on
which specific proposition about the future we are considering. For instance, while my
belief that I will be alive tomorrow might fail to count as safe in w at t (for the propo-
sition that I will be alive tomorrow is not true in all close possible worlds relevant to
w at t), my belief that an alien will not abduct me might count as safe. Hence, while
45In fact, as I have pointed out, this is exactly why the underdetermination thesis trivially leads to
skepticism when matched with P1I.
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Williamson might be a sceptic about the proposition that I will be alive tomorrow, he
is not necessarily a sceptic about every proposition about the future.
Propositions about the Present
Finally, Dodd argues that the case from E=K to scepticism can be generalised to propo-
sitions about the present that are not the content of any current perceptual experience.
Consider a scenario in which you have just looked at your books on the shelves. As-
sume now that you are in a different room and you consider the proposition that there
are still books on the shelves. Do you know that there are still books on the shelves?
According to Dodd, if E=K is true, the answer to this question is negative. This is be-
cause, he says, according to some interpretation of quantum mechanics, there is some
very small non-zero chance that the particles forming the books have just rearranged
themselves in such a way that they do not count as books anymore46. Again, Dodd’s
reasoning here is analogous to the previous two cases. The idea is that there is a small
non-zero chance that the proposition that there are books on the shelves is false. That
is, there is a sense in which my belief that there are books on the shelves is underde-
termined by my evidence, where Dodd cashes out the notion of underdetermination
in terms of evidential probability. Crucially, Dodd says, if E=K is true, then one’s
knowledge that there are books on the shelves is incompatible with there being a small
non-zero chance that there are no books on the shelves. At this point, it should be clear
to the reader where Dodd’s argument goes wrong: once again, it reverses the order of
explanation. Whether we can or cannot know that there are books on the shelves does
not depend on what the probability of this proposition on our evidence is. Once again,
by appealing to a modal construal of the related notions of safety and risk, Williamson
can easily explain our knowledge of iii): S knows that there are books on the shelves
in w at time t (assuming the proposition is true) because the proposition is true in all
close possible worlds relative to the world w at t.
46Dodd readapts this example from Hawthorne’s Knowledge and The Lotteries (Hawthorne, 2003:
4-5).
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3.5.1 Why we know propositions about the future and propositions
about the (unperceived) present although they are underde-
termined!
In the first half of this Chapter, I have put forward a taxonomy of varieties of infallibil-
ism and underdetermination theses. I have argued that, once varieties of infallibilism
and underdetermination theses are on the table, we should seriously consider mis-
matches of infallibilism and underdetermination theses. This enabled me to show that
E=K is indeed committed to a certain kind of infallibilism that I have called ‘Proposi-
tional Infallibilism’, and that this kind of infallibilism does not lead to scepticism when
matched with non-corresponding Doxastic Underdetermination. Williamson can thus
easily resist Dodd’s dilemma.
Furthermore, in the previous section, I have addressed the specific propositions
Dodd considers when arguing that Williamson is a sceptic, and I have pointed out
where Dodd’s argument goes wrong: by relying on an ambiguity in the notion of
‘chance’, he uses the notion of evidential probability as what determines whether we
can or cannot know a given proposition. By contrast, I have stressed that the evidential
probability of a proposition is an indicator of whether, as things stand, we do or do not
know the target proposition. Once again, E=K (and its commitment to Propositional
Probability 1 Infallibilism) does not have by itself any sceptical implications.
However, I still have to provide an explanation of how Williamson can avoid
Dodd’s dilemma with respect to the specific propositions Dodd considers, namely,
that i) my lottery ticket will lose, that ii) I will be alive tomorrow, and that iii) there are
books on the shelves.
I have argued that, for reasons that are independent of E=K, Williamson would
deny knowledge of proposition i). A consequence of my ignorance of i) is that the
probability of i) on my evidence remains indeed less than 1. It follows that there is no
pressure to resist the dilemma anymore: we can happily embrace the ‘sceptical’ horn
of the dilemma!
“[H]ow can it be anything but painfully obvious that I do not know that [I shall be
able to go on an African safari next week] [...]? This is a good question.” Littlejohn
says (2008: 684). As I have stressed above, whether Williamson allows for knowledge
of propositions about the future depends on the details of the case and on the propo-
sition in question. So, assuming we are talking about me, a philosophy PhD student,
I can take the proposition that I shall be able to go on an African safari next week as
102
being epistemically on pair with a lottery proposition. Both propositions are not safe
propositions, and we should thus accept that I in fact do not know that I will be able to
go on an African safari next week.
But what about the proposition Dodd considers: ii) that I will be alive tomorrow?
Depending on the details of the case, Williamson might deny knowledge of ii), thereby
embracing the sceptical horn of the dilemma again! But what if the case is actually
such that the proposition that ii) I will be alive tomorrow counts as safe on Williamson’s
framework? That is, what if Williamson can account for knowledge of ii)? Given E=K,
when I know that ii) I will be alive tomorrow, it follows that the probability of ii) on my
evidence is 1. We should thus take the dilemma seriously in these cases, and we should
try to resist it. In order to successfully resist the dilemma, we have to explain how it
is possible to have knowledge that ii) I will be alive tomorrow, without rejecting the
overwhelmingly plausible thesis that there is a sense in which ii) is underdetermined
by our evidence. After all, it just might be the case that I will have an unexpected
heart attack tomorrow. Fortunately, appealing to the varieties of underdetermination
theses I have developed enables us to resist the dilemma successfully. Besides be-
ing compatible with Doxastic varieties of Underdetermination, i.e., Doxastic Proba-
bility 1 Underdetermination and Doxastic Entailing Underdetermination, knowledge
of propositions about the future is also compatible with both Objective-Chance and
Appearance-Entailing Underdetermination.
Let us now move on to proposition iii). As explained above, the proposition iii) will
count as safe on Williamson’s view. Williamson can thus account for knowledge of iii).
Again, we should take the dilemma seriously here. Given E=K, when I know that iii)
there are books on the shelves, it follows that the probability of iii) on my evidence
is 1. And yet, it might be the case that the particles of my book unfolded themselves
in some weird ways so to make iii) false! Again, we can appeal to my taxonomy of
varieties of underdetermination theses. In particular, we want to see if there are vari-
eties of underdetermination theses that are compaible with E=K, besides the Doxastic
varieties of Infallibilism. One way to go could be to appeal to the Objective-Chance
Underdetermination thesis. This might allow us to say that, although the evidential
probability of iii) for S at time t is 1, there is a non-zero objective chance at time t
that iii) is false at t. Crucially, it is easy to see why this is not going to be a promising
strategy. Remember that, by appealing to iii), Dodd is considering a proposition about
the present. That is, the scenario is one in which S believes that there are books on the
shelves at time t, whilst it might be that the particles of the books unfolded themselves
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at t in such a way that they do not count as books anymore. What is important here is
that the moment in which S forms her belief and the moment in which the particles of
the book might unfold themselves in weird ways are the same. If this is so, then we
have two possible scenarios. A first scenario is one in which S believes that there are
books on the shelves in world w at time t, while the books indeed remain books in w at
time t. This entails that Chtw(iii) = 1. A second scenario is one in which S believes that
there are books on the shelves in world v at time t, while the books do indeed unfold
themselves in a weird way so as to stop counting as books in v at time t. This entails
that iii) is false. Given factivity of knowledge, S would not know that there are books
on the shelves in v at t. Note that, insofar as I wish to explain, contra Dodd, that knowl-
edge of iii) is compatible with both E=K and a plausible underdetermination thesis, I
am here concerned with the former scenario only. Crucially, if I assume that S knows
that iii) at time t in the first scenario, iii) is not underdetermined in the sense expressed
by Objective-Chance Underdetermination. For remember that we are here concerned
with a true proposition about the present so that Chtw(iii) = 1. If we want to resist
the dilemma, we thus need to find a different formulation of the underdetermination
thesis. Fortunately, there is a variety of underdetermination thesis that is compatible
with E=K as well as with the fact that S knows that iii) in w at t. That is, there is a
sense in which iii) is underdetermined by our evidence in w at t, namely, in the sense
expressed by what I have called the Appearance-Entailing Underdetermination Thesis:
Appearance-Entailing Underdetermination (AEU):
For any proposition p, S’s non-factive psychological states (i.e., S’s im-
pressions, appearances etc.) do not entail p.
Appealing to AEU enables us to resist Dodd’s dilemma with respect to the specific
proposition iii). On one hand, S knows that there are books on the shelves in w at time
t , and this is because – as I have explained – S’s belief is safe from being mistaken in
all close possible worlds relevant to w. Given E=K, once S knows that there are books
on the shelves, S’s evidential probability of the proposition that there are books on the
shelves is 1. On the other hand, once we understand the underdetermination thesis
in the sense expressed by Appearance Entailing Underdetermination, it is possible to
account for the intuition that S’s belief that there are books on the shelves is under-
determined by S’s available evidence, when we restrict S’s available evidence to facts
about S’s non-factive mental states: S’s (non-factive) psychological states in w at t do
not entail that there are books on the shelves. Putting the matter in another way: S’s
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non-factive psychological states in w at t, namely, S’s non-factive psychological states
in the case in which S knows that there are books on the shelves, are compatible with
S being in v at t, namely, with S being in the case in which S does not know that the
books are on the shelves because their particles did unfold themselves in some funny
way.
3.6 Conclusion
Infallibilism has traditionally been thought of as entailing a variety of scepticism. In
this Chapter I have challenged this tradition. To do so, I have focused on Williamson’s
E=K and Dodd’s argument that allegedly shows that E=K is committed to a scepti-
cal version of infallibilism. More precisely, as I have stressed in this Chapter, Dodd
presents his argument in the form of a dilemma. Given that E=K entails a version of in-
fallibilism that leads to scepticism when combined with an overwhelmingly plausible
underdetermination thesis, Dodd argues that Williamson is forced to give up on some-
thing. The first horn of the dilemma involves holding onto both E=K (and the entailed
infallibilism) and Underdetermination thesis. This comes at the cost of embracing
scepticism. The second horn of the dilemma involves saving E=K while rejecting Un-
derdetermination thesis. This comes at the cost of being too dogmatic. In this Chapter,
I have shown that Dodd provides us with a false dilemma. More precisely, developing
varieties of infallibilism and varieties of underdetermination theses enabled me to do
the following two things: 1) identify the real source of scepticism, and 2) show how
the defender of E=K can have it both ways: she can retain both her infallibilist view
and underdetermination thesis, while rejecting the sceptical conclusion. With respect
to the first point, my taxonomy of infallibilism and underdetermination theses shows
that there is nothing intrinsically sceptic about infallibilism. Rather infallibilism leads
to scepticism only when combined with a corresponding variety of underdetermination
theses. However, once we have clarified what the source of scepticism is, I show that
we can combine varieties of infallibilism with non-corresponding varieties of underde-
termination theses. This will allow us to retain our favourite infallibilist thesis as well
as reject scepticism, while, at the same time, acknowledging that there is a sense in
which (most of) our beliefs are underdetermined by our evidence. Focusing on E=K,
my taxonomy of infallibilism and underdetermination theses allowed me to identify
in which sense Williamson’s E=K is an infallibilist view, and which variety of under-
determination thesis avoids scepticism, when combined with E=K. More precisely, I
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have shown that E=K entails what I have called Propositional Entailing Infallibilism
and Propositional Probability 1 Infallibilism. I have pointed out that these varieties of
infallibilism do not lead to any sceptical result when combined with the following four
varieties of underdetermination theses: Doxastic Probability 1 Underdetermination,
Doxastic Entailing Underdetermination, Objective Chance Underdetermination, and
Appearance-Entailing Underdetermination. Finally, I have reconstructed the details
of Dodd’s argument with respect to the specific three propositions he considers when
arguing that Williamson should be a sceptic. I have pointed out that, besides overlook-
ing varieties of infallibilism and underdetermination theses, his argument relies on an
ambiguity of the notion of ‘chance’ and ‘risk’ underpinning the idea that our beliefs
are underdetermined by our evidence. However, the lesson learnt from Dodd and E=K
can be generalised. What this Chapter shows is that we should be careful when talking
about infallibilism, its sceptical import, and the problem of underdetermination. There
is no univocal way of being an infallibilist (although, as my taxonomy shows, some
ways are more plausible than others). Similarly, I believe there are different ways in
which we can account for the intuition that (most of) our beliefs are underdetermined
by our evidence. We should thus take seriously the possibility of having varieties of
underdetermination theses. The main moral we can draw from this Chapter is thus
the following: whether one thinks infallibilism is plausible or not, we should just stop
blaming infallibilism for being the source of sceptical troubles.
106
Conclusion of Part II
In Chapter 3, I have considered the Infallibility Problem for E=K. That is, I have asked
whether E=K entails some sceptical variety of Infallibilism. By developing varieties
of infallibilism and underdetermination theses, I have argued that E=K entails differ-
ent varieties of infallibilism that, when combined with at least four non-corresponding
varieties of Underdetermination Thesis, do not lead to scepticism. I have thus focused
on E=K without considering Epistemological Disjunctivism. As mentioned previously
in this Thesis, Epistemological Disjunctivism is a view that concerns paradigmatic
cases of perceptual knowledge only, and yet epistemologists seem to take the Infal-
libility Problem more seriously when it comes to non-perceptual cases of knowledge
(see Dodd (2007)). However, at this point one might nevertheless wonder whether
Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism entails any of the varieties of infallibilism
I have formulated in Chapter 3 and, if so, whether these varieties are compatible with
some Underdetermination Thesis. In order to answer these questions, let us recall what
Epistemological Disjunctivism amounts to:
In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, an agent, S, has perceptual
knowledge that P in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R
[i.e., S’s seeing that], for her belief that P which is both factive (i.e., R’s
obtaining entails P) and reflectively accessible. (Pritchard (2012): 13).
As I have argued in Chapter 2, the most plausible interpretation of the notion of
reflective access is one which accounts for the fact that S knows that p in virtue of
basing one’s belief that p on one’s rational support R. In other words, S has perceptual
knowledge that p insofar as the reason why S believes that p is R. It thus follows that,
on Epistemological Disjunctivism, what kind of reason one bases one’s belief on are
relevant for determining whether one has (perceptual) knowledge. Following the tax-
onomy of infallibilism I have developed in Chapter 3, we can define Epistemological
Disjunctivism as an instance of, what I have called, Doxastic Entailing Infallibilism,
namely, the thesis on which if S knows that p and believes that p on the basis of
evidence e, then e entails p. However, as I have explained in Chapter 3, any view
that is committed to Doxastic Entailing Infallibilism will also be committed to Dox-
astic Probability 1 Infallibilism. Furthermore, remember that, as I have pointed out
in Chapter 3, Doxastic varieties of Infallibilism are the strongest versions of infalli-
bilism on my taxonomy, and they entail all Propositional Varieties of Infallibilism. It
turns out that Epistemological Disjunctivism is also committed to those varieties of
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infallibilism. I have said above that, given that ED is restricted to paradigmatic cases
of perceptual knowledge, we might be willing to accept that there is no available un-
derdetermination thesis that, when combined with these kinds of infallibilism, avoid
scepticism (that is we might just reject the idea that our beliefs in paradigmatic cases
of perceptual knowledge are underdetermined at all). Nevertheless, the reader might
still wonder if, in principle, there is a version of underdetermination that is compatible
with ED. Once again, we can appeal to the varieties of underdetermination theses that I
have developed in Chapter 3. Given that Disjunctivism is concerned with paradigmatic
cases of perceptual knowledge, we can plausibly restrict the scope of Epistemological
Disjunctivism to propositions about the present. For this reason, we cannot appeal to
Objective Chance Underdetermination to account for the fact that there is a sense in
which, although S knows that p at time t, S’s belief that p is underdetermined. For if S
knows that p at time t, then p is true, thereby making Objective Chance of p in world
w at time t = 1. However, we can still say that S’s belief that p is underdetermined in
the sense expressed by Appearance-Entailing Underdetermination.
A final consideration is in order before concluding this Part. Note that, as men-
tioned in Chapter 2, Pritchard takes one of the advantages of his ED to be that it
resists the sceptical paradox. In particular, he argues that his ED is able to resist
the Underdetermination-based Sceptical Argument. While appealing to my taxonomy
shows that there ED entails some versions of infallibilism that are, nevertheless, log-
ically compatible with one variety of underdetermination theses, I think the question
of whether Pritchard’s ED is able to resist the radical sceptical paradox is still to be
answered. However, this is something I will not address here47
47It is also important to point out that there is a distinction to be made between local and global scep-
tical challenge. Pritchard offers two different solutions to these problems. See for instance Pritchard,
2012 and Pritchard, 2016a. For a criticism to Pritchard’s solution to global scepticism see Zalabardo,
2015. For an interesting recent criticism to Pritchard’s solution to local scepticism see Smith, 2016b.
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Part III
Evidential Externalism and Epistemic
Justification
109

Introduction
I have considered Evidential Internalism as the thesis on which one’s evidence super-
venes on one’s non-factive mental states. I have taken Evidential Externalism to be
merely the denial of Evidential Internalism. As I have stressed in the Introduction of
this thesis, Evidential Externalism, so defined, is silent on various issues concerning
the notion of evidence. For instance, it does not specify what it takes for something
to be evidence, what it takes for evidence to support a proposition, and what it takes
for someone to possess evidence. Furthermore, Evidential Externalism defined as the
denial of the supervenience thesis between evidence and non-factive mental states, re-
mains silent on how we should characterise the notion of epistemic justification. How-
ever, although Evidential Externalism, as well as Evidential Internalism, per se do not
entail anything about epistemic justification, I believe it is nevertheless plausible to
consider Evidential Externalism and Evidential Internalism as two ways in which one
can embrace an Evidentialist theories of epistemic justification. Following Conee and
Feldman (2004), I will understand Evidentialism as the thesis on which one’s justifi-
cation supervenes on one’s evidence. This thesis is also very broad and leaves various
questions about evidence and the relation between evidence and justification unan-
swered. For all Evidentialism says is that the notions of evidence and justification are
strictly intertwined, yet it does not specify how these notions are related to each other.
Part III addressed the following question: how does Evidential Externalism understand
the relation between evidence and epistemic justification? In other words, how can we
combine Evidential Externalism with Evidentialism about epistemic justification?
This section is constituted of Chapter 4 and a general conclusion. In chapter 4, I
consider two varieties of evidentialism, what I call, Evidence-first Evidentialism and
Knowledge-first Evidentialism. I take Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism (un-
derstood in evidentialist terms) to be a version of the former. I take Williamson’s
account of evidence and justification to be a version of the latter. After defining these
evidentialist views, and after clarifying to what extent Knowledge-first Evidentialism
differs from the more orthodox Evidence-first Evidentialism, I argue for novel eviden-
tialist theory: Ecumenical Evidentialism. I show that my Ecumenical Evidentialism
vindicates some of the intuitions underlying Evidence-first Evidentialism while re-
maining in the spirit of the Knowledge-first program.
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Chapter 4
Evidence-first, Knowledge-first, and
Ecumenical Evidentialism
4.1 Introduction
Let Evidentialism be the thesis on which one’s justification supervenes on one’s ev-
idence (Conee & Feldman, 2004). On Evidentialism, the notions of evidence and
justification are thus strictly intertwined. However, as defined, Evidentialism remains
silent on lots of questions concerning the nature of evidence and justification, and how,
precisely, these notions are related. It is important to point out that what Conee and
Feldman have in mind when formulating Evidentialism is propositional justification
(as opposed to doxastic justification), namely, evaluation of a proposition relative to a
subject’s evidence (as opposed to an evaluation of a belief relative to a subject’s evi-
dence). Nevertheless, I take it that a satisfying Evidentialist theory, namely, a theory
that wants to cash out epistemic justification in terms of evidence, should provide us
with an answer to both the following two questions:
i) What is the relation between evidence and propositional justification?
ii) What is the relation between evidence and doxastic justification?
Evidentialism, as defined, does not answer these questions. In this Chapter, I will
take this to be a virtue of Evidentialism, for, depending on how we answer the fore-
going questions, we will have varieties of Evidentialism. In particular, I will devote
most of my attention to the second of the two questions above. This is because, as
I will show later, while there is more agreement, amongst evidentialists, on how to
spell out propositional justification in terms of evidence, there is general disagree-
ment on how to answer the question about doxastic justification. An orthodox way of
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answering the second question is to take doxastic justification to be a matter of appro-
priately responding to the evidence one has, thereby vindicating what I will call the
‘Responsiveness Intuition’. Call this view ‘Evidence-first Evidentialism’. However,
I believe there’s another way of understanding Evidentialism, one that is in line with
Williamson’s Knowledge-first Epistemology. As I will explain later, on Williamson’s
view, doxastic justification is just a matter of complying with the Knowledge Norm of
Belief (KNB), so that one is (doxastically) justified in believing that p iff one knows
that p. By reducing justification to knowledge, this view doesn’t seem to vindicate
the Responsiveness Intuition1. Nevertheless, given Williamson’s E=K, his view of
epistemic justification is also an instance of Evidentialism. Call this ‘Knowledge-first
Evidentialism’.
The aim of this Chapter is two-fold. It sheds light on how much and to what extent
Knowledge-first Evidentialism differs from Evidence-first Evidentialism. It explores
the prospects of a novel evidentialist view, one that is able to account for the so-called
‘Responsiveness Intuition’, while remaining in the spirit of Knowledge-first Episte-
mology. I shall call this ‘Ecumenical Evidentialism’2.
This Chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, I clarify the main com-
mitments of Evidence-first Evidentialism. I then direct my attention to what I call
Knowledge-first Evidentialism in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, I provide a careful di-
agnosis of how much and to what extent Knowledge-first Evidentialism differs from
Evidence-first Evidentialism. Finally, in Section 4.5, I develop the main theoretical
commitments of my Ecumenical Evidentialism. I conclude in Section 4.6 with some
remarks about possible future developments of Ecumenical Evidentialism.
4.2 Evidence-first Evidentialism
According to Evidentialism, the notions of evidence and justification are strictly in-
tertwined. Evidence-first Evidentialism and Knowledge-first Evidentialism represent
different ways of understanding this relation between evidence and justification. As
I mentioned in the introduction, one aim of this chapter is to shed light on just how
much and to what extent these evidentialist views differ from each other. In order to
do so, however, we first need to have a better sense of what I mean by Evidence-first
1I will point out that this is exactly what we should expect when we appreciate how radical the
Knowledge-first Project is.
2Thanks for the suggestion of the name to Rachel Fraser.
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Evidentialism and Knowledge-first Evidentialism. In this Section, I will clarify what I
take to be the main commitments of Evidence-first Evidentialism.
Clarifying the relation between evidence and justification is not an easy task, es-
pecially given the disagreement over both the notion of evidence as well as the notion
of justification. I will proceed as thus: first, I will look at the important distinction
between propositional and doxastic justification and how this is traditionally under-
stood. Second, after discussing the roles we expect evidence to play, I will suggest a
way of understanding the relation between evidence and (propositional and doxastic)
justification in a way that captures the orthodox intuition underpinning Evidence-first
Evidentialism. Before proceeding, a disclaimer is in order. In what follows I will
just assume that Evidentialism as stated above is the right view about epistemic jus-
tification. Furthermore, I will use the terms ‘reason’ and ‘evidence’ interchangeably.
However, the reader who believes Evidentialism is wrong3 might still find the discus-
sion in this chapter useful both because it clarifies a longstanding debate on evidence
and justification by framing a new opposition, i.e., that one between Evidence-first and
Knowledge-first Evidentialism, and because it explores a novel possibility in the de-
bate that could bring together the two opposing views, i.e., Ecumenical Evidentialism.
4.2.1 Propositional and Doxastic Justification
As I already mentioned in the Introduction of this Chapter, I take propositional justifi-
cation to be, roughly put, an evaluation of a proposition relative to a subject’s evidence.
And I take doxastic justification to be, roughly put, an evaluation of a belief. I have also
mentioned that a satisfying Evidentialist account is one that answers both the following
questions:
i) What is the relation between evidence and propositional justification?
ii) What is the relation between evidence and doxastic justification?
Here is, in a nutshell, how I take propositional and doxastic justification to be tra-
ditionally understood. On one hand, one has propositional justification for believing
a proposition p when, roughly put, one has good evidence for believing that p, where
‘good evidence’ is evidence that provides adequate epistemic support to p. On the other
hand, one is doxastically justified in believing that p, when one justifiably believes that
3As mentioned in the Introduction of this thesis, Reliabilism represents a paradigmatic example of a
non-evidentialist view about justification. However, see Comesana, 2010 for a recent discussion on how
to combine reliabilism with evidentialism. For a more recent argument against evidentialism, one that
does not rely on Reliabilism, see Littlejohn, 2018a
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p, namely, one is believing that p for – roughly speaking – the right kind of reasons
(i.e., in virtue of the evidence that makes the proposition p justified). Whether one
has propositional justification for believing something thus depends on what counts
as evidence and on how we spell out the evidential support relation. One way to un-
derstand this evidential support relation is in probabilistic terms. For instance, one
has propositional justification for believing that p when one’s evidence makes p suffi-
ciently likely. Of course, on this account, we need to set a threshold t that determines
when p is sufficiently likely. Although other interpretations of the evidential-support
relation have been offered4, this probabilistic understanding of the evidence-support
relation, and thus its related notion of propositional justification, is widely embraced
amongst epistemologists. Doxastic justification, instead, is traditionally understood as
having propositional justification and basing one’s belief on one’s propositional jus-
tification. That is, on this view, one is doxastically justified in believing that p only
if one has propositional justification for believing that p, and one bases one’s belief
that p on one’s propositional justification (cf. Firth, 1978: 218, Kvanvig & Menzel,
1990, Pollock & Cruz, 1999: 35, Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010: 205-6).5 For the purpose of
this section, it won’t matter what the right way of spelling out the details about the
basing relationship is6. Remember that the aim of this section is to shed light on what
a general orthodox Evidence-first Evidentialism looks like. Therefore, while assuming
Evidentialism about justification, I will cash out propositional and doxastic justifica-
tion as evaluations of propositions and beliefs respectively, thereby keeping a fairly
neutral standpoint on which specific Evidence-first Evidentialist account is the right
one.
Let us now go back to the two questions that every satisfying Evidentialist account
has to answer:
4For instance, Conee and Feldman understand the evidential support relation in terms of inference
to the best explanation (see Conee & Feldman, 2008), while Smith has recently offered a ‘normalcy’
account (see Smith, 2016a).
5While there is a general consensus (amongst evidentialists) on how to cash out the notion of propo-
sitional justification, there is less agreement on how to understand the notion of doxastic justification.
For instance, Turri, 2010 has recently challenged this orthodox account by presenting cases in which
someone believes that p on the basis of her propositional justification, yet she does so for the wrong
reasons. The cases Turri presents are supposed to show that, given that one can base one’s belief on
one’s propositional justification improperly, the orthodox account is mistaken. Instead, he argues that
we should understand the notion of propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification (and
not vice versa). For an interesting response to Turri, see Silva, 2015. Despite the disagreement, and
despite the different ways in which one can fill in the details of this account, understanding doxastic
justification in terms propositional justification plus basing remains the paradigmatic and orthodox way
of understanding doxastic justification.
6For an excellent overview on different ways of understanding the notion of ‘basing’ see Korcz, 2010
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i) What is the relation between evidence and propositional justification?
ii) What is the relation between evidence and doxastic justification?
Evidence-first Evidentialism will answer i) and ii) respectively as follows:
(Propositional Justification) (PJ): PJ is an evaluation of a proposition rela-
tive to a subject’s evidence, so that a proposition p is propositionally justi-
fied for a subject S if and only if S’s evidence stands in a support-relation
R towards p.
(Doxastic Justification) (DJ): DJ is an evaluation of a belief, so that S’s
belief that p is doxastically justified for S only if S believes that p on the
basis of one’s evidence E that stands in a support-relation R towards p.
It is worth noticing that, Evidence-first Evidentialism, understood as a package of
view embracing PJ and DJ, does not put any constraint on the nature of evidence. It is
compatible with an externalist picture of evidence, as well as with evidential internal-
ism. Similarly, it is compatible with the view on which evidence is propositional, as
well as with the view on which evidence is constituted by one’s mental states or expe-
riences. Furthermore, note that, as stated, DJ is neutral on how to cash out the basing
relation, and PJ and DJ are both neutral on how we should understand the evidential-
support relation R.
Despite the disagreement on how to fill in the details in PJ and DJ, most epistemol-
ogists who embrace Evidentialism will agree on the following commitments (which is
why I take this way of understanding doxastic and propositional justification to be the
orthodox view):
1. Propositional Justification is an evaluation of a proposition relative to a subject
and given the subject’s total evidence7.
2. Doxastic Justification is an evaluation of a subject’s belief relative to the subject’s
evidence.
3. While being doxastically justified in believing that p entails believing that p, one
can have propositional justification for believing that p without believing p.
4. If one is doxastically justified in believing that p, then one has propositional
justification for believing that p.
7It is important to note that the kind of propositional justification I am interested in here is what is
sometimes called ‘ordinary’ propositional justification rather than ‘objective’ propositional justification.
While the former refers to the evidence that are at one’s disposal, the latter concerns the kind of evidence
that is beyond the cognitive limits of a subject and that only idealised subjects have. Cf. Melis, 2018: 5.
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Given PJ and DJ, Evidence-first Evidentialism comes together with the following
two commitments:
PJ-DJ Relation: Propositional Justification is prior to Doxastic Justifica-
tion and partly explains Doxastic Justification.
E-first: Evidence is prior to justification
There are different ways in which one can embrace Evidence-first Evidentialism.
As I said above, here I am not interested in what the exact way of understanding
the notion of ‘basing’ is. Instead, I am interested in understanding what the intuition
underlying this orthodox notion of doxastic justification is. More precisely, I’d like
to ask: what has led epistemologists to put a ‘basing’ requirement in the definition
of doxastic justification? The following scenario will help us seeing what the overall
intuition motivating the basing requirement is. Imagine I believe that earth is not flat,
and I have tons of scientific and testimony evidence that support my belief that the
earth is not flat. However, assume the reason why I believe the earth is not flat is not
constituted by all the scientific and testimony evidence I have. Instead, the reason why
I believe the earth is not flat is that today it is Sunday and I am convinced that on
Sundays the earth is not flat. In this scenario, I have tons of evidence supporting the
proposition that the earth is not flat, thereby making it (propositionally) justified, and
yet we wouldn’t judge my belief as being (doxastically) justified. The intuition driving
our judgment in this scenario is that, in order for my belief to be doxastically justified,
not only my belief that the earth is not flat has to be supported by my evidence, but I
also have to believe that the earth is not flat on the basis of my evidence that supports
the proposition that the earth is not flat. As Pollock and Cruz say:
“To be justified in believing something it is not sufficient merely to have
a good reason for believing it. One could have a good reason at one’s
disposal but never make the connection.”
(Pollock & Cruz, 1999: 35)
Similarly, when arguing that doxastic justification requires a belief to be “well
founded”, Conee and Feldman say:
“The notion of a well-founded belief [...] serves [...] to accommodate the
intuition that there is something epistemically defective about drawing jus-
tified conclusions for bad reasons. Such beliefs are ill-founded, in virtue
of not being based on justifying evidence.”
(Conee & Feldman, 2004: 103)
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Despite the different ways of spelling out the basing requirement, or whether one
prefers to talk about “well-founded” belief, what all the traditional conceptions of dox-
astic justification seem to have in common is the following Responsiveness Intuition:
(Responsiveness Intuition): Doxastic justification is sensitive to whether
one is evidence responsive. That is, doxastic justification, as evaluation
of a belief, requires belief to be the result of appropriately taking into
consideration one’s evidence in coming to form the target belief.
By understanding doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification plus
basing, Evidence-first Evidentialism vindicates the foregoing Responsiveness Intu-
ition. That is, on this view, doxastic justification is a matter of appropriately taking
into account one’s evidence when forming one’s belief. That is, justification is a mat-
ter of being evidence-responsive.
Before moving on to the next section, let me note that, interestingly, Pritchard’s
Epistemological Disjunctivism can be thought of as being an instance of Evidence-first
Evidentialism in some relevant sense. To see why this is so, let us recall Pritchard’s
formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism:
“In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, an agent, S, has percep-
tual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of rational support,
R [i.e., S’s seeing that], for her belief that p which is both factive (i.e., R’s
obtaining entails p) and reflectively accessible.” (Pritchard, 2012: 13).
As I mentioned previously in this Thesis, and as it results clear from the above-
mentioned passage, Pritchard does not talk about evidence. However, we can have an
evidentialist formulation of Pritchard’s Disjunctivism, one on which S has perceptual
knowledge in virtue of having evidence (i.e., S’s seeing that) for her belief that p that
is both factive and reflectively accessible8. Assuming, knowledge entails doxastic jus-
tification, on this evidentialist formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism it looks
like one has doxastic justification (in paradigmatically good perceptual cases) in virtue
of having evidence that one gets access to and in the light of which one thus believes
that p. In a sense, by requiring one’s evidence to be reflectively accessible, Pritchard’s
Epistemological Disjunctivism provides us with an Externalist version of the tradi-
tional Evidence-first view which takes doxastic justification as the result of believing
that p for the right kind of (factive) reasons, thereby vindicating, the Responsiveness
Intuition.
8This is a shift that Pritchard himself does in Pritchard, 2011b.
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4.2.2 The Relation between Roles of Evidence and Justification
Recall the definition of Evidentialism as provided in the Introduction of this chapter:
evidentialism is the thesis that one’s justification supervenes on one’s evidence. As I
mentioned in the Introduction, Evidentialism, as stated, is relatively silent on how we
should understand the relation between evidence and justification (both propositional
and doxastic). In the previous section, I have evaluated how Evidence-first Evidential-
ism understands this relation. On Evidence-first Evidentialism, evidence provides one
with propositional justification for believing a proposition p in virtue of appropriately
supporting p (e.g., in virtue of making p sufficiently likely). Evidence provides one
with doxastic justification in believing that p only if one believes that p on the basis
of one’s evidence that appropriately supports p (e.g, that makes p sufficiently likely).
I have pointed out that one of the main features of Evidence-first Evidentialism is that
it vindicates the so-called Responsiveness Intuition: (doxastic) justification is a matter
of being evidence-responsive. In this Section, I suggest another way of understanding
the relation between evidence and justification in an Evidence-first fashion, one that
appeals to the roles we expect evidence to play.
Using the terminology familiar to the philosophers of reasons and action we can
think of evidence as having the following main two roles: justifying and motivating
(see Alvarez, 2008, Alvarez, 2009, Alvarez, 2010, Sylvan, 2016). Evidence plays a
justifying role insofar as, roughly put, it is what favours having one doxastic attitude
over another. Evidence plays a motivating role insofar as, roughly put, it is that in the
light of which one believes something. To better see the contrast between the justifying
and motivating role of evidence, we can think of an instance of evidence e as having
a motivating role for S in believing a proposition p insofar S takes e as favouring
believing p over not-p, thereby using e as a premise in deliberation for whether to
believe that p. Instead, an instance of evidence e has a justifying role insofar as it is
what, in fact, favours believing that p over not-p, thereby making believing that p a
justified belief to have9. It is thus in virtue of its justifying role, that we are in fact
justified when we appropriately believe in accordance to our evidence. Once again:
depending on what view of evidence one subscribes to, and depending on what one
9Note that philosophers usually distinguish a third role reasons can have, namely, an explanatory
role. A reason r (and thus evidence) plays an explanatory role for a subject S, for it is what explains
why a subject has done a certain action, or has came to believe something. I believe Alvarez, 2009
is right in arguing that the explanatory and motivating reason can easily come apart. Here I won’t be
concerned with the explanatory role of evidence. Instead, I will focus on the motivating role for, as I
will show later, I take this to play an important role in whether we should attribute doxastic justification
to a subject.
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takes the evidential-support relation to be, the details of how evidence plays a justifying
rather than a motivating role will differ. However, the details won’t matter for the
purpose of this Chapter.
Let us go back to the two questions we expect an Evidentialist account to answer
i) What is the relation between evidence and propositional justification?
ii) What is the relation between evidence and doxastic justification?
Here is another way in which we can understand the relation between evidence and
propositional justification and doxastic justification in an Evidence-first fashion:
PJ - Evidence Relation: Propositional justification is the “manifestation”
of the justifying role of evidence.
DJ - Evidence Relation: Doxastic justification is the “manifestation” of
both the justifying and the motivating roles of evidence, where these roles
are manifested simultaneously and are in alignment, i.e., they are mani-
fested by the same instance (or instances) of evidence.
We can ask: what notion of justification is involved when philosophers talk about
the “justifying” role of evidence? Addressing this question will help us to shed light on
what the notion of “manifestation” amounts to, and it will enable us to further under-
stand the way in which Evidence-first Evidentialism understands the relation between
justification and evidence.
To answer this question let us go back to the definitions of propositional and dox-
astic justification:
(Propositional Justification) (PJ): PJ is an evaluation of a proposition rela-
tive to a subject’s evidence, so that a proposition p is propositionally justi-
fied for a subject S if and only if S’s evidence stands in a support-relation
R towards p.
(Doxastic Justification) (DJ): DJ is an evaluation of a belief, so that one’s
belief that p is doxastically justified for S only if S believes that p in the
light of one’s evidence E that stands in a support-relation R towards p.
In the light of the notions of propositional and doxastic justification given here, the
most plausible and intuitive way of accounting for the relation between the justifying
role of evidence and epistemic justification is to take propositional justification to be
the notion of justification underlying the justifying role of evidence. In order to see
why this is the case, consider first the relation between the justifying role of evidence
and the motivating role of evidence. As mentioned before, an instance of evidence
121
e plays a motivating role for one insofar as e is the reason in the light of which one
believes that p. On the other hand, the justifying role of evidence is that role evidence
plays when it supports a target proposition. However, evidence e plays its justifying
role regardless of whether one in fact uses e as the reason for believing that p or not.
In other words, the justifying and motivating roles of evidence may come apart. It
is thus easy to see a similarity between the propositional kind of justification and the
justifying role of evidence. As we have seen before, a proposition p is propositionally
justified for one, when, given one’s evidence, it is justified for one to believe that p. A
proposition p can be propositionally justified regardless of whether one believes that
p in virtue of p being propositionally justified by one’s evidence. In fact, a proposi-
tion p can be propositionally justified for one regardless of whether one believes p at
all. Doxastic justification, however, requires one to believe that p in the light of the
evidential support provided by one’s evidence. This suggests that, as it stands, dox-
astic justification is not a good candidate for the notion of justification that is in play
when epistemologists talk about the justifying role of evidence. Our evidence does not
provide us with doxastic justification merely in virtue of its justifying role. We thus
have an alternative Evidence-first answer to the first question 1): what is the relation
between evidence and propositional justification? I take the foregoing considerations
to support my suggestion to conceptualise the notion of propositional justification as
being the “manifestation”, namely, the result, of evidence playing its justifying role.
This leaves us with the second question: what is the relation between evidence and
doxastic justification? Bearing in mind what I have said so far about propositional
and doxastic justification, and bearing in mind the relation between the justifying and
the motivating roles of evidence, it should now be easy to see why understanding
doxastic justification as the “manifestation” of both the justifying and motivating roles
of evidence, where these roles are manifested simultaneously and by the same instance
(or instances) of evidence, accounts for the orthodox way of understanding doxastic
justification in evidentialist terms. That is, S’s belief that p is doxastically justified as
the result of both evidence e playing a justifying role and S “exploiting” the motivating
role of evidence, i.e., as the result of S using e as the reason for believing that p.
On this orthodox Evidence-first Evidentialist account, doxastic justification is thus a
matter of whether one believes correctly given the evidence one has. This aligns with
the intuition that, when ‘praising’ someone for believing accordingly to her evidence,
we are not merely claiming that the propositions she believes are justified. What we
normally care about – or, at least, what most epistemologists seem to care about – when
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we evaluate the epistemic status of a subject is whether one appropriately believes
in the light of one’s evidence. It is in this sense that Evidence-first Evidentialism
vindicates the Responsiveness Intuition according to which one is justified if one is
appropriately evidence responsive:
(Responsiveness Intuition): Doxastic justification is sensitive to whether
one is evidence responsive. That is, doxastic justification, as evaluation
of a belief, requires a belief to be the result of appropriately taking into
consideration one’s evidence in coming to form the target belief.
4.3 Knowledge-first Evidentialism
In the previous section, I have considered ‘Evidence-first Evidentialism’, and I have
elucidated how this variety of evidentialism understands the relation between evidence
and justification. In this Section, I consider another way of cashing out Evidential-
ism, one that is in line with Williamson’s Knowledge-first Epistemology. I call it
‘Knowledge-first Evidentialism’.
First of all, let me point out the legitimacy of talking about Knowledge-first Evi-
dentialism in the first place. It is worth noting that Williamson never explicitly defines
himself as an evidentialist. However, he seems to be committed to something in the
neighbourhood of Evidentialism in his Knowledge and its Limits, for instance when he
writes:
“An epistemically justified belief which falls short of knowledge must be
epistemically justified by something; whatever justifies it is evidence.”
(Williamson, 2000: 208)
Furthermore, in Knowledge and its Limits, we can derive Evidentialism, from the
following two theses that Williamson simultaneously embraces. First, the thesis that
“in any possible situation in which one believes a proposition p, that belief is justified,
if at all, by propositions q1 ...qn (usually other than p) which one knows” (2000: 203).
Second, the thesis on which all and only propositions one knows are part of one’s
evidence (E=K) (2000, ch.9). I think we can thus safely define Williamson’s theory of
justification as being an instance of Evidentialism.
However, it might still be difficult to provide a unified Williamsonian account con-
cerning the relation between evidence and justification, given that his view on this
topic seems to have slightly changed over the years. For instance, while he seems to
allow for justified false beliefs in his Knowledge and its Limits (as the above quote
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shows), in his latest papers he reserves the status of justification to those beliefs that
constitute knowledge (cf. Williamson, 2011, Williamson, in press). However, I think it
is possible to define a coherent Knowledge-first Evidentialist view in a way that make
sense of both his work in Knowledge and Its Limits, and what he argues for in his more
recent papers. This is what I am going to do in the coming Section. That is, I want to
shed light on how we can be evidentialist in a Knowledge-first way. In what follows, I
will evaluate how Knowledge-first Evidentialism understands the relation between ev-
idence and propositional justification on one hand, and the relation between evidence
and doxastic justification on the other hand.
4.3.1 Knowledge-first Evidentialism: on Propositional Justification
In order to shed light on what Knowledge-first Evidentialism looks like, we will need
to disentangle the main commitments underlying Williamson’s Knowledge-first view
about evidence and justification, and how and to what extent his Knowledge-first view
of justification is informed by his theory of evidence. I will argue that, while his
E=K entails something about propositional justification, it is silent on what it takes for
someone to be doxastically justified. It is by appealing to the Knowledge Norm of
Belief (KNB) that Williamson provides us with an account of doxastic justification.
As already discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis, Williamson offers a
theory of evidence in terms of knowledge (2000, ch. 9). On his view, one’s evidence
is all and only the propositions one knows (E=K). But what does E=K entail about
epistemic justification? More precisely, what does E=K entail about propositional and
doxastic justification? In order to have a charitable answer to this question, we need to
consider E=K as part of Williamson’s broader picture of evidence. Call it the Evidence
Package:
i Propositionalism about evidence is true
ii A proposition e is part of S’s evidence iff S knows that e
iii A proposition e is evidence for q iff S’s evidence includes e and the probability
of q conditional on e is higher than the unconditional probability of q.
Let us start with i). Take propositionalism to be the thesis on which, roughly put,
the nature of evidence is propositional. In a nutshell, Williamson’s argument for propo-
sitionalism is that only propositions can play the roles evidence is supposed to play,
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e.g., in probabilistic reasoning, inference to the best explanation, and in ruling-out
hypothesis (2000: ch.9)10. I will not rehearse Williamson’s argument for proposition-
alism here. I will assume that propositionalism about evidence is true, given that the
aim of this section is merely clarificatory, and given that the nature of evidence does not
have a straightforward implication on what DJ and PJ amount to. Let us move onto ii).
If i) entails that something can work as evidence only if it is a proposition, commitment
ii) specifies which propositions can work as evidence: all and only those propositions
one knows can be evidence for one11. Commitment iii) puts a further constraint on
what counts as evidence. In particular, while commitment ii) is concerned with the
nature of evidence, commitment iii) concerns the evidence-for relation, namely, what
it takes for some instance of evidence e to provide evidential support to a proposition
p (Williamson, 2000: 187-189).
We can see that although i), ii), and iii), by themselves, do not entail anything about
epistemic justification, when we take these commitments together with the evidential-
ist claim that anything that is justified is justified by evidence (Williamson, 2000: 208),
then we have an initial evidentialist picture of justification. But, we can ask, what kind
of justification? I believe we should take the commitments of the Evidence Package to
provide us with an evidentialist account of propositional justification, while remaining
relatively12 silent on what it takes for someone to be doxastically justified. In order to
see why this is so, recall the core difference between propositional and doxastic jus-
tification: while propositional justification is an evaluation of a proposition, doxastic
justification is an evaluation of a belief. Crucially, note that i) to iii), taken together,
are either concerned with what counts as a justifier of a proposition (i, ii), or with
how we should spell out the evidential-support relation R between the justifier and a
target proposition (iii). None of i) - iii) involves an evaluation of a belief. Therefore,
if i) to iii) entail anything at all about justification, they must entail something about
propositional justification. In fact, by considering the evidence-for relation, and taken
together with the evidentialist assumption on which “what justifies is evidence”, com-
mitment iii) can be read as a way of spelling out the kind of evidential-support relation
in virtue of which a proposition is justified. More precisely, it provides a probabilistic
10For an interesting argument in favour of propositionalism but against Williamson’s argument see
Neta, 2008.
11Note that i) clearly follows from ii). However, I think it is useful to make propositionalism explicit
as one of the main commitments of Williamson’s theory of evidence.
12Of course the ‘Evidence Package’ is not completely silent on doxastic justification. In particular,
E=K is going to be related to the notion of doxastic justification given that, as I will discuss in a bit,
Knowledge-first Evidentialism equates doxastic justification to knowledge.
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interpretation of such a relation. Assuming, further, that the evidence has to increase
the probability of a target proposition over a specific threshold t, we have a first evi-
dentialist account of propositional justification. The first conclusion we can draw here
is that Williamson’s account of evidence, and, more broadly, his Evidence Package,
entails something about propositional justification, while remaining silent on what it
takes for someone to be doxastically justified.
However, far from being uninterested in the notion of doxastic justification, Williamson
has a way of accounting for when and why one’s beliefs deserve the status of doxastic
justification. In the next Section, I will evaluate his Evidentialist Account of Doxastic
Justification. Once I have clarified the main commitments of Knowledge-first Evi-
dentialism, I will evaluate to what extent Knowledge-first Evidentialism differs from
Evidence-first Evidentialism.
4.3.2 Knowledge-first Evidentialism: on Doxastic Justification
In the previous Section, I have shown that the main commitments of Williamson’s ac-
count of evidence (what I have called ‘The Evidence Package’) entails something about
propositional justification while remaining virtually silent on what it takes for some-
one to be doxastically justified. Nevertheless, it would be uncharitable to conclude that
Williamson is just not at all concerned with the notion of doxastic justification. Fur-
thermore, while in his Knowledge and Its Limits he seemed to allow for justified beliefs
that are not knowledge, in his more recent work he seems to reserve the notion of justi-
fication only to known propositions. To make sense of Knowledge-first Evidentialism
in a coherent way, I think we should understand Williamson’s words here (namely,
when he equates justification and knowledge) as referring to doxastic justification. Let
us see how.
In his [forthcoming], Williamson argues that justification is the result of complying
with the following norm of belief: one ought to believe that p only if one knows that
p. Call this the Knowledge Norm of Belief (henceforth, KNB). So one is justified
in believing that p iff one knows that p. How does he get there? Williamson is not
the only one who has argued for the thesis that being justified in believing that p is a
matter of knowing that p (cf. Sutton, 2005, and Littlejohn, 2018b), but he is the only
one, as far as I know, who argues for the KNB from considerations that are explicitly
independent of epistemology. The idea in his paper is to “take a step back from the
epistemological issue to make some [. . . ] general normative distinctions, then return
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with them to epistemology” (Williamson, forthcoming, p. 3). Consider, as Williamson
does, the case of promise-keeping. If I promise to be in Italy for my dad’s birthday,
the norm of keeping my promise has specific compliance conditions, namely, to be in
Italy for my dad’s birthday. It follows that if I try my best to be in Italy for my dad’s
birthday but my flight gets cancelled and I am stuck at the airport, I have failed to keep
my promise. I fulfil my promise if and only if I end up being in Italy for my dad’s
birthday. To put it in Williamson’s words:
“In general, if I promise to phi, then I keep my promise if and only if I
phi, and I comply with the norm of promise-keeping with respect to that
promise if and only if I do keep it.”
(Williamson, in press, p. 10)
However, any given norm, on Williamson’s view, generates other derivative norms.
For any primary norm N we thus have, at least, a secondary and a tertiary norm, what
he calls ‘DN’ and ‘ODN’ respectively. One complies with a secondary norm DN only
if one has a general disposition to comply with the relevant primary norm N (D stands
for disposition). The tertiary norm ODN, instead, requires one to do whatever some-
one who has a general disposition to comply with the primary norm N would do in the
given circumstances (O stands for occurrent). Importantly, however, the secondary and
tertiary norms do not inherit the full normative status of the primary norm. While the
primary norm N has full normative strength, the secondary and tertiary norms are, so
to speak, normatively weaker. Consider again the case of promise-keeping. Imagine I
promise I will be in Italy for my dad’s birthday, but I am a compulsive liar and I am
not that kind of person who makes a promise and keeps it. I have thus no intention
whatsoever to end up in Italy for my dad’s birthday. Assume now that, unexpectedly,
it turns out I really have to be in Italy for an important doctor’s appointment, and this
turns out to be the same day as my dad’s birthday. I thus end up being in Italy for my
dad’s birthday. What Williamson’s normative framework predicts in this case is that,
although I fail to comply with the secondary norm DN, I have nevertheless complied
with the relevant primary norm N of promise-keeping: I have kept my promise. This
framework has important and interesting consequences when applied to the epistemo-
logical case. For, once we take this general normative framework seriously, and we go
back to do epistemology, we have a framework on which we “restrict the term ‘jus-
tification’ to compliance with the relevant primary norm” (Williamson, forthcoming,
p.10). On this view, justification is not something we can get from complying with DN
or ODN, for their normative statuses are merely derivative from the primary norm N.
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What we can get from complying with DN and ODN is, at most, an excuse13. Justifi-
cation requires compliance with the primary norm of belief KNB14. At the same time,
complying with the relevant primary norm of belief is sufficient for being justified. On
this view, one is doxastically justified in believing that p if and only if one knows that
p15.
4.3.3 How to make sense of Knowledge-first Evidentialism
Let us recapitulate the main features of Knowledge-first Evidentialism and how it
cashes out the notions of propositional and doxastic justification. On one hand, it
seems to understand propositional justification in terms of evidence and the eviden-
tial support it offers to a proposition. This view of propositional justification is thus
in line with the way in which Evidence-first Evidentialism understands propositional
justification:
(Propositional Justification (PJ)): PJ is an evaluation of a proposition, so
that a proposition p is propositionally justified for S only if S’s evidence
stands in a support-relation R towards p.
Similarly, we can understand propositional justification in terms of the justifying
role of evidence as follows:
PJ - Evidence Relation: Propositional justification is the manifestation of
the justifying role of evidence.
13It is worth noting that appealing to the excuse-justification distinction represents the typical exter-
nalist move to the New Evil Demon problem, an objection originally raised by Lehrer & Cohen, 1983
and again Cohen, 1984 to reliabilism. The problem goes, roughly, as follows. Consider an subject
who’s radically deceived by an evil demon and who doesn’t know she’s radically deceived. In fact,
everything looks just as if she were not radically deceived. If Reliabilism about justification is right,
then the subject is not justified in believing as she does because, given the evil demon, her beliefs are
systematically false. Crucially, the internalist says, she is doing the best she can and she should thus be
granted justification. Appealing to the excuse-justification distinction enables the externalist to account
for the intuition that the radically deceived subject is doing well: she is not justified but she is neverthe-
less excused (or some would say blameless). For this line of response see also Littlejohn, in press. For a
critique of this response see Gerken, 2011 who argues the excuses-justification distinction is an ad hoc
move. I am not going to discuss the New Evil Demon Problem in this Chapter.
14The idea that Knowledge is the norm of belief already appears in Knowledge and Its Limits where
Williamson first defends a Knowledge norm of Assertion and then he takes the belief to be the inner
speech of assertion thereby suggesting an analogous knowledge norm of belief (see Williamson, 2000,
ch. 10). For other arguments for the Knowledge norm of assertion and knowledge norm of action see
Hawthorne, 2003: 30, Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008. For other arguments for Knowledge Norm of Belief
see Littlejohn, 2018b. For another defence of how justification is a matter of complying with the relevant
norm of belief see Littlejohn, 2018b.
15It is far from clear why compliance with the primary norm gives one epistemic justification and
Williamson does not really provide an argument for that. In fact, as I will mention in the last section of
this chapter, I think KNB does not set the standard for epistemic justification.
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On the other hand, Knowledge-first Evidentialism understands the notion of dox-
astic justification in terms of compliance with the knowledge norm of belief:
K-first DJ: DJ is an evaluation of a belief, so that one is doxastically justi-
fied in believing that p iff one knows that p.
I’ve already mentioned at the beginning of Section 4.3 that, although Williamson
does not explicitly define himself an evidentialist, his commitment to evidentialism
seems to underlie his Knowledge and its Limits. Now that we have a better picture
of what Williamson’s account of doxastic justification amounts to, we can see more
clearly why we can legitimately define this view an evidentialist view: if one is dox-
astically justified in believing that p if and only if one knows that p, and p is part
of one’s evidence if and only if one knows that p, then, on this view, one’s justifica-
tion supervenes on one’s total evidence. Therefore, although Williamson’s account of
doxastic justification is importantly different from the orthodox Evidence-first way of
understanding doxastic justification, it is nevertheless an instance of Evidentialism as
defined it above. 16
4.4 Evidence-first VS Knowledge-first Evidentialism
At the beginning of this Chapter, I offered a definition of Evidentialism as the thesis on
which one’s justification supervenes on one’s evidence. I have noted that, as it stands,
Evidentialism is silent on what evidence is and how we should understand the relation
between evidence and epistemic justification, both in its propositional as well as in
its doxastic form. I have thus considered the orthodox way of understanding Eviden-
tialism, what I have called, ‘Evidence-first Evidentialism’. I have then considered a
different way of cashing out Evidentialism, namely, ‘Knowledge-first Evidentialism’.
On the way I understand Evidence-first Evidentialism, we should cash out the relation
between evidence and propositional and doxastic justification in the following way:
(Propositional Justification (PJ)): PJ is an evaluation of a proposition, so
that a proposition p is propositionally justified for S only if S’s evidence
stands in a support-relation R towards p.
(Doxastic Justification DJ): DJ is an evaluation of a belief, so that one’s
belief that p is doxastically justified for S only if S believes that p on the
basis of one’s evidence E that stands in a support-relation R towards p.
16In fact, note that Knowledge-first Evidentialism is even more ‘hardcore’ evidentialism than the
Evidence-first Evidentialism. For remember, on this latter view, doxastic justification supervenes on
evidence plus basing.
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Alternatively, I have suggested that we can understand propositional and doxastic
justification as being strictly intertwined with the justifying and motivating roles of
evidence in the following way:
PJ - Evidence Relation: Propositional justification is the manifestation of
the justifying role of evidence.
DJ - Evidence Relation: Doxastic justification is the manifestation of both
the justifying and the motivating roles of evidence, where these roles are
manifested simultaneously and are in alignment, i.e., they are manifested
by the same instance (or instances) of evidence.
While Williamson’s Knowledge-first Evidentialism understands propositional jus-
tification in a similar way, as seen in the previous Section, it embraces a different
conception of doxastic justification. That is, Knowledge-first Evidentialism takes dox-
astic justification to be a matter of compliance with the knowledge norm of belief. I
have also stressed that, despite the differences, both Evidence-first and Knowledge-first
accounts can legitimately be considered as varieties of Evidentialism.
In this Section, I will examine how much and to what extent Knowledge-first Evi-
dentialism differs from the more orthodox Evidence-first Evidentialism.
Justified False Beliefs
One of the main differences between Evidence-first and Knowledge-first Evidentialism
is that Knowledge-first Evidentialism does not allow for (doxastically) justified false
beliefs. This is not very surprising; rather it is just what trivially follows once we
understand, as Williamson does, doxastic justification in terms of compliance with the
knowledge norm of belief. I will thus move onto what I take to be more interesting
features of Knowledge-first Evidentialism.
Responsiveness Intuition
Besides the fact that Knowledge-first does not allow for justified false beliefs, I take
the core difference between Evidence-first and Knowledge-first Evidentialism to be
the way in which they conceptualise the notion of doxastic justification. On one hand,
as I’ve mentioned in the previous section, by understanding doxastic justification in
terms of basing one’s belief on one’s (justifying) evidence, Evidence-first Evidential-
ism vindicates the intuition on which doxastic justification is a matter of whether one
is appropriately responding to the evidence one has (Responsiveness Intuition). On
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the other hand, by understanding doxastic justification in terms of compliance with the
KNB, on Knowledge-first Evidentialism, whether one is doxastically justified in be-
lieving that p is not strictly related to whatever evidence one takes into consideration
when coming to believe that p. In a nutshell, Knowledge-first Evidentialism does not
capture the intuition that takes doxastic justification to be a matter of being evidence-
responsive in the sense specified in the Responsiveness Intuition17, 18.
Responsiveness Intuition and Epistemic Evaluations
Once we understand doxastic justification in terms of compliance with the Knowledge
Norm of Belief, the Responsiveness Intuition seems to play no interesting function in
our epistemological evaluations. In other words: if the notion of doxastic justification
is separated from any basing requirement, namely, if the notion of doxastic justification
is unrelated to what evidence one takes into consideration when forming the target be-
lief, then the Responsiveness Intuition ends up playing no role when we evaluate one’s
doxastic attitude as being epistemically good. And yet, one might object that, when
we evaluate one’s doxastic attitude as being epistemically good or bad, epistemologists
seem to be interested in whether one is appropriately responding to the evidence one
has.
I can see two ways in which a defender of the KNB account of doxastic justifica-
tion can respond here. One could either bite the bullet, thereby saying that, in fact, we
should not care much about whether one is appropriately evidence-responsive when
evaluating whether one’s doxastic attitude is ‘epistemically good’. That is, the Re-
sponsiveness Intuition should play no role in our epistemic evaluations. Alternatively,
one could try to ‘save’ the Responsiveness Intuition by linking it to some other relevant
epistemic concepts. I’m going to consider the latter response only.
One could point out that we can still appeal to the Responsiveness Intuition when
making our epistemic evaluation, namely, when judging someone as being epistemi-
cally ‘successful’ or ‘defective’. For instance, one could suggest that we can appeal to
17For those who prefer talking about justification in terms of the roles of evidence, it will be interesting
to note that one consequence of taking doxastic justification to be a matter of complying with the KNB
is that, by doing so, Knowledge-first Evidentialism separates the notion of doxastic justification from
the motivating role of evidence.
18Brueckner has a similar concern when it comes to cases of non-inferential knowledge. As I will
explain later, on a knowledge-first account of non-inferential knowledge one can have knowledge with-
out having any previous evidence. As I will argue in Section 4.5, I do not think this is a problematic
aspect of Knowledge-first Epistemology. On the contrary, I think this is something we should embrace
as a nice feature of the view. See Brueckner, 2005b, Brueckner, 2009 and Williamson’s response in
Williamson, 2009b: pp.282-85.
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the Responsiveness Intuition when evaluating whether one is personally justified in be-
lieving something. While propositional justification is an evaluation of a proposition,
and doxastic justification is an evaluation of a belief, personal justification is generally
taken to be an evaluation of the subject. Although the notions of doxastic and personal
justification have been sometimes used interchangeably (see, for instance, Kvanvig &
Menzel, 1990), there are good reasons to think these are two distinct notions. While
doxastic justification has to do with whether one’s belief that p is epistemically justi-
fied, personal justification has to do with whether the subject is justified in believing
as she does, given the subject’s perspective. Following Catherine Lowy, we can put
things in terms of what we reasonably expect from a subject to do in a given situation
with respect to figuring out whether one’s believing in an epistemically appropriate
way (e.g., one’s belief is true, one’s belief fits the evidence etc.) (see Lowy, 1978). A
subject is thus personally justified if and only if she has done all we can expect her to
do given the subject’s perspective. Doxastic and personal justification can thus come
apart, for one might do all one can given the circumstance, and yet nevertheless fails
to be doxastically justified (which, within a Knowledge-first Evidentialist framework
means that one fails to have knowledge). I think it is thus plausible to say that, while
doxastic justification is sensitive to epistemic factors only, the standard for personal
justification might change depending on epistemic as well as practical factors (see also
Engel, 1992: 40).
One can thus think of ‘saving’ the Responsiveness Intuition in our epistemic eval-
uations by relating it to the notion of personal justification. On this view, whether one
is personally justified has to do with what evidence one takes into consideration when
believing something. A Knowledge-first Evidentialist could thus suggest the following
evidentialist account of personal justification:
Personal Justification: One is personally justified in believing that p only
if one believes that p on the basis on what one takes to be evidence that
stands in an appropriate evidential-support relation R towards p.
We can see how personal and doxastic justification come apart on this account. For
while whether one is doxastically justified depends on whether one’s evidence stands
in an appropriate evidential support relation toward the target believed proposition,
personal justification embodies a more internalist vibe on which all that matters for
the subject to be personally justified is whether, on the subject’s perspective, the target
believed proposition is well supported by what she takes to be one’s evidence (regard-
less of whether this is actually the case). On this view, one might thus be personally
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justified in believing something without actually being either propositionally or dox-
astically justified.
To see how this would be compatible within Knowledge-first Evidentialism, re-
member that, on the kind of Knowledge-first Evidentialism I am considering, a propo-
sition p is propositionally justified for someone when one’s evidence raises the prob-
ability of p over a certain threshold. Assume t to be whatever threshold we take to be
relevant for assigning propositional justification. While doxastic justification, on his
view, would thus be a case in which one knows that p, and thus, given E=K, one’s ev-
idence – trivially – fully supports p over any specific threshold, personal justification
would be a case in which one believes that p one the basis of one’s evidence E (that
one takes to support p over t), and yet P(p | E) < t. In this sense, one might be per-
sonally justified in believing that p without being either doxastically or propositionally
justified.
In this way, one might be able to hold onto a “norm-based” account of doxastic
justification (like the one defended by Williamson), while maintaining that something
in the neighbourhood of the Responsiveness Intuition still plays a relevant role in our
epistemic evaluation. Whether one is appropriately evidence-responsive is not going
to be relevant for attributing doxastic justification, but it is going to be relevant for
attributing personal justification.
However, I do not think this is a very promising way to go, for at least two reasons.
First, note that, as mentioned above, the notion of personal justification is meant to
capture the idea that, despite failing to be doxastically justified, one might nonetheless
be excusable in believing as one does. However, remember that Williamson already
has a way of accounting for how one might be excusable despite not being doxastically
justified. As he points out, while only compliance with the primary norm guarantees
justification, compliance with secondary and tertiary norm can give one an excuse.
There is already an easy way of making sense of when and how someone is excusable
but not justified within Williamson’s normative framework. Hence, there is already an
easy way of accounting for what someone might call ‘personal justification’19. Besides
‘saving’ the Responsiveness Intuition, it is thus not clear why one might want to cash
out the notion of personal justification in terms of being evidence-responsive while
having a norm-based account of doxastic justification. If anything – and this brings
me to the second point I want to raise – this view seems to make doxastic justification
19In fact, as I mentioned in a previous footnote, Williamson’s normative framework is meant to make
sense of the justification-excuse distinction often used by the externalists to account for the notorious
New Evil Demon Intuition.
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something that is easier to achieve than personal justification. On this view, personal
justification seems something that one can get only with some sort of cognitive effort
that involves considering the evidence one has and believing in the light of such evi-
dence, and yet the notion of personal justification epistemologists seem to be interested
in does not seem to require such an effort. Furthermore, note that, especially when we
combine E=K with an account of personal justification understood in terms of being
evidence-responsive, then we end up with a very restrictive picture of what it takes
for someone to be ‘excusable’. For if one’s evidence is all and only one’s knowledge,
an evidentialist account of personal justification entails that one is excusable (despite
not being doxastically justified) only if one believes something in the light of one’s
knowledge 20.
Propositional Justification and Evidence
A final implication of Knowledge-first Evidentialism and its way of understanding
doxastic justification is that, not only does the Responsiveness Intuition seem not to
be relevant in our epistemic evaluations anymore, but propositional justification seems
also to play no substantial role in our evaluation of people’s beliefs. Despite the dis-
agreement on how to best cash out the notion of doxastic justification, it is nevertheless
widely accepted that propositional justification plays an important role in determining
whether one is doxastically justified or not. That is, not only would virtually everyone
agree that if one is doxastically justified, then one is also propositionally justified, but,
as I mentioned in Section 4.2, epistemologists would also claim that the fact that one is
propositionally justified partly explains why one is doxastically justified21. Note that,
on Williamson’s norm-based account of doxastic justification, doxastic justification
does trivially entail propositional justification. Given that one is doxastically justified
in believing that p if and only if one knows that p, on this view, knowledge becomes a
limiting case of propositional justification22. However, note that, on Knowledge-first
20Of course this is not the only option available to save the Responsiveness Intuition. For instance,
one could point out that Williamson could relate the secondary (derivative) norm to the Responsiveness
Intuition. In this way he could keep his already existing normative framework while ‘saving’ the Re-
sponsiveness intuition. Considering this further option would lead us too far afield. Anyway, I suspect
that linking the Responsiveness Intuition to the derivative norm will also be problematic. For instance, it
wouldn’t be clear in which sense the derivative secondary norm would be in fact derivative from the pri-
mary norm given that the compliance with the two different norms would involve completely different
“epistemic jobs”.
21For an interesting discussion on the conceptual and theoretical priority of propositional justification
see Melis, 2018.
22That knowledge is a limiting case of propositional justification is easily derived from the main
commitments of Williamson’s Evidence Package. This trivially follows from ii). For assume S knows
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Evidentialism, the fact that one has propositional justification for believing that p plays
no role in explaining why one is doxastically justified. In principle, one can account
for one’s doxastic justification without appealing to the notion of propositional justifi-
cation at all. Once again, we can see how Knowledge-first Evidentialism differs from
Evidence-first Evidentialism: Knowledge-first Evidentialism seems to reject the PJ-DJ
intuition. But if we don’t need to appeal to the notion of propositional justification in
order to account for doxastic justification, then it looks like the notion of propositional
justification plays no substantial role either in our epistemic theorising or in our eval-
uation of whether one’s beliefs are justified. This, by itself, is an interesting result,
but it is not necessarily a bad result. Perhaps one could argue that this is actually a
positive outcome for it would provide us with a simpler framework within which we
could evaluate the epistemic situation of a subject. Perhaps, one could say, we should
lighten our theoretical apparatus and we should quit using the notion of propositional
justification while focusing on doxastic justification only. Although this is an available
option, I am afraid this move would come at a very high cost. For remember that, as I
have mentioned above, one of the main consequences of understanding doxastic justi-
fication in terms of compliance with the constitutive (knowledge) norm of belief is that
this framework separates the notion of doxastic justification from any basing require-
ment and from the Responsiveness Intuition. That is, it detaches the notion of doxastic
justification from whether one is responding to the evidence one has. However, even if
we detach the notion of evidence from the notion of doxastic justification in this way,
evidence could still be relevant in our epistemic evaluations: the evidence one has,
and its ‘evidential strength’, are what we consider in order to determine whether one
is propositionally justified or not. Therefore, getting rid of the notion of propositional
justification from our theoretical apparatus would thus mean getting rid of the notion
of evidence in our epistemic evaluations 23, 24. It is important to stress that, by this I
that p. Given ii), once S knows that p, p becomes part of S’s evidence. It thus follows that the evidential
probability of p conditional on one’s evidence is 1, thereby meeting any specific threshold.
23Of course given E=K, if doxastic justification is understood as compliance with the KNB, then
we still have an evidence-based account of doxastic justification in a sense, for, on this view, if S is
doxastically justified in believing that p, then p is part of S’s evidence. However, my point is that,
on this norm-based account of doxastic justification, appealing to the notion of evidence is not at all
required in order to explain why one is doxastically justified. I think this by itself is an interesting result.
24Once again, some similar and interesting consequences can be drawn when we understand propo-
sitional and doxastic justification in terms of the roles of evidence. Doxastic Justification understood in
terms of compliance with the knowledge norm of belief deprives evidence of its motivating role. Evi-
dence is thus reduced to its justifying function, namely, evidence is what provides us with propositional
justification. Getting rid of the notion of propositional justification altogether thus means getting rid of
the notion of evidence altogether from our epistemic evaluations.
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do not mean to say that a defender of Knowledge-first Evidentialism is forced to get
rid of the notion of evidence altogether. For, although evidence might end up playing
no role in our epistemic evaluations, it might still fulfil an important role in other epis-
temic practises, such as, in ruling-out hypothesis, in grounding inference to the best
explanation, as well as in doing probabilistic reasoning (cf Williamson, 2000, ch. 9).
However, at the very least, the defender of Knowledge-first Evidentialism is forced to
rethink the role evidence plays in our epistemic evaluations.
Let me recapitulate what I have done in this section. On one hand, Williamson’s
Knowledge-first Evidentialism understands propositional justification similarly to how
Evidence-first Evidentialism does: one has propositional justification for a proposi-
tion p iff one’s evidence appropriately supports the target proposition p (e.g., one’s
evidence makes p sufficiently likely). On the other hand, it understands doxastic jus-
tification as compliance with the Knowledge Norm of Belief, so that one’s belief that
p is doxastically justified iff one knows that p. In this section, I have clarified to
what extent Knowledge-first Evidentialism differs from Evidence-first Evidentialism,
and I have pointed out some interesting consequences of Knowledge-first Evidential-
ism. I’ve pointed out that, besides the (already noted) fact that Williamson’s view
does not allow for (doxastically) justified false beliefs, the main differences between
Evidence-first and Knowledge-first Evidentialism concern the way in which the notion
of doxastic justification is conceptualised. More precisely, I have pointed out that it is
in virtue of understanding doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification
plus basing requirement that Evidence-first Evidentialism accommodates the Respon-
siveness Intuition. By contrast, on Knowledge-first Evidentialism, the evidence one
takes into account when coming to believe something is not relevant for determining
whether one is doxastically justified. Doxastic justification is not a matter of being
evidence-responsive (in the sense specified in Responsiveness Intuition). One conse-
quence of this framework is that the Responsiveness Intuition seems to play no relevant
role in our epistemic evaluation. Nevertheless, I have noted that, rejecting the Respon-
siveness Intuition from our epistemic evaluations does not necessarily mean giving up
on the notion of evidence altogether. In principle one could reject the Responsiveness
Intuition while still appealing to the notion of evidence in our epistemic evaluations:
what evidence one has is what we consider when we want to determine whether one is
propositionally justified. However, given that the reason why one might be interested
in whether one has propositional justification is to determine whether one is doxasti-
cally justified, once we realise that, on Knowledge-first Evidentialism, propositional
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justification does not explain why one is doxastically justified, it is not really clear
what the need for these notions is. That is, it is not clear what the role of propositional
justification (and thus the role of evidence) is in our epistemic evaluations.
4.5 Ecumenical Evidentialism
In the first half of this Chapter, I have considered two possible ways of understanding
Evidentialism: Evidence-first Evidentialism and Knowledge-first Evidentialism. After
shedding light on what these views amount to, I have considered to what extent the
two views are different. In particular, I have pointed out that one important difference
between the two views is that, while Evidence-first Evidentialism vindicates the so-
called Responsiveness Intuition, the intuition that takes doxastic justification to be a
matter of believing in the light of one’s evidence, Knowledge-first Evidentialism does
not vindicate the Responsiveness Intuition. On this view, being justified in believing
that p is just a matter of knowing that p. In this section, I will suggest a novel Eviden-
tialist view that accounts for the orthodox Responsiveness Intuition while remaining in
the spirit of Knowledge-first Epistemology. I will call it Ecumenical Evidentialism.
4.5.1 A two-tiered account of knowledge
Ecumenical Evidentialism steers a course between Evidence-first Evidentialism and
Knowledge-first Evidentialism. It retains the main commitments of Knowledge-first
Epistemology, i.e., KNB, E=K, and it combines them with the intuition that doxastic
justification is a matter of adequately responding to one’s evidence. More precisely,
Ecumenical Evidentialism embraces all the following Knowledge-first and Evidence-
first commitments:
1. Doxastic Justification: DJ is an evaluation of a belief so that one’s belief that p is
doxastically justified for S only if S believes that p on the basis of one’s evidence
E that stands in a support-relation R towards p.
2. Responsiveness Intuition
3. PJ-DJ Intuition
4. JFB
5. E=K
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6. KNB
How is it possible to bring together these Evidence-first and Knowledge-first com-
mitments? The answer is to be found in the two-tiered account of knowledge that
underpins my Ecumenical Evidentialism.
On one hand, Ecumenical Evidentialism understands inferentially-formed beliefs
and inferential knowledge in an Evidence-first fashion. On the other hand, it embraces
a Knowledge-first approach when it comes to cases of non-inferential knowledge. Let
us first consider cases of inferential knowledge. Consider, for instance, my belief that
my friend is in London right now. This belief is supported by my total evidence: I saw
her standing next to the train from Edinburgh that goes to London this afternoon, every
Tuesday she is in London and today is Tuesday, and so on. That is why I believe that
my friend is in London. In fact, my friend is in London. What would Knowledge-first
Evidentialism say about this case? If we understand Knowledge-first Evidentialism
within Williamson’s broader account of knowledge, then we will expect a defender
of Knowledge-first Evidentialism to say that, in this scenario, I know that my friend
is in London and this is because my belief is safe (and any other relevant necessary
conditions for knowledge is met). Instead, Ecumenical Evidentialism would consider
cases of inferential knowledge in an Evidence-first fashion. That is, given the orthodox
notion of doxastic justification Ecumenical Evidentialism embraces, cases of inferen-
tial knowledge will be cases in which one knows that p in virtue of having doxastic
justification for believing that p (while fulfilling whatever further condition is needed
in order to have knowledge). For remember that on the orthodox Evidence-first view,
doxastic justification is the result of basing one’s belief on one’s propositional justifica-
tion. Putting the matter in terms of the roles of evidence, on Ecumenical Evidentialism
doxastic justification is connected with the motivating role of evidence: one has dox-
astic justification as the result of taking into account one’s evidence when coming to
believe a specific proposition. Inferential cases thus represent exactly the context in
which one can “exploit” the motivating role of evidence, insofar as one takes such
evidence as a premise in one’s reasoning.
Consider now a different case of inferentially-formed belief. Again, I believe my
friend is in London right now. This belief is supported by my total evidence: I saw her
standing next to the train from Edinburgh that goes to London this afternoon, every
Tuesday she is in London and today is Tuesday, and so on. As it happens, however,
my friend’s train got delayed and she didn’t manage to get to London. What would
Ecumenical Evidentialism say about this case? While on Williamson’s account, my
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belief would be at most excusable, but it would fail to be justified, Ecumenical Evi-
dentialism, instead, would classify my belief as being doxastically justified because,
despite false, it is the result of appropriately believing on the basis of my supporting ev-
idence. It is in this sense that Ecumenical Evidentialism accommodates at east two of
the main commitments of Evidence-first Evidentialism: not only does it vindicate the
Responsiveness Intuition, but it also allows for (doxastically) justified false belief.25
Let us now move onto cases of non-inferential knowledge. While Ecumenical Evi-
dentialism embraces an orthodox Evidence-first view about inferential knowledge (and
inferentially-formed beliefs more in general), it retains a Knowledge-first view about
non-inferential knowledge. Consider a paradigmatic case of non-inferential knowl-
edge, such as, a case of perceptual knowledge. Assume Albert is in a paradigmatic
good case and he sees that there is a table in front of him. Ecumenical Evidentialism
understands this case in a Knowledge-first fashion; by seeing that there is a table in
front of him, Albert comes to know that there is a table in front of him. Seeing that
there is a table is just a way of knowing that there is a table. There is no interest-
ing sense in which Albert has to previously consider the evidence he has in order to
come to believe that there is a table26. It is in this sense that Ecumenical Evidentialism
(partly) captures the Knowledge-first commitment that takes knowledge to be the most
general factive mental state.
It is important to note that epistemologists have sometimes taken this to be a prob-
lematic aspect of Knowledge-first Epistemology. Consider again the proposition that
there is a table. Brueckner, for instance, has focused on perceptual knowledge and has
argued against the Knowledge-first view, on which one perceptually knows that there
is table merely by seeing that there is a table (Cf. Brueckner, 2005b, Brueckner, 2009
and Williamson’s response in Williamson, 2009b: pp.282-85.). In particular, Brueck-
ner has claimed that, on this Knowledge-first view of perception, it is hard to see what
evidence one has and in virtue of which one knows that there is table. Given that,
on E=K, once you know a proposition, then that proposition is part of your evidence,
and given knowledge entails belief (thing that Williamson accepts as well), Brueckner
25For other interesting views that aim to account for justified false belief while remaining Knowledge-
first in some relevant sense see Bird, 2007, Ichikawa, 2014, and, in a sense, Smith, 2010b. For some
objections to these views see McGlynn, 2012.
26It is natural to think of cases of proprioception as similar to cases of non-inferential knowledge
in this respect. Notoriously, Anscombe describes cases of bodily awareness as cases of ‘knowledge
without clues’ (see Anscombe, 1962). However, I think the case of proprioception is a complicated one.
For instance, I suspect that whether cases of proprioception will end up being cases of knowledge not
based on any evidence in the same way as cases of perceptual knowledge are will depend a lot on the
details of the case in question.
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argues that the only option available is to say that cases of perceptual knowledge are
cases in which one is justified in believing something (e.g., that there is a table) in
virtue of ones belief that it is the case (e.g., in virtue of the belief that there is a table).
I will not discuss Brueckner’s arguments in this thesis, but I would like to briefly note
three things. First, note that, as McGlynn has said, Brueckner’s mistake here seems to
be that “[he] assumes a picture according to which there must be independent evidence
for the proposition that [there is a table], in virtue of which his belief in that proposi-
tion is justified and, given that the world is cooperating in the right way, knows” (2014:
65). Given what I have discussed in the first half of the Chapter, this does not come as
a surprise. For Brueckner seems to assume what I have called Evidence-first Eviden-
tialism. What Section 4.4. of this Chapter was meant to show is exactly that it is part of
the Knowledge-first picture to reject the orthodox conception concerning the relation
between evidence and justification, one that embraces the Responsiveness Intuition.
Williamson is just offering us a completely new paradigm, one that is an alternative to
the orthodoxy. Second, once we accept and realise that, the Knowledge-first picture
of perceptual knowledge is such that perceptual knowledge is not based on any evi-
dence, I do not think this is a negative result. Instead, as I will suggest later, I think it
vindicates our intuitions concerning the role evidence plays in perceptual knowledge.
Third, as I will argue in a moment, it does not follow from this Knowledge-first picture
of non-inferential knowledge that one is justified in believing that there is a table in
virtue of ones belief that there is a table. Considering my Ecumenical Evidentialism
further will help us see why this is the case.
We can ask: what does Ecumenical Evidentialism say about the epistemic status
of Albert’s belief? At this point it is worth noticing that, virtually every epistemolo-
gist (both Knowledge-firsters and non) would grant that, in this scenario, Albert both
knows and (thus) is doxastically justified in believing that there is a table in front of
him. Those who are sympathetic to a traditional Knowledge-first approach would say
that Albert is doxastically justified because he knows that there is a table in front of
him: doxastic justification is just a matter of complying with the Knowledge Norm of
Belief. By contrast, defenders of more orthodox Evidence-first view would say that he
knows that there is a table because he is doxastically justified: seeing that there is a
table provides him with the right kind of support necessary for knowing that there is a
table27. Whatever order of explanation one choses, however, both Evidence-first and
Knowledge-first defenders would grant that Albert is doxastically justified in believ-
27This result especially clear in Pritchard’s version of Evidence-first Evidentialism.
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ing that there is a table before him. Knowledge entails (doxastic) justification. Here
is where Ecumenical Evidentialism departs from both Evidence-first and Knowledge-
first Evidentialism. Remember that Ecumenical Evidentialism combines the orthodox
Evidence-first view of doxastic justification, on which one is doxastically justified as
a result of taking into account one’s evidence when coming to form one’s belief, with
a Knowledge-first view of non-inferential knowledge, on which perceptual (and other
non-inferential) cases, are just cases in which one just comes to know something with-
out taking into account any evidence when forming the target belief. But if we want to
retain the orthodox intuition on which doxastic justification is a matter of believing on
the basis of one’s evidence, then we have to insist that cases of non-inferential knowl-
edge are cases of knowledge without justification. This is what Ecumenical Eviden-
tialism does. Let me show why. On Ecumenical Evidentialism, doxastic justification
has to do with how much and whether one is appropriately evidence-responsive in a
way that captures the Responsiveness Intuition. Putting things in terms of the roles of
evidence, doxastic justification should be understood in an orthodox manner, namely,
as the result of the justifying and, more importantly, the motivating role of evidence.
Crucially, even if we grant, as Ecumenical Evidentialism does, that E=K, and thus we
grant that cases of non-inferential knowledge are related to the justifying role of ev-
idence (given that they are limiting cases of propositionally justified belief), cases of
non-inferential knowledge are not cases in which the subject “exploits” the motivating
role of evidence. As I mentioned above, when Albert sees a table in front of him, he
just comes to know that there is a table in front of him. There is no interesting sense in
which Albert had to previously consider any evidence at all in order to come to believe
that there is a table in front of him.
To sum up: on Ecumenical Evidentialism, doxastic justification is the result of ap-
propriately taking into account one’s evidence when coming to believe something. In
this way, Ecumenical Evidentialism captures the orthodox Responsiveness Intuition
that sees doxastic justification as a matter of being evidence-responsive. Cases of
inferential knowledge and inferentially-formed beliefs are understood in an Evidence-
first way. Inferential knowledge is the result of having doxastic justification. At the
same time, Ecumenical Evidentialism understands non-inferential cases, e.g., percep-
tual cases, in a Knowledge-first fashion. These are cases in which one knows that p
without taking into account any evidence when coming to believe that p. On Ecumeni-
cal Evidentialism, cases of non-inferential knowledge are cases of knowledge without
justification. Interestingly, by appealing to this two-tiered account of knowledge, not
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only Ecumenical Evidentialism is in line with the Responsiveness Intuition, but it also
seems to vindicate the Austian intuition on which:
“if [a table] [. . . ] stands plainly in view, there is no longer a question of
collecting evidence; its [standing plainly in] view doesn’t provide me with
more evidence that it is a table, I can now just see that it is, the question is
settled.”
(Austin, 1962: 115)
For this, and other reasons that I will show in the remaining part of this chapter,
I take the case of knowledge without justification to be a feature of my Ecumenical
Evidentialism rather than a bug.
4.5.2 Meta-epistemological Pluralism
In the previous section, I have presented the core theoretical commitments of Ecu-
menical Evidentialism. As said above, this view steers a course between traditional
Knowledge-first Evidentialism and orthodox Evidence-first intuitions about doxas-
tic justification. It does so by appealing to a two-tiered account of knowledge, one
that brings together a Knowledge-first view about non-inferential knowledge with an
Evidence-first view about inferentially justified beliefs and inferential knowledge. Within
this picture, Ecumenical Evidentialism restricts the notion of doxastic justification to
those doxastic attitudes that are the result of appropriately taking into account one’s
evidence, thereby taking cases of non-inferential knowledge to be cases of knowledge
without (doxastic) justification. However, one might find my two-tiered account of
knowledge unsatisfying with respect to what it predicts about Albert’s epistemic sta-
tus. For wouldn’t everyone agree that Albert is successful in believing as he does? In
particular, one might point out that my Ecumenical Evidentialism has a very counterin-
tuitive result: on one hand it considers a (inferentially-formed) false belief as justified,
while it deprives non-inferential knowledge of the status of justification. Drawing a
distinction between unjustified and non-justified belief will be helpful here. Take an
unjustified belief to be a belief that is based on evidence that does not support the
target believed proposition (e.g., it does not make the target proposition sufficiently
likely). Take a non-justified belief to be, instead, a belief that is not based on any ev-
idence. While the case of non-inferential knowledge is a case of non-justified belief,
we should not make the mistake to classify it as a case of unjustified belief. On my
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view, cases of non-inferential knowledge are just cases of beliefs that are not justified.
In fact, on my view, these beliefs are not even in the market for justification.28
However, I can see why one might still find my view puzzling. For isn’t an in-
stance of knowledge always better than any false belief? But how can we account for
Albert’s success if, on Ecumenical Evidentialism, his belief can’t be classified as being
doxastically justified? In this section, I further develop and motivate Ecumenical Evi-
dentialism by appealing to a form of meta-epistemological pluralism. I will show that
the form of meta-epistemological pluralism I develop provides us with a framework
that is sensitive to the different ways in which a belief can be epistemically successful
as well as epistemically defective. I will show that this form of meta-epistemological
pluralism best achieves the conjunction of Evidence-first and Knowledge-first features
in a satisfying way.
We can ask: what, as epistemologists, do we evaluate when judging one’s epis-
temic situation as ‘epistemically good’?29 That is, what are we interested in when we
make epistemic evaluations of people’s beliefs? When do we consider one’s doxas-
tic attitude as epistemically successful? Meta-epistemological Pluralism claims that
there is no univocal answer to these questions. Instead, there are at least two Epistemic
Success Criteria that we should consider in our epistemic evaluations: Epistemic Jus-
tification and Epistemic Excellence. We can further distinguish Epistemic Justification
into Propositional and Doxastic Justification, thereby having three Epistemic Success
Criteria: i) Propositional Justification, ii) Doxastic Justification, and iii) Epistemic Ex-
cellence. We already have an idea of what Propositional and Doxastic Justification
amount to. When making epistemic evaluations, we can evaluate whether a proposi-
tion is justified for a subject given the subject’s evidence (propositional justification);
we can evaluate whether a subject’s belief is justified given the evidence one has (dox-
astic justification). However, we can also evaluate whether a subject’s belief is a good
mental state to be in, regardless of whatever evidence one has (epistemic excellence).
These three criteria enable us to appreciate that there are different ways in which one
can be epistemically successful in a target situation. In particular, the criteria of Dox-
28So far in this thesis, I have avoided talking about rationality. I will continue to do so. However, I am
inclined to apply the unjustified-non justified distinction to the case of rationality. That is, I believe we
should distinguish between arational beliefs and irrational beliefs. Arational beliefs are beliefs that are
just not in the market for rationality. Given I believe rationality is a matter of appropriately responding
to the evidence one has, I believe we should just accept that cases of perceptual knowledge are cases
arational beliefs. However, this is not something I am going to defend here. For an interesting recent
discussion on rationality see Williamson, 2017.
29One’s epistemic situation includes but is not restricted to, one’s doxastic attitude. For instance, it
includes the evidence one has.
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astic Justification and Epistemic Excellence show that there are at least two different
ways in which a belief can be epistemically successful. According to this form of
meta-epistemological pluralism, on the Doxastic Justification Criterion, one’s doxastic
attitude is epistemically good insofar as it is the best response one can provide, given
one’s evidence. On the Epistemic Excellence Criterion, one’s doxastic attitude is epis-
temically good insofar as it is an excellent mental state to be in. More precisely, on this
form of pluralism, one’s belief is Epistemically Excellent insofar as it complies with
the constitutive norm of belief. To sum up, on this form of Meta-epistemological Plu-
ralism, we should consider - at least - the following three Epistemic Success Criteria
in our epistemic evaluations:
Propositional justification: an evaluation of a proposition relative to the
evidence a subject has.
Doxastic justification: an evaluation of a subject’s belief qua adequate
response to the evidence she has.
Epistemic Excellence: an evaluation of a subject’s belief qua belief that
meets the standard set by the constitutive norm of belief.
How can this meta-epistemological pluralism support Ecumenical Evidentialism?
That is, how can we make sense of this form of Meta-epistemological Pluralism within
an Ecumenical Evidentialist framework?
My proposal is that, while we should cash out Epistemic Justification (both in its
propositional and doxastic form) in an Evidence-first fashion, namely, as being re-
lated to the justifying and motivating roles of evidence, we should understand Epis-
temic Excellence within the normative framework developed by Williamson. Using
Williamson’s normative framework, and the KNB that underpins it, generates the claim
that one’s belief that p is epistemically excellent if and only if one knows that p. Ec-
umenical Evidentialism embraces the Knowledge-first commitment on which knowl-
edge is the norm of belief. However, instead of setting knowledge as the standard for
Doxastic justification, it takes knowledge to be the standard for Epistemic Excellence.
Therefore, it is not by merely complying with the Knowledge Norm of Belief that
one’s belief can be judged as being doxastically justified. While doxastic justification
is sensitive to how one responds to one’s evidence, on Ecumenical Evidentialism, one’s
belief can be epistemically excellent even if no evidence is taken into account when
coming to form the target belief. By capturing the epistemic successes as well as the
epistemic failings of a target belief, my meta-epistemological pluralism helps us mak-
ing sense of the way in which Ecumenical Evidentialism brings together an orthodox
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way of understanding doxastic justification with some core features of Knowledge-first
Epistemology. Let us see how.
Remember that, on Ecumenical Evidentialism, cases of non-inferential knowledge
are understood within a Knowledge-first framework. Consider the case of Albert again.
Albert’s seeing that there is a table is just a way of knowing that there is a table. As
I have noticed above, in these cases, there is no evidence that Albert previously con-
siders in order to form the belief that there is a table before him. That is, his belief
that there is a table in front of him is not the result of him responding to the evidence
he had before forming the belief. When we take this Knowledge-first account of non-
inferential knowledge together with an Evidence-first notion of doxastic justification,
one on which whether one is doxastically justified depends on whether one believes
appropriately in the light of the evidence one has, then we have to insist that cases
of non-inferential knowledge are cases of knowledge without justification. Crucially,
everyone would agree that Albert’s belief is a good belief to have. That is, despite
not being doxastically justified, Albert’s belief is intuitively epistemically good. Ap-
pealing to my version of Meta-epistemological pluralism allows us to account for the
sense in which Albert’s belief is epistemically successful despite not being justified.
This consideration can be generalised, of course, to all those cases of (doxastically)
non-justified non-inferential knowledge. Albert’s belief is successful because, by com-
plying with the constitutive (Knowledge) Norm of belief, it is epistemically excellent.
The criterion of Epistemic Excellence allows us to capture the idea that there is a sense
in which one is doing well when one knows something, even if the belief is based on
no evidence at all30.
Let us now go back to the case of inferentially-formed belief. In particular, let’s
consider the case in which my belief that my friend is in London is false, despite being
supported by my evidence. On Williamson’s view, my belief that my friend is in Lon-
don may be excusable, but it is not justified. One reason of dissatisfaction with this
view is that, in this scenario, my belief seems to be more than merely excusable (cf.
Boult, 2017). My pluralist view accounts for the intuition that this belief is not merely
excusable, but, in coming to believe in the light of my evidence, I’m doing epistemi-
cally well. My Meta-epistemological Pluralism captures the sense in which my belief
30Of course, one might object that knowledge is not the constitutive norm of belief. I think there are
good arguments in the literature for the KNB (see footnote 14), but assessing those arguments would
lead me too far afield. In any case, this is not needed for the purpose of this Chapter. For remember
the aim of this chapter is to explore the plausibility of a novel variety of evidentialism, one that brings
together Evidence-first and Knowledge-first features. Here I am borrowing the KNB from Knowledge-
first Evidentialism, thereby assuming it to be true.
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is epistemically successful, namely, it is doxastically justified. At the same time, it
captures the sense in which my belief is epistemically defective: is not epistemically
excellent for it fails to meet the KNB.
What about the case in which my belief that my friend is in London is in fact true?
Remember that, on Ecumenical Evidentialism, these cases are understood in a more
orthodox way. Therefore, this would classify as an instance of inferential knowledge
as being the result of having doxastic justification. My Meta-epistemological pluralism
will thus predict that cases of inferential knowledge like the one described above are
cases of successful beliefs, both in the sense of being doxastically justified as well
as in the sense of being epistemically excellent beliefs. For remember that, on this
view, a belief is epistemically excellent if and only if it complies with the Knowledge
Norm of Belief. Therefore, cases of inferential as well as non-inferential knowledge
will be classified as cases of epistemic excellence. By contrast, cases of epistemically
excellent beliefs will not necessarily be cases of doxastically justified belief.
At this point one might worry that, by keeping an orthodox account of doxastic
justification, and by understanding inferential knowledge in terms of more basic com-
ponents (i.e., propositional and doxastic justification), my view does not maintain the
spirit of a Knowledge-first account. I think this is a legitimate concern. However,
once I have filled in the details of this account a bit more I will be able to show that,
despite being revisionary, my Ecumenical Evidentialism can be developed in a way
that retains some of the main features of traditional Knowledge-first Epistemology. I
will show that not only can one be a “Knowledge-firster” when it comes to cases of
non-inferential knowledge, but, on Ecumenical Evidentialism, knowledge also plays
a fundamental role in explaining the how one is doxastically justified. In order to do
so, I will first consider some potential objections for my view. Addressing (and resist-
ing) these objections will enable me to provide further details on my account. Once
I have done that, I will show that Ecumenical Evidentialism successfully retains the
main orthodox intuitions about doxastic justification, while remaining in the spirit of
the Knowledge-first program.
4.5.3 Non-traditional Foundationalism
As I have described in the previous section, Ecumenical Evidentialism rests on a two-
tiered account of knowledge. On this two-tiered account of knowledge, we should
understand knowledge differently, depending on whether it is an instance of non-
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inferential knowledge, or inferential knowledge. It understands the former in a Knowledge-
first fashion. It understands the latter in an Evidence-first fashion. In this section, I will
address a potential problem for my view. Resisting this problem will enable me to pro-
vide more details and to further shed light on some important features and benefits of
Ecumenical Evidentialism.
The problem I want to address is one that concerns the more orthodox part of Ecu-
menical Evidentialism. Remember that, on my view, if one is doxastically justified in
believing that p, then one believes that p in the light of one’s evidence that stands in
an appropriate evidential support relation towards p. Furthermore, on my view, only
cases of inferentially formed beliefs are cases of (potential) doxastic justification. Re-
member however, that Ecumenical Evidentialism brings together the orthodox notion
of doxastic justification with the Knowledge-first thesis that one’s evidence is all and
only the propositions one knows, namely, E=K. Crucially, if one’s doxastic justifica-
tion depends on whether one believes appropriately on the basis of one’s evidence, and
one’s evidence is one’s knowledge, the worry of an infinite regress arises. Consider
a chain of inferentially formed and justified beliefs. If a doxastically justified belief
rests on one’s knowledge k1, then this knowledge k1 must also be the result of a be-
lief based on evidence, namely, given E=K, on knowledge k2, which, in turn, must be
inferentially justified in the light of further evidence, namely, given E=K, on further
knowledge k3 and so on.
There have been four main ways of dealing with the Regress Problem31. A first
option is to provide a foundationalist response and argue that we have self-justifying
beliefs at the end of the chain, and that these beliefs do not need further justification
(BonJour, 1978, BonJour, 1985, BonJour, 1999, BonJour & Sosa, 2003). A second
option is to embrace infinitism and to bite the bullet by accepting that the chain of
justification continues ad infinitum (cf. Klein, 2005). A third option is to embrace
coherentism. On this view, what it takes for a belief to be justified is to form a coherent
system with a set of beliefs. Therefore, the regress stops because the chain of beliefs
circles back on itself (cf. Lehrer, 1990). Finally, one can take a sceptical stance and
argue that in fact we do not have justified beliefs.
One of the benefits of Ecumenical Evidentialism is that it provides a straightfor-
ward foundationalist solution to the Regress Problem. There are two ways in which
one can provide a foundationalist solution to the Regress Problem. A traditional foun-
31For recent discussion on the Regress Problem as it arises for some forms of internalism see
Bergmann, 2006.
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dationalist solution resists the Regress Problem by claiming that we can find a self-
justified belief at the end of the chain of beliefs. A non-traditional foundationalist
solution resists the Regress Problem by claiming that what we find at the end of the
chain is a non-justified belief. On this non-traditional form of foundationalism, in-
ferential justification is provided eventually by beliefs that are not themselves justi-
fied. Ecumenical Evidentialism provides a non-traditional foundationalist solution to
the Regress Problem. As it will be clear in a moment, considering this foundational-
ist solution enables us to see how the two parts of Ecumenical Evidentialism interact
with each other. On this non-traditional foundationalist solution, the regress eventu-
ally stops because what we find at the end of the chain of beliefs is non-inferential
knowledge, which, on Ecumenical Evidentialism, is not (doxastically) justified itself.
Non-inferential knowledge stops the regress by being knowledge that is not based on
evidence, namely, given E=K, on knowledge32. This foundationalist solution to the
Regress Problem enables us to clarify in which sense my account is Knowledge-first:
it shows that, on my account, knowledge is the most basic epistemic state. (Non-
inferential) knowledge is first because it represents the grounds on which other beliefs
are doxastically justified. It is in virtue of non-inferential knowledge that one can
gain doxastic justification. It is in virtue of non-inferential knowledge that one can ac-
quire further knowledge. On Ecumenical Evidentialism, (non-inferential) knowledge
is more fundamental. (Non-inferential) knowledge is potential justification. It is at
least in this sense that Ecumenical Evidentialism retains the spirit of Knowledge-first
Epistemology33.
32Wittgenstein can be thought of as offering a similar non-traditional foundationalist solution. How-
ever, note that on his view hinge-propositions are not-justified and not-known (at least not in the tradi-
tional sense of knowing), yet they are certain. By just accepting the possibility of non-justified knowl-
edge, my non-foundationalist solution avoids appealing to vague notion of certainty. (see Wittgenstein,
1969).
33I have already mentioned above that the way in which Ecumenical Evidentialism resists the regress
problem can be classified as a non-traditional foundationalist solution. That is, it claims that the regress
is stopped by non-inferential knowledge that, nevertheless, is not itself justified. However, it is worth
pointing out that there is at least another way in which the solution provided by Ecumenical Eviden-
tialism differs from the one offered by traditional foundationalists. For a traditional foundationalist
response would identify one’s experience as the candidate for what lies at the end of the chain of infer-
entially justified beliefs. However, note that, on my view, everything that is known non-inferentially is
suitable for being the foundation of our justificatory chain. Therefore, while a traditional foundation-
alist response would claim that empirical knowledge is what stops the regress, on my view, perceptual
knowledge is only one of the various non-inferential candidate that stops the regress. On my view, any
kind of non-inferential knowledge will be a good candidate for stopping the regress.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter, I have considered the Evidentialist claim on which one’s justification
supervenes on one’s evidence. However, Evidentialism so defined is silent on various
issues, e.g., the nature of evidence and justification, and how to understand the relation
between these two epistemic notions. All Evidentialism entails is that if two subjects
have the same evidence, then they have the same justification. But, besides that, Evi-
dentialism does not explain what relation there is between evidence and propositional
justification, and between evidence and doxastic justification. Depending on how we
fill in the details, we can have varieties of Evidentialism. The theories that I have
considered in this Chapter, namely, what I have called, ‘Evidence-first Evidentialism’,
and ‘Knowledge-first Evidentialism’, are just two ways in which one can be an Evi-
dentialist. What I have called ‘Evidence-first Evidentialism’ constitutes the orthodox
way of understanding propositional and doxastic justification in evidentialist terms.
Roughly put, it understands propositional justification in terms of evidence and the
support that evidence provides to a target proposition, and it understands doxastic jus-
tification in terms of propositional justification and a basing requirement. In particular,
by understanding doxastic justification as being related to what kind of evidence one
bases one’s belief on, Evidence-first Evidentialism vindicates the orthodox intuition on
which whether one is doxastically justified depends on whether one is appropriately
evidence-responsive, namely, on whether one’s belief is the result of appropriately tak-
ing into consideration one’s evidence in coming to form the target belief. I have called
this the ‘Responsiveness Intuition’. Williamson (Williamson, 2011, Williamson, in
press) has a different view about doxastic justification. He argues that doxastic justi-
fication is a matter of compliance with the Knowledge Norm of Belief. On this view,
whether one is doxastically justified in believing that p is not strictly related to what
evidence one takes into account in coming to believe that p. However, given his E=K,
his view is also an instance of Evidentialism. I have called this view ‘Knowledge-
first Evidentialism’. In this Chapter, firstly, I have clarified the main commitments of
both Evidence-first and Knowledge-first Evidentialism. Secondly, I have put forward
a novel evidentialist view, one that retains some of the main Knowledge-first commit-
ments, such as, KNB and E=K, whilst at the same time capturing the Evidence-first
Responsiveness Intuition. I have called this view ‘Ecumenical Evidentialism’. Ecu-
menical Evidentialism brings together Evidence-first and Knowledge-first features by
appealing to a two-tiered account of knowledge. On one hand, it understands cases
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of inferential knowledge in an orthodox Evidence-first way. This means that cases of
inferential knowledge are cases in which one knows in virtue of having doxastic jus-
tification. On the other hand, it embraces a Knowledge-first picture of non-inferential
knowledge. This means that cases of non-inferential knowledge are cases in which
one’s seeing something is just a way of knowing something. That is, one knows some-
thing by directly seeing something and without taking into account any evidence. How-
ever, I have pointed out that if we want to retain both an orthodox Evidence-first view
of inferential knowledge (one that vindicates the Responsiveness Intuition), together
with a Knowledge-first view of non-inferential knowledge, we have to insist that cases
of non-inferential knowledge are cases of knowledge without doxastic justification. I
have argued that this is a feature of my account rather than a bug. Furthermore, I have
argued that a form of meta-epistemological pluralism best achieves the combination
of Evidence-first and Knowledge-first features in a way that accounts for the fact that
cases of non-inferential knowledge, despite being cases of non justified belief, are nev-
ertheless importantly epistemically successful. Similarly, it accounts for the facts that,
when based on supporting evidence, inferentially-formed false beliefs are more than
merely excusable: they are justified. On the form of pluralism I defend, we should thus
distinguish Doxastic Justification from Epistemic Excellence. While Doxastic Justifi-
cation has to be understood along Evidence-first lines, we should understand Epistemic
Excellence in terms of compliance with the constitutive (Knowledge) norm of belief.
While one is doxastically justified in believing that p only if one believes that p on the
basis of evidence that stands in a support relation towards p, one’s belief that p is epis-
temically excellent if and only if one knows that p. Meta-epistemological Pluralism
accounts for the virtues (and the vices) of cases of non-inferential knowledge as well
as cases of inferentially justified but false beliefs.
One might wonder why we should take Ecumenical Evidentialism seriously. Here
are what I take to be the following two main benefits of Ecumenical Evidentialism:
First, Ecumenical Evidentialism brings together Evidence-first commitments while
remaining in the spirit of Knowledge-first Epistemology. In particular, Ecumenical
Evidentialism is Evidence-first in the following sense:
• It understands Doxastic Justification in terms of propositional justification plus
basing, thereby vindicating the Responsiveness Intuition.
• It allows for (doxastically) justified false beliefs
• It understands the relation between doxastic and propositional justification in a
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traditional way: propositional justification partly explains doxastic justification
It is Knowledge-first in the following sense:
• It embraces E=K
• It embraces KNB
• It takes knowledge (in its non-inferential form) to be more basic and fundamen-
tal: inferential knowledge and doxastic justification are explained in terms of
non-inferential knowledge.
Second, as mentioned above, by appealing to two-tiered account of knowledge and
a form of Meta-Epistemological Pluralism, my Ecumenical Evidentialism is sensitive
to the different ways in which a doxastic attitude can be epistemically successful and/or
epistemically defective.
Let me conclude with some more speculative remarks on possible future develop-
ments of my view. I believe there are other ways in which, if developed further, Ec-
umenical Evidentialism will show to be a promising view. For instance, I believe the
two-tired account of knowledge underpinning Ecumenical Evidentialism might pro-
vide us with a solution to the so-called ‘Basis Problem’. The Basis Problem is a prob-
lem that arises for views that seem to embrace the following two theses: i) seeing that
p entails knowing that p, and ii) seeing that p is the reason in virtue of which one
believes (and knows) that p. Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism represents an
instance of such a view. The problem arises because a logical gap seems to be re-
quired between believing that p and the reason on the basis of which one believes that
p (cf. Pritchard, 2012: 19). Interestingly, the Basis Problem does not seem to arise
once we just reject, as Ecumenical Evidentialism does, the thesis that seeing that p is
the reason in the light of which one knows that p. Furthermore, if developed further,
my Ecumenical Evidentialism might provide us with an anti-sceptical solution that is
alternative to (and in between) the solutions offered by the conservative on one hand
and the dogmatist on the other hand (cf. Wright, 2004 for the former, and Pryor, 2000
for the latter). Imagine that I see that I have hands. Like the dogmatist, Ecumenical
Evidentialism rejects the idea that knowledge that I have hands requires antecedent
justification for the belief that I am not a brain in a vat. Unlike the dogmatist, and
like the conservative, Ecumenical Evidentialism predicts that I do not have justifica-
tion for the belief that I have hands. Nevertheless, by appealing to a knowledge-first
view of non-inferential knowledge, Ecumenical Evidentialism can explain how I can
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have knowledge of my hands despite not having a justified belief. Finally, I believe
that by developing further this view, we can appreciate how Ecumenical Evidentialism
can account for how a target doxastic attitude can be evaluated as being epistemically
successful or defective within a novel framework than the one provided by traditional
virtue-epistemologists (cf. Sosa, 2005). Of course, a complete defence of Ecumeni-
cal Evidentialism would involve addressing and resisting arguments that potentially
threaten my view. In particular, I think there are two main ways in which one could
reject Ecumenical Evidentialism. One could argue that, contrary to the appearances,
cases of non-inferential knowledge are cases in which the subject gains knowledge as a
result of taking into account one’s evidence (as a traditional Evidence-first view would
do). Alternatively, one could reject the Responsiveness Intuition and argue that dox-
astic justification is not a matter of being appropriately evidence-responsive (as tradi-
tional Knowledge-first Evidentialism would do). Note, however, that anyone who opts
for the former strategy will have to explain exactly how that is possible while resisting
the above-mentioned Basis Problem. On the other hand, anyone who wants to say that
non-inferential knowledge is both non evidence-based as well as a case of justified
belief, will have to come up with an account of justification that is sensitive to the dif-
ferent ways in which a belief can be epistemically successful. However, the aim of this
Chapter was more modest than providing a full defence of Ecumenical Evidentialism.
All I wanted to do was to explore a novel evidentialist view, one that brings together
Evidence-first and Knowledge-first elements, and evaluate the prospects of such a view.
I believe the work in this Chapter shows that, overall, Ecumenical Evidentialism, when
developed further, could represent a view that we should take seriously.
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Concluding Remarks Part III
In Part III, I have addressed the following question:
How does Evidential Externalism understand the relation between evi-
dence and justification?
Previously in this Thesis, I have pointed out how Evidential Externalism, defined
as the denial of the supervenience thesis between evidence and non-factive mental
states, is silent on what justification is. Nevertheless, it is plausible to take Evidential
Externalism as a way of embracing Evidentialism. Following Conee and Feldman
(2004), I define Evidentialism as the thesis on which one’s justification supervenes on
one’s evidence. However, as I have already stressed, Evidentialism so defined does not
specify which kind of relation there is between evidence and justification. In Part III,
I have formulated various ways in which one can be an evidentialist: Evidence-first
Evidentialism, Knowledge-first Evidentialism, and Ecumenical Evidentialism.
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Conclusion
In this Thesis, I have focused on Evidential Externalism and I have addressed the
following three questions:
1. Does the Access Problem represent a real threat to Evidential Externalism?
2. Is Evidential Externalism committed to a sceptical variety of infallibilism?
3. How does Evidential Externalism understand the relation between evidence and
justification?
The arguments I have developed in the three Parts of this Thesis answer the ques-
tions respectively as follows:
1. The Access Problem represents a serious challenge for Pritchard’s Epistemolog-
ical Disjunctivism, but it does not pose a real threat to Williamson’s E=K.
2. The Infallibility Problem does not represent a serious threat to Williamson’s
E=K. Given that Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism is a claim restricted
to paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, it seems it is not committed to
any problematic variety of infallibilism.34
3. There are different ways in which an Evidential Externalist can cash out the
relation between evidence and justification. I have argued that we can under-
stand Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism and Williamson’s account of
evidence as two instances of, what I have called, Evidence-first and Knowledge-
first Evidentialism respectively. Furthermore I have defined a novel Evidential
Externalist view which I have called Ecumenical Evidentialism.
34In fact, following Dodd, I have pointed out that we should take seriously the threat of the Infallibility
Problem only when it comes to cases of knowledge of “what it is like outside the region of the world
with which [we] have direct perceptual contact” (Dodd, 2005: 644). However, I have shown that even
when focusing on these cases, we can realise infallibilism does not lead to scepticism.
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Where does this leave us? I believe we can summarise the main conclusion of this
thesis in the following way. On one hand, I have noticed that Pritchard’s Epistemo-
logical Disjunctivism can be classified as an instance of Evidence-first Evidentialism.
In fact, despite restricting its scope to paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge,
Epistemological Disjunctivism vindicates the Responsiveness Intuition underpinning
Evidence-first Evidentialism, namely, the intuition that takes doxastic justification to
be a matter of responding to the evidence one has (or, to use Pritchard’s terminology,
a matter of responding to the ‘rational support’ one has). Furthermore, I have noticed
that it seems to be in virtue of its accessibility requirement that Epistemological Dis-
junctivism can capture the orthodox Evidence-first view of doxastic justification. Cru-
cially, the accessibility requirement is exactly what gives rise to the Access Problem.
On the other hand, Williamson’s E=K successfully resists the Access Problem, insofar
as it is not committed to such a strong accessibility requirement. At the same time,
by reducing doxastic justification to knowledge, his account of justification, which
can be defined as an instance of Knowledge-first Evidentialism, does not vindicate the
Responsiveness Intuition. Interestingly, the Ecumenical Evidentialism I have devel-
oped in the last Chapter, is a Knowledge-first version of Evidential Externalism that
vindicates the Responsiveness Intuition. It vindicates the Responsiveness Intuition be-
cause it takes doxastic justification to be a matter of being evidence-responsive, and
it can do so without posing any strong accessibility requirement. It is an instance of
Evidential Externalism because, by embracing E=K, it denies the thesis that evidence
supervenes on non-factive mental states. It is Knowledge-first because, besides under-
standing cases of non-inferential knowledge in a Knowledge-first fashion, it explains
evidence and justification in terms of knowledge.
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